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The impact of financial difficulties, technical inefficiency, incorrect pricing, and 
poor quality of services under traditional public procurement, has led to large 
scale infrastructure project procurement turning to the private sector for 
financing, construction and operation. This is known as Public Private 
Partnership - Build Operate Transfer (PPP-BOT). 
Successful implementation of a PPP-BOT project is subject to appropriate 
risk management and successful negotiations and renegotiations especially in the 
development phase. Appropriate risk management is tied to risk and uncertainty 
modelling whereas successful negotiations and renegotiations are tied to the 
consensus of the main parties involved in the project. 
The major and key parties involved in PPP-BOT projects are concessionaire, 
government, sponsors and lenders each of which have diverse and conflicting 
objectives. Finding or arriving at an equilibrium solution as a strategically stable 
position that meets all parties’ objectives simultaneously within the PPP-BOT 
negotiation process avoids costly and lengthy negotiation and renegotiation 
processes. Consequently determining the negotiation positions in the 
development phase of PPP-BOT project and incorporating risk and uncertainty 
in the simulation process is crucial to achieve the project objectives. 
The general view in current literature is that game theory (GT) is a suitable 
method to simulate negotiations between parties and analyse their behaviour. In 
game theory, a cooperative game is a game where groups of players may 
enforce cooperative behaviour. An example is a coordination game, when 
players choose the strategies by a consensus decision-making process. On the 
contrary, a non-cooperative game is one in which players make decisions 
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independently. Pareto efficiency is a situation in which it is not possible to 
make a player better off without making other player(s) worse off. 
Additionally, it shows that Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is an appropriate 
technique for risk and uncertainty modelling. Moreover, Real Options Valuation 
(ROV) and Analysis is a mechanism that has the capability to improve 
negotiation results of a PPP-BOT project. From this it can be seen that PPP-BOT 
projects suffer from a lack of a systematic methodology that could help both the 
public and private sectors to find or arrive at a consensus solution as a 
strategically stable position. Likewise there is a lack of a comprehensive method 
for simulation that incorporates and addresses both risk and uncertainty 
simultaneously in the model. 
This thesis proposes a systematic negotiation mechanism for PPP-BOT 
infrastructure project based on the game theory, hybrid simulation and Real 
Options Valuation and Analysis which address the aforementioned gaps and 
shortcomings. 
Firstly, this mechanism helps parties to find equilibrium solutions based on 
the fuzzy game theory approach especially in the development phase. 
Consequently, it follows by determining each party’s negotiation position and 
corresponding payoff through applying an appropriate game type. This 
determination helps parties to analyse other parties’ behaviour and also mitigate 
the effects of costly and lengthy negotiation process. 
Secondly, the proposed fuzzy randomness Monte Carlo simulation (FR-
MCS) technique helps both parties to incorporate risk and uncertainty in the 
simulation simultaneously, which is a main limitation of conventional Monte 
Carlo simulation (MCS). FR-MCS results lead to well defined negotiation bound 
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(bargaining interval) of decision variables i.e. financial and contractual 
negotiation parameters which are called negotiable concession items (NCIs) and 
its associated cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) corresponding to specific 
confidence level for simulation output. Conversely, conventional MCS results in 
just one CDF and consequently a deterministic value corresponding to specific 
confidence level for simulation output. 
Finally, the financial viability of PPP-BOT project was assessed. The Real 
Options mechanism was proposed to retain the project financial viability at an 
acceptable level by all parties especially under the impact of catastrophic risks. A 
case study was conducted to examine the systematic negotiation mechanism for 
validation of models. 
By using the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism both public and 
private sectors could take advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. The 
proposed mechanism could facilitate negotiations on the verge of break down as 
well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have been slowed down. It 
supports to manage and also allocate risks between all parties in such a way that 
is fair to all. 
However, as this research did not consider third parties, more research is 
needed to identify and address the role of third parties such as insurers in 
addition to major and key parties, i.e. concessionaire, government, sponsors and 
lenders in PPP-BOT projects. 
 
Keywords: Negotiation, Fuzzy Game Theory, Simulation, Fuzzy 
Randomness, Uncertainty Modelling, Financial Viability Mechanisms, Financial 
Modelling, Real Options Valuation and Analysis, PPP-BOT Projects. 
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𝐵𝑂𝑇  Capacity of the BOT plant in year t 
𝐼𝐶𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑇  Investment cost of the BOT plant in year t 
𝑉𝐶𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑇  Variable cost of the BOT plant in year t 
𝐹𝐶𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑇  Fixed cost of the BOT plant in year t 
𝐹𝐶𝑡
𝑈 Fixed cost of the utility in year t 
𝑉𝐶𝑡
𝑈 Variable cost of the host utility in year t 
𝑃𝐵 Breakeven cost for BOT’s electricity- marginal cost 
𝑃𝐴 Average cost of the host utility 
𝐶0 Total cost of power generating without the BOT contract 
C𝐵𝑂𝑇  Total cost of power generating with the BOT contract 
Rev𝑡 Revenue of BOT plant in year t 
𝐶𝑡
𝑝
 BOT plant Production costs in year t 
𝑓𝑈 Total payment to BOT plant 
𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 Coefficients 
k Biding strategy coefficient 
C𝑟 
Cost of regulation for government 
C𝑝 
Cost of profit maximization for private investor 
𝛼 Confidence level 
𝜇 Uncertain level 
𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑎 Actual revenue in year t 
xvi 
 
𝑟𝑓 Guaranteed minimum return on equity (Min-GEROR) 
𝑟𝑐 Guaranteed maximum return on equity (Max-GEROR) 
𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛  Guaranteed minimum revenue in year t 
𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥  Guaranteed maximum revenue in year t 
𝑆𝐹𝑡 Shortfall in revenue in year t 
𝑅𝑡 Excess cash flow as repayment in year t 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Infrastructure development is a crucial target for a country’s economic 
development. Traditionally this target was fulfilled solely by the government. In 
the last decades, due to barriers such as shortage in financing, governments 
especially in developing countries have moved to use private sector capabilities 
to meet demand for infrastructure development in a timely manner. On this 
movement the governments focus on new collaboration methods. 
A popular project procurement method, the Public Private Partnership - 
Build Operate Transfer (PPP-BOT), has been drawing increasing attention from 
not only developing countries but also developed countries. There are many 
reasons for this. First, there are ever-growing pressures on public budgets as 
public borrowing is increasing. Second, there is evidence that the private sector is 
usually more efficient than the public sector, even in developed countries. 
This chapter initially reviews the concept and characteristics of PPP-BOT 
projects. After identifying the difficulties and challenges in implementation of 
PPP-BOT projects, the research gaps, objectives and scopes are presented. 
This chapter will proceed to present the research methodology followed by a 
description of the thesis structure. 
1.1. Concept of PPP-BOT Projects 
Under the PPP-BOT scheme the client, usually a government agency, grants 
a concession under concession agreement to the concessionaire, usually private 
sector consortium, who has the obligation to finance, design and builds an 
infrastructure project. In return, the concessionaire is entitled to operate the 
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completed project for a specified period, called concession period (fixed or 
variable), at the end of which the project must be transferred to the agency free of 
charge. During the concession period, all the revenues generated from the project 
go to the concessionaire’s account in order to repay the financing and investment 
costs, cover operation and maintenance costs, and make a margin of profit to 
concessionaire (Delmon, 2009; Levy, 1996; Tiong et al., 1992). On the one 
hand, the government is concerned with the purchase of services/products rather 
than acquiring assets in order to meet the demand for the services/products with 
reasonable and justifiable price and cost to end users. The government’s 
objective is to build sufficient infrastructures for public usage. The strategy 
adopted by government is to procure a project by the project’s anticipated 
revenues rather than by borrowings or budgeted funds. The goal of the PPP-
BOT scheme is therefore to ease the infrastructure development without 
increasing the financial burden of the public sector (Delmon, 2009; Levy, 
1996; Tiong et al., 1992). 
 
Figure 1-1 the concept of the PPP-BOT scheme 
From the private sector’s viewpoint; the concern is the financial viability of 



































private sector wishes the PPP-BOT project provide investment opportunities that 
will meet the needs of enough end users/customers to cover the financing and 
investment costs and earn a reasonable profit as well. If a project is not only 
financially viable but also economically viable, PPP-BOT scheme can offer win-
win solutions to government agency, concessionaire, lenders and end-user 
through a joint effort aiming at the realization of financial, social and economic 
objectives. The financially viability is referred to financial return i.e. return on 
capital (equity) which is the concern of the private sector and economically 
viability is referred to economical return i.e. cost-benefit analysis which is the 
concern of the public sector and end user. The concept of discussion thus far can 
be diagrammatically expressed in Figure 1-1. 
1.2. Characteristics of PPP-BOT Projects 
Compared with traditional project procurement methods, the PPP-BOT 
scheme has a number of unique and specific characteristics. The major ones are 
listed as follow: 
 Lengthier and costly development period; 
 More complex contractual arrangements and agreements; 
 More complex project packages and financing; 
 Negotiations dominated by the financial viability; 
 Balanced risk allocation. 
PPP-BOT schemes consist not only design and construction phase but also 
pre-concession (development) and operation phases. Thus they require more 
participants because of the need for finance and expertise. This makes the 
contractual arrangements and agreements more complex. In PPP-BOT 
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projects, the initial private promoters to whom the concession is awarded to 
them form a joint venture or a consortium Project Company (PC) which is also 
called Special Purpose Vehicle/ Company (SPV/SPC). A typical PPP-BOT 
project usually includes main parties involved in the project, namely, a 
government agency (public sector), who grants the concession and ultimately 
owns the project after transfer; a concessionaire (private sector), who is 
responsible for financing, designing, building and operating the project; 
lenders (banks and financial institutes), who provide fund in the form of 
loan/debt to the project; investors (stakeholders), who provide fund in the form 
of equity to the project; a constructor, who undertakes the design and 
construction work; an operator, who undertakes the operation of the project; 
end users (off takers), who purchase the off take or use the facility itself; 
suppliers, who supply equipment and/or raw materials; and finally insurer 
(insurance company), who insure the project. The basic structure of a PPP-
BOT project with important agreements involved in its negotiations and 





Figure 1-2 Typical PPP-BOT Project Structure 
Based on this structure, the essential contracts of PPP-BOT projects are 
presented below:  
 Concession agreement: The government grants the concession to the 
concessionaire (Project Company). The concession is the right to build, 
own and operate the facility and often acquire most or all of the service 
provided by the facility. One of the most important issues in a concession 
agreement is the length of the concession agreement “concession period”. 
The concession period (CP) consists of construction duration (CD) and 
operation period (OP). Concession period is the company’s operation 
timespan of the facility needed to compensate the front end equity 
investment and repay the debt and interest borrowed from the lenders. The 
first type of project is contract-led project e.g. power plant which sells 
power to the power grid operator. The revenue is generated via the 





























market-led project e.g. toll road or toll bridge which generates the project’s 
revenue. 
 Loan agreement: It is a contract between lenders and the project company, 
the purpose of which is to provide debt. It is a critical contract particularly 
for a successful PPP-BOT project financing. In practice, the average of debt 
to equity ratio is 70/30 (Chang and Chen, 2001; Buljevich and Park, 1999; 
World bank, 2014). The equity capital complements debt financing. Equity 
investment is compensated by dividends, but equity investor is last in 
priority for its repayment. So it is called a risk capital compared to credit 
capital provided by the lender. 
 Off take contract: If the operational output of the PPP-BOT project cannot 
be sold directly to end users, off take contacts are used to ensure the sale of 
products/services usually in the form of “take or pay” or “take and pay” 
agreements, user-fee and availability-based PPPs. 
The concessionaire is involved in the life cycle of PPP-BOT project 
development. In the development phase from initiating the project to signing 
the concession agreement (effective date (ED) and closing date (CD)) and 
commercial operating date (COD), the concessionaire may have to be 
involved in various time-consuming and costly activities and negotiations. 
Usually, a long development period may result from one or more of the 
following: 




 Investigate technical feasibility and assess financial viability: estimate 
capital and operating costs and predict revenue streams under risks and 
uncertainties; 
 Set up a project company and provide required funds for the project; 
convince investors and lenders that the project is financially viable in 
order to raise funds required. Usually complicated negotiation would 
be required on financing; 
 Convince the government to adopt PPP-BOT strategy (unsolicited 
project); usually, unsolicited proposals for PPP projects offer new 
technology. For instance, the Philippine PPP Centre as government 
agency only accepts unsolicited proposals that are innovative and offer 
new technology as mandated by the Philippine BOT law. The 
reviewing process and its mechanism for unsolicited proposals for 
infrastructure projects are not same as planned and solicited projects. 
So it typically leads to a long development period. 
 Bid for the project: a tender including technical solutions and financial 
package; 
 Proceed in problematic and unwieldy negotiation process with the 
government in order to sign the concession agreement. 
So, PPP-BOT project is characterized with long maturation and 
development period. The development phase is a time-consuming and costly 
process to award the concession and includes high front-end costs. In short, 
the negotiations in the development phase, especially between public sector 
(government agency) and private sector (concessionaire), play the crucial and 
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essential role, and it will be focused more in the following sections of this 
thesis. 
PPP-BOT scheme raises the capital through project financing instead of 
direct financing. So it comprises complex project financing packages. Project 
financing is also called off-balance sheet (OBS) financing. Off-balance sheet 
financing means a company does not include a liability on its balance sheet. In 
PPP-BOT schemes, the capital costs are normally reimbursed just from the 
project revenues. A reliable revenue stream projection provides security for 
lending banks and will encourage equity participation. Therefore, financial 
viability of the project is dependent upon the ability of the revenue stream to 
sustain a satisfactory profit margin over the project costs such that the equity 
and loans can repay within the concession period. 
Various risks and uncertainties exist in PPP-BOT projects. Figure 1-3 
shows a diagram categorizing the risks and uncertainties found on PPP 
projects from literature. Table 1-1 shows the identified main risks specific to 
PPP versus common risks in all construction projects. 
 
Figure 1-3 Risks and uncertainties in PPP-BOT Project, Fish bone diagram 
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Table 1-1 Main risks in PPP Project versus construction project 
PPP project Risk category Construction project 
Currency exchange restriction and rate, interest rate, 
Funding (High ﬁnance cost), Inﬂation rate volatility 
Financing Delay in payments for claim, cash 
flow difficulties, lack of financial 
resources 
Political risk, Change in government laws and 
regulation, Poor public decision-making process, 
Investor’s expected return rate 
Development Bureaucracy, delay in project 
approval and permit, improper 
design, change of scope 
force majeure, Geotechnical conditions, cost overruns, 
completion delay 
Construction Land acquisition, Poor supervision, 
design variation (by the client), , 
inadequate scheduling (tight project 
schedule) and cost estimation, site 
safety, insolvency of supplier, Lack 
of coordination between project 
participants 
Operational revenue below expectation, demand 
decline, Low operating productivity, O&M cost 
overrun, Expropriation or nationalization of assets 
Operation Compliance with law and regulation 
for environment issues, pollution 
 
Risk allocation among parties involved is the centre of risk management 
process. The generally accepted principles of risk allocation are (Tan and 
Tiong, 2011; Smith, 1995): 
 Risks allocate to those parties who are best able to evaluate, control, 
manage, bear the cost, and benefit from the assumption of risks; 
 Assumed risk has an associated and unavoidable cost which must be 
presumed somewhere in the cost-revenue model; the allocation should be 
symmetrical (balanced) in terms of benefits and liabilities; and 
 Remained risks and liabilities are best shared. 
Proper allocation of risk reduces the overall cost to the project and promotes 
Value for Money (VFM) to the public sector. However, in PPP-BOT schemes, 
the private sector is expected to take the substantial burden of risk. Since the 
responsibility of project financing is shifted from public sector to private 
sector, the concessionaire have to take financial risks such as foreign exchange 
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and interest rates fluctuations. Furthermore, a long operation and maintenance 
period makes the concessionaire exposed to revenues risks and political risks 
such as sovereign risk and instability risk, besides the risks encountered in 
traditional methods such as cost overrun and completion delay resulting from 
construction difficulties. 
The life cycle process of a BOT-PPP project development is classified into 
following stages: feasibility study to submit the initial proposal; tender to 
negotiate concession and contracting; design and construction; operation and 
maintenance; transfer and post-concession operation. 
The host government plays an important role in PPP-BOT scheme not only 
to take up a successful project, but also to rescue and being the insurer of last 
resort for unsuccessful projects. The government must make sure that the 
project is feasible and suitable for PPP-BOT scheme. If a project is not self-
financing, the government must provide motivations and incentives to make 
project financially attractive to the private sector. The following incentives 
proved to be effective for PPP-BOT scheme: Provide revenue stream 
guarantees, improvement of cash flow e.g.: government involvement in equity 
investment, retain some risks, provide direct loan or loan subsidies and loan 
guarantees, provide some coverage for outstanding debt and other financial 
obligations for uninsurable risks, and other incentives such as tax exemption. 
Many common decision problems can be thought of as a game. For 
example in the development phase, before effective date milestone, both 
parties (concessionaire and government agency) meet each other around the 
negotiation table, maybe on several occasions, in order to make decision to 
promote project and allocate of responsibilities, risks and benefits to each 
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party. This game has been called bargaining-game. This bargaining-game can 
be categorised by types of objectives and decision variables. 
The first and most famous bargaining are negotiations over negotiable 
concession items (NCIs): concession period, tariff/toll and royalty which are 
the most important concession items. Although there are few methodologies 
available for helping to determine the value of these variables, risk and 
uncertainty modelling techniques, especially financial risk and uncertainty 
management simulation, can help to determine concession period, tariff/toll 
and royalty under risks and uncertainties. The second bargaining is over 
subsidy and claim. If both risk management (financial risk management tools) 
and bargaining process simultaneously have been considered, it is possible to 
achieve a model with multi-objectives and best allocation of risks. 
This research seeks to show how the bargaining process and financial risk 
management can influence the project development and each party’s final gain 
and payoff. Further it also identifies various approaches that can be adopted to 
manage the problems previously discussed. 
The aforementioned characteristics of PPP-BOT scheme present difficulties 
and challenges with high risks and uncertainties for the project. This is more 
significant in negotiations especially in the development phase. As a result it 
makes negotiations longer and more costly. This study evaluates the above 
problems and proposes a comprehensive method and mechanism to find or 
arrive at the solutions that are equitable for main parties involved under 
uncertainties and risks and simultaneously performing the risk management that 
meet the parties’ objectives. 
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1.3. Research Gaps, Scope and Objective 
1.3.1. Research Gaps: Motivation for Required Studies 
A literature review was conducted to examine the current state of knowledge 
with respect to the development of long term infrastructure projects (PPP-BOT 
projects), and risk management. Over 100 journal articles and other publications 
pertaining to PPP-BOT projects were collected and reviewed. In light of the 
above literature review, some research gaps have been identified. These gaps 
have led to the current research. These research gaps are discussed below. 
1.3.1.1. Negotiation-Based Risk Management 
According to research records on failure and success in PPP-BOT projects, 
interviews with the PPP-BOT project experts and managers and also the author’s 
experiences in some PPP-BOT projects, the crucial and essential part of the long 
term infrastructure projects is negotiation and renegotiation. Study on negotiation 
and renegotiation is helpful to simulate the negotiation aimed to analyse, 
characterize and forecast parties’ behaviour in the negotiations and observe 
players’ tendency and characteristic of behaviour. So, risk management of 
these projects must be done from a negotiation perspective. To the best of the 
writer’s knowledge, few researchers have viewed risk management through this 
perspective. There is a lack of framework and modelling methods that capture 
and interpret the negotiation standpoint in risk management process. To this end, 
models and tools that are able to demonstrate and simulate negotiations between 
parties and their behaviour are needed. 
Consensus of all players in negotiations is critical and important to ensure the 
success of PPP-BOT project. Although Delphi method has been introduced to 
address this issue, there are still some limitations including uncertainty 
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modelling. There is a lack of systematic approach/method that can find or arrive 
at consensus negotiation positions in PPP-BOT projects under uncertainty and 
risk. To the best of the writer’s knowledge, the research in this area is sparse. 
1.3.1.2. Uncertainty and Risk Modelling 
PPP-BOT project as a long term infrastructure project is exposed to both risk 
and uncertainty. Risk (randomness characteristic) that refers to probabilistic 
features is expressed by stochastic models (probability theory and statistical 
methods) and uncertainty (fuzziness characteristic) that refers to non-
probabilistic features is represented by fuzzy sets (possibility theory). 
Although the existing approaches represent how to overcome the risks, there is a 
lack of framework and modelling methods that demonstrates how uncertainty 
can be modelled properly to overcome it. Also, there is a lack of framework and 
modelling methods that interprets what is the best combination method for risks 
and uncertainties propagation in the whole model, particularly in simulation and 
financial model. To the best of the writer’s knowledge, the research in this area is 
sparse especially its application in the research area of PPP-BOT projects. 
1.3.1.3. Negotiable Concession Items (NCIs) 
In viewing PPP-BOT project through the negotiation perspective, the 
determination of negotiable concession items (NCIs) as well as decision 
variables from different perspective under uncertainties and risks is important. 
This enables the management of uncertainty and risk in a structured manner. 
Furthermore, it helps to answer the commonly asked question which is “how to 
pursue a win-win-win scenario among the public sector (government), the 
private sector (concessionaire), and ultimate general public users (end-users)”. 
The research in this area needs more consideration and works to incorporate 
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group decision making (multi criteria decision making) and uncertainty and risk 
modelling. 
1.3.1.4. Financial Viability Mechanisms 
Financial vulnerability is crucial and critical in PPP-BOT project as a long 
term infrastructure project.  PPP-BOT project is exposed to uncertainty and risk 
especially the catastrophic risk which may leads to project bankruptcy. In order 
to address this issue, methods, models and tools are needed to move on dynamic 
situation properly to evaluate financial mechanisms for PPP-BOT project. 
Further these methods are also required to manage and mitigate the risks and 
uncertainties involved. Dynamic situation means the changing situation that 
permits simulation inputs follow either probability distributions (objective 
parameters) or membership functions (subjective parameters) or even their 
combination. The significant of the dynamic situation compare to the static 
situation is relied on taking uncertainties and risks into account for decision 
making process. The uncertainty and risk’s analysis is in such way that 
simulation outputs reflect any probable and possible scenario for simulation 
inputs. To the best of the writer’s knowledge, few researchers have worked on it. 
1.3.2. Research Scope and Objectives 
The main aim of this research is to develop an integrated negotiation-based 
risk management framework as a systematic approach and a corresponding 
mechanism which is able to manage both risk and uncertainty involved in 
complex infrastructure development. Another aim is to develop and propose a 
method to find or arrive at consensus negotiation positions for the main parties 
involved in the project. By using this mechanism and method, the parties’ 
behaviour in negotiations can be realized and analysed properly. The main 
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research objective is to develop an integrated risk management methodology 
which generates and evaluates scenarios in uncertain situations and establishes 
the solutions that are equilibrium solutions for main parties (e.g., based on the 
win-win-win strategy for public sector, private sector and end users). To achieve 
this overall aim and objective, the main sub-objectives are to: 
Sub-objective 1: Develop a framework for Negotiation-based risk 
management in PPP-BOT projects 
After developing a conceptual and practical model to enhance the 
understanding of parties’ behaviour in PPP-BOT projects using game theory, a 
framework and mechanism for negotiation-based risk management in PPP-
BOT projects is developed to find superior negotiation positions based on 
Pareto optimality under uncertainty. This framework and mechanism improve 
the understanding of the negotiation position of the main parties involved. It 
also contributes to facilitate analysing the parties’ behaviour. 
Sub-objective 2: Develop a simulation model under uncertainty and risk for 
both static and dynamic negotiation scenarios 
The main goal in developing this simulation model is to demonstrate 
mathematical modules to determine optimal negotiable concession items 
(NCIs) and decision variables based on knowledge and experiences under 
uncertainties and risks. As mentioned, existing methods for risk evaluation 
mostly employ risk modelling approaches. The proposed method explains the 
approaches of overcoming the uncertainty and risk. Furthermore, it shows 
uncertainty and risk combination method in simulation by considering fuzzy 
randomness. Finally, it estimates the payoff for both public and private sectors 
under uncertainty and risk. 
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Sub-objective 3: Use the decision making model under uncertainty and risk 
to evaluate financial mechanisms for PPP-BOT project in order to manage 
financial vulnerability of project financial return 
Methods and models will be examined and proposed to move on dynamic 
situations and negotiations properly which is crucial to overcome the financial 
vulnerability especially under catastrophic risk events. Moreover, the final 
step is considering Real Options Valuation (ROV) as a mechanism to secure 
the return for both main parties, particularly the concessionaire. 
The results of this research contribute to: 
1. Understanding the negotiation positions of both public and private 
sectors in development phase of PPP-BOT project in order to 
determine the feasible negotiation space and find the superior 
equilibrium solutions. 
2. Proposing fuzzy randomness simulation to find the optimal negotiable 
concession items under uncertainties and risks. 
3. Proposing and examining the proper mechanisms tailored for PPP-
BOT negotiations that could arrive at consensus negotiation positions 
as equilibrium solutions in the case that no solution is found. 
The scope of this research covers the three main areas in development 
phase of PPP-BOT projects: Negotiation based risk management, equilibrium 
solutions for main parties involved in the project simultaneously and decision 
making under uncertainty and risk in development phase of PPP-BOT 
projects. 
It is understood that there is a wide range of uncertainty and risk in PPP-
BOT project. From the negotiation perspective, the uncertainty and risk can be 
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considered as negotiable concession items (NCIs) in development phase and 
are also incorporated in this study in the form of risk with financial 
consequence. Detailed analysis on these types of uncertainty and risk in other 
phases is beyond the scope of this work.  
1.4. Research Methodology 
The big research problem that this thesis tries to address (deal with) is 
negotiation problems in development phase. The thesis proposes a mechanism 
to find or arrive at an equilibrium solution as a strategically stable position. 
The thesis tries to apply and connect three techniques: Game theory, 
Simulation, and Real Options Valuation under uncertainty and risk for PPP-
BOT projects. 
The flowchart shown in Figure 1-5 depicts the research methodology 
adopted in this study to achieve the research objectives. In the initial stage, 
different types of research data related to PPP-BOT projects were collected for 
the subsequent studies. The collected data could be classified into three main 
categories: academic publication, case studies and project data collected via 
designed survey, and practice knowledge and experiences obtained through 
expert interview. 
The author visited different parties involved in PPP-BOT projects 
including the public and private sectors as well as consultant companies. The 
author also attended coordination meetings between the government and 
concessionaire to understand the current practice of infrastructure 
development through PPP-BOT approach as well as to collect project data. 
Personal interviews were arranged individually with project managers and 
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experts over two study trips to actual projects site in Iran. 
These interviews and visits were required to understand the current gaps in 
PPP-BOT projects implementation process and to identify potentials for 
improvement. By presenting the contributions of this research, the author 
could motivate the public and private sectors to apply the research results in 
infrastructure development using PPP-BOT approach in Iran. 
There are three major parts in this research. In the first part, game theory is 
used to develop a game model for negotiations in development phase to 
analyse the parties’ behaviour and find superior equilibrium solutions. This 
model will be extended into uncertain environment, by proposing fuzzy game 
theory, which will be developed to capture the uncertainty feature of PPP-
BOT projects negotiations. It fulfils the first research objective. 
The second part is simulation. Long term infrastructure projects projection 
is subject to change due to both risks and uncertainties. Fuzzy randomness 
Monte Carlo simulation (FR-MCS) technique is proposed to cater both 
stochastic and fuzzy input variables. This leads to determine agreeable NCIs 
under uncertainties and risks. It addresses the second research objective. 
The third part is Options and Real Options Valuation and Analysis. A 
major advantage of real options analysis is over NPV analysis. It highlights an 
appropriate procedure for analysing financial valuation under uncertainty. 
Real Options Valuation (ROV) represents a superior tool for capturing 
managerial flexibility. Also the advantage of Real Options technique is to 
facilitate and resolve tied negotiations. It meets the third research objective. 
The last step will be implementation of the models and concepts developed 
in previous parts by developing an integrated model. At this step the validation 
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of models will be verified via real case studies and related projects 
experiences. Figure 1-4 shows a holistic approach to PPP-BOT negotiations 
management to find win-win solution. Figure 1-5 represents flow chart of 
research methodology. The answer to the question “why do we use Game 
theory, simulation, fuzzy and options?” will be discussed later in each related 
chapter in detail. Research stages of the proposed mechanism to find or arrive 
at censuses for PPP-BOT negotiation toward negotiation-based risk 
management is demonstrated in Figure 1-6. 
 
Figure 1-4 A holistic approach to PPP-BOT negotiations management 
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Figure 1-6 Research stages of the proposed mechanism to find or arrive at censuses for PPP-
BOT negotiation toward negotiation-based risk management 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
The dissertation is organized in eight chapters, as shown in thesis outline 
represented in Figure 1-7. First, the background of the research is introduced 
in Chapter 1, introduction. This chapter also presents research gaps and 
Start 
Stage 1 (Game Theory) 
 Define the project’s players 
 Define the players strategies 
 
Stage 2 (Simulation) 
 Identify input variables 
 Risk modelling: define risky 
factors and probability 
distribution 
 Uncertainty modelling: define 
uncertain factors and fuzzy 
membership function 
 Define output decision 
variables 
 Define Simulation process and 
input-output relationship 
 
Stage 3 (Game Theory) 
 Construct payoff table, using 
simulation output and results 







Stage 4 (Real Options) 
 Identify suitable options 
that create enough value 
and new windows for 
negotiations 
 Define and add the 
options to simulation 
process and concession 




purposes. It ends by the research methodology. Second, the literature review is 
presented in the next chapter, Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is to develop a game theory 
model aim to determine the superior negotiation position under uncertainty 
and risk. The detailed description on fuzzy randomness simulation-based risk 
management (FR-SRM) and its application in negotiation simulation to 
determine negotiable concession items (NCIs) are presented in chapters 4 and 
5 respectively. Options-based negotiation management is considered in 
chapter 6. Chapter 7 is the case study. The last chapter, chapter 8, is 
conclusion and future works. This chapter concludes the research findings and 
recommends what could be done as further studies. The general structure of 





Figure 1-7 Thesis organization 
  
Chapter2. Literature review 
 Game theory, negotiations 
 Simulation, risk assessment 
 Uncertainty and risk modelling and quantification 
 Real options valuation (ROV) 
 
 Chapter3. Develop Game Theory model 
 Simulate the negotiation behavior 
 Finding the superior negotiation positions 
 Fuzzy game theory 
 
Chapter6. Options-based negotiation 
management 
 Government supports valuation 
 Early fund generation option 
 Equitable bound for guaranteed rate of return 
 
Chapter7. Case study and analysis 
 PPP-BOT power plant projects 
Chapter4. Fuzzy randomness 
simulation (FR-MCS) 
 Hybrid simulation approach 
 Determining negotiation bound for NCIs 
Chapter5. Determining negotiable 
concession items (NCIs) 
 Determining NCIs as an interval via its 
fuzzy CDF for all parties. 
 Consensus on NCIs via fuzzy numbers 
Chapter1. Introduction 
 Research Motivation and Background 
 Thesis Objectives, Scope and Organization 
 
 
Chapter8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Summary of research contribution 
 Limitations 
 Direction for future research 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a broad overview of the background relevant literature in 
order to allow readers to understand underlying concepts employed in PPP-BOT 
negotiations analysis and risk management methodologies and mitigation 
mechanisms in the development phase. Furthermore, it helps readers to assess 
how these methodologies and mechanisms incorporate risk and uncertainty 
modelling for determining feasible negotiable concession items (NCIs). Future 
chapters will present more detailed aspects of literature relevant to the content of 
the chapters. 
2.1 General Discussion 
Long term infrastructure projects such as PPP-BOT projects are one kind of 
contract strategy, which has been applied to diverse kind of projects/sectors in 
different countries with varied level of economic development and different legal 
systems. This requires researchers to study PPP-BOT project from various 
perspectives and aspects by use of different methods. 
PPP-BOT scheme has captured many researchers’ attention recently since 
this kind of project was introduced in the infrastructure development. A 
number of scholarly works have studied PPP-BOT project from diverse 
perspectives. From a research methodologies perspective, some literature 
reviews the PPP-BOT scheme from an overall standpoint. Some literature 
highlights special problems. Some researchers utilize case-based research 
methodologies, by which the complexity and problems of implementing a 
PPP-BOT project and adopting this strategy are illustrated through case 
studies. Some use survey-based research methodologies, by which the impact 
25 
 
of different PPP-BOT contract components is evaluated through 
questionnaires and/or interviews. Occasionally the combination of case-based 
and survey-based research methods is used. Also some models are developed 
by some researchers. 
In this review, journal papers relevant to PPP-BOT projects published in the 
following six leading construction management journals within the last two 
decades were mainly considered: the ASCE Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management (JCEM), Construction Management and 
Economics (CME), International Journal of Project Management (IJPM), 
Journal of Management in Engineering (JME), Engineering Construction and 
Architectural Management (ECAM), and Building Research and Information 
(BRI). Beyond these journal papers, some well-known conference papers and 
technical reports of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB) 
are considered as well (See Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1 Number of articles which are related to PPP-BOT studies in the selected journals 




Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 45 
Construction Management and Economics  30 
International Journal of Project Management 30 
Engineering Construction and Architectural Management 18 
Journal of Management in Engineering 8 
Building Research and Information 5 
 
According to Tang et al. (2010), there is a growing research interest in PPP-
BOT (e.g. there were 15 published papers in 1998 and 1999, while this rose to 
34 in the years 2006-07). 
Tang et al. (2010) classified the papers of interest under the research 
methodologies they used. Case study has been mostly used (60 papers), 
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because it is easier for scholars to draw some implications from real cases than 
from other research methods. Additionally, survey and literature review 
ranked second and third with 45 and 35 papers respectively, followed by 
interview (20 papers). There are also two papers using workshops to get 
opinions from academic scholars and industry practitioners. Many researchers 
have attempted to improve the operation of PPP-BOT projects by identifying 
key aspects of these projects (Tiong, 1996; Erridge and Greer, 2002; Grimsey 
and Lewis, 2002; Li et al., 2005a, b, c). One of the most important issues in 
PPP-BOT scheme is to adequately identify, model and anticipate the 
behaviour of parties involved in the project. This is especially true during the 
negotiations of the development phase. Consequently, it is necessary to carry 
out research into these issues. In addition to lessons learned from case studies 
(James et al., 2005), researchers have suggested the advantages of various 
aspects of PPPs, which include: 
 Understanding and improved partnership between the public sector and 
the private sector (Erridge and Greer, 2002; Ysa, 2007; Kumaraswamy 
et al., 2005; Zhang and Kumaraswamy, 2001a, b; Zhang et al., 2002; 
Zhang, 2004a, b). 
 Improved maturation of contract in the development phase (Ho, 2006; 
Tranfield et al., 2005). 
 Proper risk management and allocation (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; Li 




 Appropriate financial viability analysis (Akintoye et al., 2003a,b; 
Norwood and Mansfield, 1999; Huang and Chou, 2006; Saunders, 
1998). 
 Clearer government policies and strategies (Hart, 2003; Chen and 
Subprasom, 2007; Qiu and Wang, 2011). 
In the current research, based on the research gaps and purposes discussed 
in chapter 1, the topics and problems of the PPP-BOT research area that are 
focused by researchers in the literature review, are categorized and discussed 
in five main categories: relationships and partnership, risk management and 
allocation, financing mechanisms under risk and uncertainty, simulation and 
concession items optimization (such as concession period), and Real Options 
Valuation and Analysis. Various research methodologies have been used to 
solve research problems of these categories. A detailed review of these 
categories is presented in the following sections. 
2.2 Research on Relationship, Partnership and Negotiation 
The relationship between organizations within the public and private sectors is 
perceived to be crucial to the success of PPP projects because a poor 
relationship, partnership and negotiation would easily lead to 
misunderstanding and conflict. Therefore, the existing literature has mainly 
focused on examining what factors facilitate or inhibit the relationship, 
partnership and negotiation. 
For example, Chan et al. (2003), when conducting an industry-wide survey 
study, found that “improved relationship and communication amongst project 
participants” were the most significant benefits obtained from the use of 
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partnering in PPP projects. Through interviews, Consoli (2006) found that 
various demands of stakeholders, contractual arrangements, and different 
philosophical standpoints created friction between the parties involved in PPP 
project. Apparently, friction is the major course for poor relationship and 
partnership. 
Furthermore, researchers have found that public and private sectors 
relationships in PPP projects were determined by the nature of relational 
contracting and relationship management (Erridge and Greer, 2002; Ysa, 
2007; Smyth and Edkins, 2007). Through a Malaysian case study, Abdul- Aziz 
(2001) claimed that once privatization has taken place, re-involvement of the 
public sector, particularly through the injection of new funds, should be 
refrained as much as possible because of its lack of expert experience and 
possible social impact of the project. 
Since a fair deal is what project parties should achieve, researchers have 
studied the success factors of how to create win-win relations by comparing 
various kinds of PPP-BOT infrastructure development in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and China (Wang et al., 1999, 2000 a,b,c; Wang and Tiong, 
2000; Zhang et al., 1998; Zhang and Kumaraswamy, 2001b). Their studies 
were intended to identify the strengths of successful approaches and provide 
lessons from less successful or abortive projects. In consequence, proper 
maintenance of relations can be achieved through effective management of 
political risks, foreign exchange, and revenue risks. 
Zhang (2004a, b, 2005a, b) carried out a knowledge-mining process to 
draw experience and lessons learned from international PPP practices and to 
refine experiential and expert knowledge underlying the subconscious 
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decision-making process in the field of project financing. Zhang (2005a) 
developed five main critical success factors (CSFs) including favourable 
investment environment, economic viability, and reliable concessionaire 
consortium with strong technical strength, sound financial package, and 
appropriate risk allocation via reliable contractual arrangements for a win-win 
relationship, each of which includes a number of success sub-factors. 
Researchers have also related the relationship issue to concessioner 
selection. For choosing suitable concessioner, researchers have not only 
suggested benchmarking the ‘best’ selection practices, but have also 
emphasized ‘innovative’ concessioner selection approaches to be used by 
large public agencies, in which relationship is always regarded as a key 
criterion (Zhang, 2004a,b; Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000a,b).  
Han and Diekmann (2001) discussed current approaches related to entry 
decisions into international construction markets. They developed a 
comprehensive approach by adopting the cross-impact analysis (CIA) method. 
The CIA-Based Go-No-Go Decision Model is proposed to make stable and 
systematic go/no-go decisions for international and traditional competitive 
public sector projects, which are either financed by governments or funded by 
international agencies. They focused on essential risks, current approaches 
used to make go/no-go decisions and most appropriate approach for risk-based 
go/no-go decision formalism associated with international construction 
projects. They highlighted the necessity of finding the primary sources of risks 




Research shows that the game theory principles have been applied in PPP 
procurement, particularly during negotiations that immediately precede the 
concession agreement: pre-contract negotiations. Ho. (2005 and 2006) applied 
game theory to analyse the information asymmetry problem during the 
procurement of a BOT project (bid compensation) and its implication in 
project financing and government policy (Financial renegotiation model). Ho 
and Liu (2004) developed a game theoretic model for analysing the 
behavioural dynamics of builders and owners in construction claims. In PPP-
BOT projects, conflicts and strategic interactions between public and private 
parties are common, and thus game theory can be a natural tool to analyse the 
problems of interest.  
Usually, a series of negotiations and renegotiations may arise and come after 
the award of project, especially in the case that financial risks lead to the 
project’s failure due to revenue shortage or increasing costs, e.g. if an unexpected 
event causes a decline in revenues or sharp rise in costs. This would hinder the 
SPV/PC to pay the project debts, operating expenses or dividend payment. In this 
case, the concession period may be lengthened, user fees may be adjusted 
upwards, and tax breaks may be given, and so on. In many cases, only one item 
is negotiated, e.g. lengthening concession period. This simplifies the 
negotiation, and if adjusting a variable will restore a reasonable return, it is the 
best way forward. Here, the onus is on the SPV/PC to show that it requires a 
lengthening of the concession period by x years, and why a certain rate of return 
to equity is required. To do this, the SPV/PC needs to show how its return on 
equity is affected by variations in critical variables. Shen et al. (2007) utilized 
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game theory to find equilibrium solution for negotiation over concession 
period, one of the most important negotiable concession items (NCIs). 
Generally, need to determine when and how the government would rescue a 
distressed PPP-BOT project. Typically, government agency provide incentives 
supports, guarantee support and financial and incentives support, to avoid the 
loss to SPV. Research on rescuing plans and capacity choice, has also been 
conducted. For instance, Ho (2006) developed a game theory based model, 
which determines when and how the government would rescue a distressed 
project and what impacts the government’s rescue behaviour on project 
procurement and management. By establishing an effective rescue model, the 
government would be able to map out the blueprint for the public, develop 
policies, and negotiate with the concessionaire (Chang and Chen, 2001). 
Javed A.A. et al. (2014) adopted an experimental approach based on game 
theory to evaluate the effectiveness of different strategies for negotiating 
changes. A multi-stage bargaining process using the ‘z-Tree’ software was 
designed to simulate four change scenarios with three output specification 
versions encompassing different change management strategies in a computer 
laboratory. Under each change scenario, pairs of public and private participants 
negotiated on the sharing of additional costs incurred by changes in the life 
cycles of fictitious PPP projects based on the different versions of output 
specification. The time taken to reach settlement or negotiation breakdown was 
recorded together with the cost-sharing pattern, with feedback collected from the 
participants on the effectiveness of the specification strategies immediately after 
the experiment. It was found that a detailed and clear output specification 
incorporating a cost-sharing framework facilitates change negotiations. 
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Governmental Debt Guarantees (GDGs) are often used to encourage 
involvement by promoters and financial institutions in PPP projects. However, 
even after demonstrating the bankability of a project and reducing debt cost, the 
success of the project may be prevented by the lack of long-term commitment 
from shareholders. Equity contributions by promoters in the project company 
may be recovered from earnings on short-term construction activities. Based on 
lesson learned from early PPP projects with GDG, the hold-up problem for 
government in the view of transaction cost economic (TCE) theory may worsen 
if the designed contractual structure does not adequately manage opportunistic 
behaviours from promoters. Tserng et al. (2014) empirically examined the effects 
of a structured GDG mechanism with particular complementary measures 
applied in joint projects to develop the Taipei mass rapid transit (MRT) stations. 
A GDG game model was then applied to bridge the theoretical gap based on the 
Taipei MRT experience. The analysis shows that requiring the promoter to 
provide sufficient equity and ensuring the commitment of the lender to provide 
the loan are the appropriate proactive measures. This study demonstrates its 
practical value for policy makers by combining case study, TCE and game 
theory in contractual issues. 
Recognizing and understanding the use of game theory when applied to 
PPP-BOT enables decision makers to reduce costs, reduce potential losses and 
mitigate the risks of the conflicts involved in a project. Two main aspects are 
ignored in the use of game theory when applied to PPP-BOT. They are finding 
the superior negotiation positions based on Pareto optimality and considering 
the PPP negotiations as a game under uncertainty and risk by utilizing fuzzy 
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game theory. These two aspects as research gaps are the concern of current 
research. 
2.3 Research on Risk Management and Allocation 
Because a PPP-BOT is a long-term arrangement of risks transfer that 
traditionally borne by the public sector to the private sector, proper risk 
identification and allocation is a key to successful PPP project 
implementation. This argument signifies the pivotal role played of optimal risk 
allocation. Risk taking by private sector is financially compensated for the 
willingness to bear the risks (Wibowo and Mohamed, 2008). 
Risk management and allocation in PPP-BOT projects is fundamentally 
different to that in traditional projects. Research on risks (Shen et al., 2006; 
Akintoye et al., 1998; Li and Tiong, 1999; Yeo and Tiong, 2000; Zayed and 
Chang, 2002; Lam and Chow, 1999; Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006; Thomas 
et al., 2006) is of help to explore the appropriate ways for managing and 
allocating important and significant risks and its process associated with life 
cycle PPP-BOT projects. According to their studies, risks in PPP-BOT can be 
clustered according to the conventional risk management process: risk 
identification, risk analysis, and risk allocation and mitigation strategies. This 
process is stated and followed unanimously by most researchers (Zhang and 
Zou, 2007; Singh and Kalidindi, 2006; Day and Ogunlana, 2002; Songer et al. 
1997; Imbeah and Guikema, 2009; Wibowo and Kochendorfer, 2005; Grimsey 
and Lewis, 2002; Ng and Loosemore, 2006). To improve the use of risk 




Research has been carried out to identify the key risks, and to study how 
government agencies, promoters and financial institutions perceive risks. For 
example, previous studies have used questionnaires to collect data for 
identifying the key risks in PPP-BOT projects, such as political risks, financial 
risks, revenue risks, market risks, promoting risks, procurement risks, 
development risks, construction completion risks, and operating risks 
(Akintoye et al., 1998; Zayed and Chang, 2002). Chan et al. (1997) identified 
and categorized risks in BOT projects and proposed solutions for each risk 
category. Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003), through a study of 13 cases, 
further found that project risks, project conditions, and availability of 
financing were the major considerations in selecting a financing strategy. The 
project risks that were argued to be most significant in financing strategy 
selection were political, financial, and market risks. Shen et al. (2006) used the 
case study of Hong Kong Disneyland theme park to analyse the risks affecting 
project performance. They grouped the important risks into the following 13 
categories: site acquisition, unexpected underground conditions, pollution to 
the land and surroundings, land reclamation, development, design and 
construction, changes in market conditions, inexperienced private partner, 
financial, operational, industrial action, legal and policy, and force majeure. 
Moreover, these risk categories were further divided into three main factor 
groups: internal, project specific, and external. 
Ng and Loosemore (2006) classified the risk in PPP projects in two main 
groups: general risks and project risks. Managing both general and project 
risks are equally important. For evidence on this issue, the reader may refer to 
some PPP project cases. For instance, the 2000 MW Dabhol Power Plant in 
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India was ordered to stop by new government in 1995 (Zhang, 2005), an 
incident in China on 1989 resulted in the syndication of loans for new super 
highway to be delayed till 1991 (Dehdashtian, 2007) and; a 45 km BOT toll 
road in Shenzhen was delayed because the consortium and government could 
not agree on appropriate toll charges (Chan et al., 1997). In other examples of 
poorly managed general risks, the USB$ 2.5 Malaysia N-S highway suffered a 
75% cost overrun largely due to inadequate allowances being made for 
inflation (Ng and Loosemore, 2006). Furthermore, in 1970s, the Spanish 
government guaranteed 75% of the loans on its new highway network and 
assumed the full exchange rate risk. This decision incurred US$2.7 billion cost 
to Spanish taxpayers. To mitigate these risks, governments often guarantee 
exchange rate and undertake to compensate the SPV if income fell below a 
certain level (Ng and Loosemore, 2006). 
Chan et al. (2014) identified and evaluated typical risks associated with 
PPP projects in the Chinese water supply sector. A literature review, a Delphi 
survey, and face-to-face interviews were used to achieve these objectives. 
Finally, a register of 16 critical risk factors (CRFs) of water PPP projects in 
China was established. The findings revealed that completion risk, inflation, 
and price change risk have a higher impact on Chinese water PPP projects, 
whereas government corruption, an imperfect law and supervision system, and 
a change in market demand have a lower impact on the water supply sector. 
The findings can help project stakeholders to improve the efficiency of 
privatization in public utility service and provide private investors with a 
better understanding while they participate in the enormous Chinese water 
market through the PPP mode. 
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Successful implementation of BOT infrastructure projects is dependent on 
a full and thorough analysis of factors that include social, economic and 
political, amongst others. Alongside the financially focused evaluations, 
qualitative factors will also have a strong impact on the project and so require 
specific techniques for the analysis. Fahad et al. (2014) presented a new 
evaluation framework, based on the analytical hierarchy process technique, for 
use in assessing the most common and significant decision factors relating to 
risks in BOT projects. Consultations with an expert group identified a series of 
risk decision factors. The results produced twenty-eight critical Risk Factors, 
which have a particular impact on the risks of BOT projects. The project risk 
framework was constructed by classifying the factors into five categories. The 
framework was successfully validated using a BOT project case study. This 
research seeks to make a valuable contribution to the field by having 
developed and validated a new risk evaluation framework, focused on BOT 
projects in Kuwait. 
The longer the contract period, the higher the chance that major changes 
will arise. Thus a greater reliance on the established relationships is needed to 
maintain the contractual bond in PPP project. Relationship management (RM) 
can therefore be expected to be even more valuable in the PPP context. Zoua 
et al. (2014) investigated current perceptions and experiences of RM in PPP 
projects and more importantly, to identify the CSFs for RM in PPP projects. 
By means of an empirical questionnaire survey geared towards PPP 
practitioners with direct hands-on experience, the opinions were solicited, 
analysed and compared in relation to potential PPP RM success factors. The 
survey findings indicate that industry practitioners currently lack a general 
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understanding of concepts and applications of RM, given that it is relatively 
new in PPP. However, they do think that RM is very important to improve the 
present performance of PPPs. Future PPP business opportunities can also be 
increased by effective RM. The top four CSFs for RM are found to be 
commitment of senior executives, defining the objectives, integration of the 
different divisions and a multidisciplinary team. However, the relative 
importance presently assigned for each of the above factors is insufficient, and 
commitment from senior management is perceived as the most difficult factor 
to improve. 
On the other hand, there are studies about the effective risk management, 
risk allocation and mitigation strategies in PPP-BOT scheme (Li and Tiong, 
1999; Li et al., 1999; Yeo and Tiong, 2000). The findings of these studies 
showed the idea that the most critical risk factors are the financial aspects of 
joint ventures, government policies, economic conditions, and project 
relationship. 
Risk management is critical for success in project-based construction 
industry. In current literature, various risk-based decision support systems 
have been proposed to systematically identify and assess risks. However, 
majority of these systems use the risk ratings assigned by the decision-makers, 
mainly, probability and impact ratings, as input values and quantify the level 
of risk associated with the project based on these inputs. However, in majority 
of the cases, these ratings are assigned based on the subjective judgment of the 
decision-makers and highly depend on their level of knowledge, risk attitude 
and assumptions. Yildiza et al. (2014) attempted to explore the process of 
assignment of risk ratings by the decision makers and question how the 
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reliability of the risk assessment process can be enhanced in practice. In this 
effort, a risk mapping tool that has been developed by the authors is used to 
conduct a case study that explains how the risk ratings are defined by different 
decision-makers and identify the reasons of possible divergence between 
assigned ratings. In this regard, a case study is conducted with three 
construction experts by using data of a real construction project and risk 
assessment exercise has been repeated using different strategies to collect 
expert opinion on risk ratings. The results of the case study show that although 
the subjectivity of ratings and sensitivity to risk attitude cannot be totally 
overcome, some strategies may be used to ensure a more reliable risk rating 
process. Those strategies mainly cover minimization of divergence of 
assumptions made by the decision-makers, clarifying what is included under 
the identified risk factors by defining sub-risk attributes and facilitating group 
decision-making. 
PPP procurement was introduced into Singapore in 2003, and 10 PPP 
projects were successfully completed and have been in operation. Hwang et al. 
(2013) examined the critical success factors as well as the relative importance 
of positive and negative factors influencing the attractiveness of PPP projects 
in Singapore, and to identify the critical risk factors and preferred risk 
allocations for PPP projects in Singapore. The questionnaire survey results 
indicated that negative factors were more affirmative than the positive factors, 
and that 23 risk factors had significant criticalities. Eight risks would be 
preferably allocated to the public sector while 19 risks could be assigned to the 
private sector. 11 risks were preferred to be shared by both parties and the 
allocation of four risks depended on project circumstances. The findings of 
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this study provide valuable information for organizations that intend to 
participate in PPP projects in Singapore. 
Ebrahimnejad et al. (2010) identified common risks in BOT projects, and 
then they defined the problem in fuzzy multi attribute decision making 
(FMADM) field. They introduced effective criteria for evaluating risks, and 
presented a fuzzy multiple criteria decision-making (FMCDM) model for risk 
assessment. The aim of the FMADM is to obtain the optimum alternative that 
has the highest degree of satisfaction for all of the relevant attributes. 
Governments are major players in promoting green developments, with 
private finance being an ideal environment in which such promotion can take 
place. The financial collaboration between governments and the private sector 
through PPP can promote a widespread implementation of green initiatives. Two 
reasons make this possible. First, in order to respond to the growing green 
awareness, governments have a great leverage on how green investments can be 
developed by the private party while enjoying steady revenues and good services 
for the public. Second, the international community is promoting green growth in 
developing countries through PPP investments, and so PPP can play a major role 
in widespread green growth. Almarria and Blackwellb (2014) focused on 
improving the chances of success with PPP contracts, since more successful 
projects will lead to improved welfare and will improve the chances for greening 
the community. The study concluded with two recommendations to improve the 
success of PPP; the first one was to reconsider the design of PPP contracts to 
include a hybrid structure that allows for a put and call options with a very 
controlled renegotiation clause. The second was to improve the risk simulation 
approach to improve the investment appraisal process through improving the 
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type and quality of input variables, in addition to the creation of cost and events 
charters of all completed projects. 
Songer et al. (1997) studied risk analysis for revenue dependent 
infrastructure projects e.g. PPP-BOT project. They utilized Monte Carlo 
simulation (MCS) for risk modelling in a case study. 
Apart from risks that were studied in general terms, risks that affected 
individual project stages were also studied by researchers. For example, the 
effect of financial risks in BOT projects on different phases of procurement 
was investigated in a survey (Lam and Chow, 1999). Results suggest that 
“interest rate fluctuation” was the most significant financial risk in the pre-
investment phase, while ‘currency exchange restrictions’ was moderately 
significant in the operational phase. With respect to practical applications, the 
above mentioned key risks should be studied carefully and corresponding 
contingency strategies should be developed when one intends to run a PPP-
BOT project. 
Researchers have also investigated the risk mitigation strategies adopted 
by the public and private sectors. For instance, Li et al. (2005c) conducted a 
questionnaire survey about risk allocation preferences in UK PPP projects. 
They found that risks could be distinguished by whether they should be 
retained by the public sector or shared with the private sector. As research 
finding, they further suggested that in PPP projects, site availability and 
political risks should be retained by the public sector partner, while 
relationship risks, legislation and regulation changes risks and the force 
majeure risks should be shared by both parties. 
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Some researchers focus more on risk management. For instance, Day and 
Ogunlana (2002) and Thomas et al. (2006) studied application of risk 
management tools and techniques in BOT projects through reviews of relevant 
literatures and developed a model for selecting risk management process for 
BOT projects. They established an outline for systematic risk management in 
BOT project. Table 2-2 summarizes the current state of knowledge in the area 
of risk management tools and techniques (RMTTs) for PPP-BOT projects. 
Table 2-2 A summary of previous studies on risk management tools and techniques 




Previous study and application  







Levitt et al. (1980) 
Yeo and Tiong 
(2000) 
Wang et al. (2004) 
Incorporate risk perceptions 
Positive management of differences for 
risk reduction 












Ashley and Bonner 
(1987) 
Diekmann et al. 
(1996) 




Identification of political risks in 
international project 
Political risks identification and cost 
assessment 
Impact assessment on project cash flow 
elements 
Liability assessment model 
Cost risk analysis 
External risk modelling 
Identification of risks in transportation 








Ibbs and Crandall 
(1982) 
Li and Ren (2009) 
Imbeah and Guikema 
(2009) 
Jin (2010) 
Farajian and Cui 
(2011) 
Demand risk allocation in PPP project 
Decision model for risky investment 
Advanced programmatic risk analysis 
and management model 
Efficient risk allocation 







Hatush and Skitmore 
(1997) 
Dey and Ogunlana 
(2001) 
 
Contractor’s performance estimate for 
contractual purpose 













Han and Diekmann 
(2001) 
Probabilistic element in sensitivity 
analysis for cost estimate  
Survey on use of sensitivity analysis in 
UK BOT project 





Moselhi and Deb 
(1993) 
Dozzi et al. (1996) 
Wang et al. (2000) 
Project alternative selection under risk 
Bid mark-up decision making 
Evaluation and management of political 
risks in China’s BOT project 
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Ahadzi and Bowles 
(2004) 
Chen and Subprasom 
(2007) 
Ebrahimnejad et al. 
(2010) 
Afshar and Fathi 
(2009) 
Kvaraciejiene et al. 
(2010) 
Farajian and Cui 
(2011) 
Relative significant of public and 
private attributes 
Demand uncertainty of BOT toll roads 
Fuzzy multi attribute decision making 
Fuzzy multi-objective optimization 


















Yun and Wei (2008) 
Hastak and Shaked 
(2000) 
Risk analysis for international 
construction project 
Assessment of project risks during the 
bidding stage 
Risk analysis for contingency 
allocation 
Risk analysis for overseas construction 
project 
Risk analysis for BOT project in 
Pakistan 
 
Appraisement of BOT risks and risks 
allocation 
Risk assessment for international 
projects 














Kangari and Riggs 
(1989) 






Peak et al. (1993) 
Tah and Carr (2000) 
Shaheen et al. (2007) 
Ebrahimnejad et al. 
(2008) 
Jin and Doloi (2009) 




Chen et al. (2011) 
Ebrat and Ghodsi 
(2011) 
Khanzadi et al. 
(2012) 
Risk assessment by linguistic analysis 
Risk identification, allocation, 
evaluation, mitigation 
Combination of  influence diagram 
with fuzzy set theory approach 
Network scheduling by fuzzy set 
approach 
Risk modelling, estimation and 
allocation models 
Bid mark-up for construction risk 
Risk pricing in construction project 
through fuzzy set approach 
Fuzzy risk evaluation in Iranian power 
plant industry 
Assessment of construction project 
risks 
Balanced risk allocation 










Chua et al. (1997) 
Boussabaine and 
Kaka (1998) 
Loss assessment model 
Development of budget performance 
model 








Haimes et al. (1990) 
Ezell et al. (2000) 
Multi-objective decision tree 












Tulsiani et al. (1990) 
Tsai et al. (1999) 
Risk evaluator 





Perry and Hayes 
(1985) 
Risk and its management in 











Dey (1997) Symbiosis of organizational 
reengineering and project risk 
management for effective 
implementation of projects 
Delphi 
technique  
Subjectivity  Dey (1997) Symbiosis of organizational 
reengineering and project risk 
management for effective 





























Ye and Tiong (2000) 
Ozdoganm and 
Birgonul (2000) 
Chiara and Garvin 
(2008) 
Sung and Kuo (2010) 
Kokkaew and Chiara 
(2010) 
Bagui and Ghosh 
(2011) 
Bagui and Ghosh 
(2012) 
Distribution form for cost estimate 
Debt cover ratio (project cash flow) in 
a toll way project 
Distribution form and correlation 
between variables in building costs 
Liability assessment model for project 
disputes 
Evaluation of investment decision in 
infrastructure project (NPV-at-Risk, 
measure of minimum expected return at 
given confidence level) 
Effective risk mitigation and sharing 
strategies 
Financial risk analysis 
Completion risk modelling of BOT 
highway project 















Sadeghi et al. (2010) 
Attarzadeh (2014) 
(this dissertation) 




Fuzzy Monte Carlo Simulation (FMCS) 
Fuzzy randomness Monte Carlo 
Simulation (FR-MCS), risk and 
uncertainty assessment. 
Mixed probabilistic/non-probabilistic 
uncertainty modelling and analysis for 
PPP projects 
Fuzzy cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) 
Evaluation of investment decision in 
infrastructure project (IND-at-Risk & 
Uncertainty, measure of minimum 




Tiong (1990) analysed the risks and securities involved in BOT projects and 
suggested what kinds of guarantees and incentives the government should 
provide in order to make a project more attractive. In later years he further 
addressed problems related to the PPP-BOT scheme, for example, critical 
success factors in winning BOT contracts from the promoter’s stand (Tiong et 
al., 1992), and the conditions for successful privately initiated infrastructure 
(Keong et al., 1997). 
Risks are always an active research topic for PPP projects. Thomas et al. 
(2006) proposed a risk probability and impact assessment framework based on 
fuzzy-fault tree and the Delphi method. The framework included extensive 
scenario modelling of critical risks in projects and systematic processing of 
professional judgment of experts. On the other hand, Zhang and Zou (2007) 
developed a fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model for the appraisal of the risk 
environment pertaining to the joint venture projects. Eaton et al. (2006) 
developed a theoretical model for the construction industry, which specifies the 
potential stimulants and impediments to creative behaviour in PPP projects. 
Effective risk allocation between the parties is vital for the success of a BOT 
project. The complexity of financial and organization structure in a BOT project, 
makes decision-making problem, particularly related to risk allocation, more 
complicated. Ozdoganm and Birgonul (2000) proposed a decision support 
framework which helps the project company to check project viability against 
some predefined critical success factors, define the risk sharing scenarios under 
which a project becomes viable, incorporate risks into cash flow analysis and, 
finally, define effective risk mitigation strategies. 
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Consequently as can be inferred from the above discussion about the risk, the 
most important part of risk management process is risk allocation which is also 
the most important goal of negotiations and renegotiations. Although there is a 
good understanding of the risks associated with PPP-BOT projects, what is less 
known is how these risks allocate to parties in the negotiations at development 
phase. 
While there have been some attempts to broadly define risk allocation and its 
profiles over the duration of a PPP project, such model remain rudimentary 
making it difficult and a main challenge to produce an overall risk allocation 
structure with mechanisms which coordinates main parties involved in all stages 
of a PPP project, especially for negotiations in development phase. Project risks 
should be allocated to the best competent party that bears it with lower cost 
through proper contractual arrangements or through government support. This 
support can be a kind of compensation and reward system as incentive method to 
increase private sectors’ motivation. Subsequently a low toll/tariff for end-user is 
realized. Eventually the lowest project life cycle cost and best value for money 
(VFM) are achieved. These are the main concerns of this research and are 
addressed and considered in later sections. Moreover, uncertainty modelling has 
received less attention than risk modelling and few existing case study mainly 
rely on it. The application of PPP-BOT projects is considered from the 
viewpoints of the major project participants and parties involved. 
In the previous works, the uncertainties affecting PPP-BOT projects are 
not properly considered. In the literature, probabilistic modelling of 
uncertainty is well established for risk modelling (Kalos and Whitlock, 1986; 
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Ahuja et al., 1994; Mun J., 2006; Vose, 1996 and 2008). However, the use of 
probability theory is not a reasonable approach to model the uncertainty. 
Most researchers attempt to eliminate or transform one type of uncertainty 
to another before performing a simulation. Wonneberger et al. (1995) and 
Dubois et al. (2004) presented a possibility to probability transformation. 
Since fuzzy logic and probability theory reflect different types of uncertainty, 
conceptually this transformation is not acceptable (Pedrycz and Gomide, 
1998).  
Guyonnet et al. (2003) and Baudrit et al. (2005) proposed a hybrid 
approach for addressing uncertainty in risk assessment without transforming 
one type to another which is recently critiqued by Sadeghi et al. (2010). There 
are three main shortcomings on Guyonnet et al. (2003) and Baudrit et al. 
(2005)’s approaches. Firstly, the α-cuts of a fuzzy set cannot always be 
represented by Inf and Sup values. Secondly, they do not mention why a 5% 
probability of getting lower and higher values of the histograms of the α-cuts 
will generate the Inf and Sup of the output α-cut. Thirdly, if only random 
inputs are considered as the extreme case for this model, the result will not be 
similar to the traditional MCS approach (Sadeghi et al., 2010). 
Alternatively Sadeghi et al. (2010) proposed a method for dealing with 
both fuzzy and probabilistic uncertainty in the input of a simulation model. 
However, it is not also free from limitations and shortcomings. A cautious 
study exposes some features of the approach that need further modification 
and improvement. Firstly, they didn’t provide any method for fuzzy random 
generation to produce appropriate sample sets. Secondly, they have used the 
probability-possibility transformation method to transform some of the 
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probability distributions in the simulation input into fuzzy sets. Thirdly, they 
perform fuzzy arithmetic to calculate the output in the form of fuzzy set. 
Fuzzy arithmetic implementation is not easy and straightforward for a 
complex simulation such as a PPP-BOT project. 
Since, our goal is not to convert probability density functions into 
membership functions or vice versa or to use one in place of the other, no 
proper direct numerical comparisons for the calculated risk estimates are 
provided, nor one should attempt to provide such a comparison due to inherent 
differences in the definition, meaning and treatment of the uncertainty as 
utilized in each method. 
This study contributes to the establishment of a framework for systematic 
risk and uncertainty modelling and management in PPP-BOT projects, 
particularly in negotiations between parties involved. Furthermore, this research 
proposes to utilize hybrid simulation model, fuzzy randomness, to analyse the 
risk allocation arrangements of critical risks and uncertainties. 
2.4 Research on Financing Mechanisms under Risk and Uncertainty 
PPP-BOT projects are characterized by high capital outlays, long lead times, 
and long operation periods, which make the forecast of cash flows more difficult 
and expose participants to high level of financial risk and uncertainty. Financing 
plays an important role in PPPs. Studies that focused on model development 
addressed different financing issues. 
Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) found that availability of financing 
influenced greatly the selection of a favourable financing strategy. Such a 
strategy can support participation from the private sector. 
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Tiong (1995c) carried out two questionnaire surveys in order to identify 
the threshold equity level in BOT tenders. One issue is “Evaluation of 
Proposals for BOT Projects” targeted at the government officials and their 
financial advisers. The other is “Experience in Tendering BOT Projects” 
targeted at project promoters and their financial and technical advisers. The 
surveys show that both governments and promoters shared similar opinions 
that high equity level, typically between 20% and 30%, is important and 
necessary. 
Bakatjan et al. (2003) used a simplified model to determine the optimum 
equity level for decision makers at the evaluation stage of a BOT project. This 
model combines a financial model and a linear programming model to maximize 
the return of the project from the equity holder’s point of view. 
The equity structure is of essence in a PPP-BOT project because it implies 
risk and profit sharing. Thus it must provide a mechanism of private incentive 
and public interest protection simultaneously. PPP-BOT project may not be fully 
self-financed through toll/tariff or other operating revenues from end-users for 
PPP-BOT market-led projects or from concession agreement for PPP-BOT 
contract-led projects due to insufficient revenue streams. Generally the reason of 
insufficient revenue streams is uncertainty included in expected cost/revenue 
estimation models and also long-term predictions involved. Sharma and Cui 
(2009) presented a structure approach for determining equity investment in PPP 
projects to reach the optimal equity structure. 
Typically, PPP projects must repay any debt obligations through their own 
net operating income, and do not provide the lenders with any other collateral 
(off-balance-sheet financing). So, the possibility of costly bankruptcy becomes 
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much more likely. Dias and Ioannou (1995) have proposed a desirability model 
in the form of a multivariate evaluation model to examine the attractiveness of an 
infrastructure project. The model shows that the amount of debt a project can 
accommodate (its debt capacity) is less than 100% debt financing. The amount of 
debt that maximizes the investors’ return on equity is less than the project’s debt 
capacity, and the amount of debt that maximizes the project’s net present value is 
even smaller. 
Esty (1999) described value equity methods for project finance investment 
and proposed improved techniques for valuing large scale projects. It has been 
shown that Monte Carlo simulation can be used to analyse cash flow uncertainty. 
Furthermore, Real Options analysis as valuation tool which can supplement 
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis for valuing large scale projects is discussed 
by Esty (1999). 
A simplified model for total project cost is developed by Ranasinghe (1996) 
which can be used for the following purposes. Firstly, to estimate the total 
project cost from the estimated cash flows. Secondly, to check the accuracy of 
the project cost estimates in feasibility studies that require careful decisions. 
Researchers have also studied the return and the value of PPP projects. For 
instance, Akintoye et al. (2003a, b) reviewed the literature and used qualitative 
analysis to examine factors that could continue to challenge the achievement of 
best value. They found that among others, the high cost of the PPP procurement 
process especially in development phase is a key factor, which is a burden on the 
PPP project effective implementation, and thus leads to a reduction in the private 
sector willingness to participate. 
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Zhang (2006a, b) argued that there is a need for establishing the best-value 
objective dimensions for innovative project delivery models. These models could 
offer the best value to the public sector. The models could also support the 
partnership between public and private sectors in continuously enhancing the 
best value through long-term contractual arrangements. Then, a methodology 
was developed for capital structure optimization and financial viability analysis 
that reflected the characteristics of project financing, incorporated simulation and 
financial engineering techniques, and aimed for win-win results for both public 
and private sectors (Zhang, 2005d, e). 
Researchers have attempted to study the financial viability of PPP projects. 
For example, Ho and Liu (2002) used an option pricing-based model for 
evaluating the financial viability of a privatized infrastructure project. This 
quantitative model takes the views of the project promoter and the government 
into account to estimate when the project is at risk from bankruptcy. 
Subprasom and Chen (2007) discussed the method of modelling and analysis 
of highway pricing and capacity choice of a BOT scheme. It was found that the 
combination of toll charge and roadway capacity regulation performed the best 
in terms of social welfare increment. Yet, in PPP highway projects, the 
regulation may cause a financial pressure against the private investors to operate 
a project. The government, therefore, may need to subsidize the private investors 
in order to make their participation financially viable. 
Some researchers focus more on financial evaluation aspects. For instance, 
Ye and Tiong (2000a, b) studied capital investment decision making methods 
that can take risks into account and developed a new project evaluation 
method called the NPV-at-risk and attempts to show that this proposed NPV-
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at-risk method can provide a better decision for risk evaluation of, and 
investment in, privately financed infrastructure projects and can potentially 
overcome these problems. 
Moreover, Yongjian et al. (2008) present a comprehensive literature review 
that examines international practices. An equitable financial evaluation method 
was then developed taking into account the inherent characteristics of PPP 
projects using six separate indicators and the Monte Carlo simulations. After an 
overview of the current financial and investment evaluation methods, they 
discussed the selection of indicators based on the government’s, lenders’ and 
sponsors’ perspectives. 
Economic modelling and risk analysis are important processes for the 
appraisal of infrastructure and revenue-generating projects such as BOT projects. 
These processes have been commonly implemented using spreadsheets in which 
the analyst would build several models to analyse a project under varying 
conditions and risk assumptions. For better efficiencies in building economic 
structures and evaluation of projects, Abdel Aziz and Russell (2006) defined 
classifications of estimating and cash flow methods, and developed a generalized 
model. The presented model explained some concepts used in building a 
generalized economic model for project evaluation and risk analysis. The model 
has a hierarchical network-based continuous model structure that integrates the 
properties and estimating methods of common infrastructure project phases. 
Malini (1999) developed a simulation model that permits the examination of 
financial viability of a BOT transport infrastructure project, as affected by 
various options relating to the toll structure, toll revision schedule, extent of the 
municipal grant, and duration of concession period. 
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Conventional methods in investment decisions include payback period (PP), 
internal rate of return (IRR), and net present value (NPV). While each method 
has specific advantages to different types of projects, all ignore the fact that the 
cash flows over the project life are varied rather than fixed. Consequently, they 
are not able to provide the decision makers with information on risk exposure 
involved, which is also as important as returns. Sung and Kuo (2010), adopted 
the concept of value-at-risk (VaR) to evaluate the level of significant risk in BOT 
project. With the help of Monte Carlo simulation as well as considering 
correlation among risks, decision makers are able to see a clear picture of risk 
involved in a BOT project and make better decisions. 
There are several risks in a BOT project. Major critical risks are total project 
cost and revenue, toll/tariff and demand (e.g. traffic for toll roads). Bagui and 
Ghosh (2011) presented a sensitivity analysis for a BOT project with real case 
study varying equity from 10% to 90%. Traffic and cost are varied ±20% and 
financial analysis is carried out with spread sheet, and test results and prepared in 
graphical forms and presented. 
As can be seen, two main aspects are ignored in the literature review and 
need to be addressed. First is analysing life cycle financial modelling of PPP-
BOT projects under the combination of uncertainty and risk, which provide 
the much required level of detail from the perspective of main parties 
involved. Second is a suitable framework for decision making under 
uncertainty and risk and their management and control mechanisms. 
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2.5 Research on Simulation and Concession Items Optimization 
With the help of the simulation model, the impact of risk can be taken into 
account when establishing ideal financial and contractual parameters which is 
called negotiable concession items (NCIs) in this research. Table 2-3 
summarizes the current state of knowledge in the area of simulation and 
concession items determination. 
Table 2-3 A summary of previous studies on simulation and concession items determination 
Method Keynotes 
Previous study and application  








Xu et al. (2012) 
Khanzadi et al. (2012) 
Concession pricing model for 
PPP highway projects 
Concession pricing adjusting 









of return  




Concession period determination 
Concession period determination 

















Go or no go 
decision 
Malini (1999) 
Shen et al. (2002) 
Ye and Tiong (2003) 
Shen and Wu (2005) 
Lianyu and Tiong 
(2005) 
Ng et al. (2007) 
Ng and Xie (2007) 
Zhang (2009) 
Ng et al. (2010) 
Bagui and Ghosh 
(2011) 
Wu et al. (2012) 
Yu and Lam (2013) 
Carbonara et al. 
(2014) 
Concession period design and 
determination 
Tariff design in BOT water 
supply projects 
Concession period and tariff 
structure 
Compound tariff 
Risk allocation and analysis 
Toll/tariff regime design and 
determination 
Proposal and Scenario Analysis 
Incentive scheme 
Net asset value 















Ng et al. (2007) 
 
 
Khanzadi et al. (2010) 
Nasirzadeh et al. 
(2014) 
 
Concession price and period 
determination 
Bi-objective problem 
Toll, capacity and concession 
period optimization 













Ngee et al. (1997) 
Liou and Huang 
(2008) 
Xu et al. (2012) 
Marco et al. (2012) 
 
Concession pricing 
Concession price adjustment 
mechanism 
Concession period determination 
Risk factors influencing 
concession pricing 












Subprasom and Chen 
(2007) 
Liou et al. (2011) 
Li et al. (2011) 
Concession price determination 
Determination of decision space 
of financial and concessional 
terms 
Bargaining-




Shen et al. (2007) 
Hanaoka and Palapus 
(2012) 






Huang and Chou 
(2006) 










Fuzzy multi objective function 
Fuzzy representation of NCIs 
IND-at-risk and uncertainty  
 
 
Study on establishing NCIs is important and crucial to the success of a PPP 
project. Niu and Zhang (2013) studied the characterization of the optimal BOT 
contract. To design a BOT contract, they considered three critical parameters 
as NCIs: the length of the concession period, the infrastructure’s capacity and 
the toll/tariff. 
One of the most important and crucial concession items is concession 
period which has received more attention compared to other concession items. 
According to Zhang and Kumaraswamy (2001b) establishing an appropriate 
concession period is important to the success of a BOT project. The main 
reason is because capital investment of the private partner is recovered through 
the operational revenue over the concession period. The concession period is a 
measure for deciding when the project ownership will be transferred from the 
concessionaire back to the government concerned. It also delimits the benefits, 
authorities, and responsibilities between the government and private investors. 
Generally, a longer concession period is more beneficial to the private 
investor, but granting an excessively lengthy concession period may result in 
loss to the government. On the other hand, if the concession period is too 
short, the investor will either refuse the contract offer or be forced to increase 
the service fees in the operation of the project in order to recover the 
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investment costs and to make a certain level of return and profit. 
Consequently, the risk burden as a result of the short concession period will be 
transferred to the end users who use the facilities. Logically, increasing the 
service fees is obviously not desirable from the end users’ standpoint and is 
not in their interest (Shen et al., 2002). Concession period is one of the most 
important decision variables (NCIs) in arranging a BOT-type contract, and 
there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of 
this variable under uncertainties (Ye and Tiong, 2003; Shen et al., 2007). 
Tiong and Alum (1997) examined both the government and promoter by 
adopting 13 financial and contractual elements as criteria. According to their 
results, the government and promoter prioritized the three most important 
elements during negotiations as the initial level of tariff, future tariff increases, 
and financial commitments by bankers of the promoters. Moreover, the 
government and promoters prioritize tariff as the most important element 
during final negotiations of financial and contractual concerns. 
The initial level of tariff/toll and also tariff/toll adjustment scheme are key 
issues in the development of privately financed infrastructure projects. The 
design of tariff/toll is an important financial and contractual negotiation 
parameter. It involves the determination of tariff/toll magnitude, the choice of 
tariff/toll structure, and the design of adjustment mechanisms. Tariff/toll 
structures can be an all-in tariff or a compound tariff/toll. Tariff/toll 
adjustment mechanisms can be used to address different risk factors such as 
inflation, exchange rate, demand, and fuel prices. An appropriate combination 
of tariff/toll structure and adjustment mechanism can be effective to manage 
key risks of privately financed infrastructure projects. Simulation results show 
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that a well-designed tariff/toll can create a ‘‘win-win’’ solution for both 
project concessionaire and the host government. In some cases, concessionaire 
was requested to renegotiate the tariff/toll, since the tariff/toll become a heavy 
burden to the end users and affect social stability (Ye and Tiong, 2003; Lianyu 
and Tiong, 2005; Ng and Xie, 2008). 
Therefore, concession period and the design of tariff/toll should (1) pursue 
end users/public objectives, (2) provide incentives to avoid the loss of 
performance efficiency, (3) reduce the risk exposure of both the 
concessionaire and the government to satisfactory level, (4) limit the 
cost/burden of regulation to an adequate level, and (5) avoid drawbacks in 
implementation (Ye and Tiong, 2003). Determining negotiable concession 
items as decision variables have correlation to each other. For instance, PPP-
BOT projects with a shorter concession period could result in a higher 
toll/tariff regime. Consequently, the risk burden due to the short concession 
period will be transferred to the end users (Shen et al., 2002). 
Deciding and determining reasonable and feasible NCIs which meet and 
ensure all parties’ interests always was, and still is a big concern in PPP-BOT 
negotiations especially in the development phase. Since negotiation in PPP-
BOT projects is so important, researchers have studied it from different 
perspectives of theory analysis and supporting tools. For instance, some 
researchers focus more on determining the concession period, one of the most 
essential and effective NCIs. Conversely, some researchers focus more on 
determining the initial level of tariff/toll and tariff/toll adjustment scheme 
(tariff/toll increases regime). Some researchers attempt to address both 
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simultaneously and their trade-off analysis. There are also a few studies on 
royalty. 
Some research has been conducted on how to determine the length of the 
concession period. Zhang and AbouRizk (2006) proposed a methodology, 
using the conventional MCS, to determine appropriate length of the 
concession based on a “win-win” principle for parties involved and exercises 
simulation techniques in measuring and evaluating construction and economic 
uncertainties and risks. Moreover, the proposed methodology, mathematical 
model, and simulation-based approach would facilitate the public sector in the 
determination of a suitable concession period for a particular infrastructure 
project, and the private sector in determining whether to bid for a concession 
solicited by public agency. It would also facilitate the private sector to develop 
unsolicited concession proposals for potential infrastructure projects and the 
public sector to evaluate such unsolicited proposals. Other studies also focus on 
developing models for determining the concession period for BOT projects. 
Khanzadi et al. (2012) presented an integrated fuzzy-system dynamics (SD) 
approach for determination of concession period. The complex inter-related 
structure of different factors affecting a BOT project is modelled using the 
system dynamics approach. Owing to the imprecise and uncertain nature of 
different factors affecting the concession period, fuzzy logic is integrated into 
the system dynamics modelling structure. The values of different factors 
affecting the concession period are determined by fuzzy numbers based on the 
opinions of different experts involved in the project. The application of 
Zadeh’s extension principle and interval arithmetic is proposed for the system 
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dynamics to enable the system outcomes to be presented considering 
uncertainties in the input variables. 
The investment return, tariff regime and concession period are the most 
important items that influence the success of a concession-based PPP project. 
Some researchers carried out their research on optimizing concession items. For 
instance, Ng et al. (2007) proposed a fuzzy simulation model which aims to 
assist the public partner to determine an optimal concession period for a PPP 
scheme based on the expected investment and tariff regime. The requirements 
for establishing different scenarios to represent the risks and uncertainties 
involved are presented, and a fuzzy multi-objective decision model is 
introduced to trade-off the associated three concession items. The combined 
features of the simulation and fuzzy multi-objective decision models enable 
the scenario most likely to result in a “win-win-win” concession scheme to be 
identified. The results of simulation show that the risks and uncertainties, such as 
a change in inflation rate, traffic flow, and operation cost, could influence the 
decision on the concession period. Subprasom et al. (2003) developed a 
simulation-based genetic algorithm to determine the optimal selection of 
capacity and toll in a BOT toll road project under multiple uncertainties. The 
consideration of multiple uncertainties is important when evaluating the 
feasibility of a BOT project. 
The process of promoting PPP-BOT projects to the host government is a 
time-consuming and expensive business. The negotiations and renegotiations are 
extensive and the financial risk of losing the tender is high. Some researchers 
carried out their research to simulate the negotiation of PPP-BOT projects and 
obtain optimized negotiation parameters. 
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For instance, in order to facilitate the contractual negotiation, Ngee et al. 
(1997) proposed an automated mechanism that allows the government and 
sponsor to reach a consensus on the combination of concession period, tariff 
structure, and rate of return of a BOT project. The proposed approach is using 
multiple regression models to formulate prediction equations using toll rates, 
concession period, and rate of return variables. This approach deals with the 
negotiation of financial and contractual parameters associated with a BOT 
project in development phase before it is awarded to the promoter. It describes 
the development of an automated mechanism as an alternative approach in 
expediting the negotiation over a suitable pricing structure for the BOT project. 
The mechanism was developed by incorporating spreadsheet data into multiple 
linear regression models to formulate the prediction equations using the tariff, 
concession period, and rate of return as the variables. 
Such mechanism is useful to reduce the bulk of urgent re-computations of the 
project cash flows during the final negotiation and renegotiation that would 
otherwise entail the use of considerable resources. The mechanisms could 
therefore be used as enhanced tools for dynamic negotiation between the 
government and promoter for an acceptable level of tariff structure; concession 
period and rate of return on the promoter’s investments; and for balancing the 
risk/return profiles of both parties. There are some shortcomings with Ngee et al. 
(1997) mechanism. Their model developed on the basis of incremental (manual) 
data inputs, is not intended to assess the risk of the BOT project in the 
negotiation model. Later on Liou and Huang (2008) extended the automated 
mechanism to address the shortcomings. 
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Alternatively, Shen et al. (2002) developed a quantitative BOT concession 
model (BOTCcM) for determining a proper concession period that can protect 
the interests of both the government concerned and concessionaire. However, 
there are still some limitations and shortcomings on this model. Firstly, it ignored 
risk impact on the model. Later on Shen and Wu (2005) extend the BOTCcM 
model and considered the risk impact to this model and presented an additional 
risk concession model by incorporating conventional Monte Carlo Simulation. 
Secondly, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot 
recommend a specific time span for concessionary. BOTCcM does not present 
possible combinations between concession period and other financial 
variables. Shen et al. (2007) extended the BOTCcM model to a new method 
called BOT bargaining concession model to identify a specific concession period 
by using bargaining-game theory, which takes into account the bargaining 
behaviour of the two parties engaged into a BOT contract. 
Liou and Huang (2008) incorporated risk attributes of the BOT project into 
the formulation of a contractual-negotiation model. The proposed model allows 
the government and the sponsor to reach a consensus on the terms of financial 
returns as well as the risk of the project is determined. The pro forma cash flow 
of a BOT project is developed and used to generate the probability distribution of 
NPV from the owner’s viewpoint by using Monte Carlo simulation. High and 
low risk scenarios are obtained to determine whether the contractual negotiation 
models vary in accordance with risk levels. Results show that, given the expected 
NPV, the sponsor should be offered more favourable concessional terms for 
projects with high risk than with low risk. They also suggested that the 
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government and industry practitioners embody the risk attributes of the project 
in the automated contractual-negotiation model. 
In PPP-BOT infrastructure development projects, government usually 
preset and predetermined the concession period to a fixed length before 
private sector is invited to bid on other concession items such as price 
(tariff/toll) and royalty. The concession period (CP) consists of the 
construction duration (CD) and the concession operation period (OP). 
Different construction duration results in different profits for the 
concessionaire. According to the time-cost trade off principle, shortening the 
CD increase the construction cost; shortening the CD also prolongs the OP, 
which could increase the total benefit of BOT projects. This practice has 
potential economic, financial, and social problems. To overcome this 
limitation on concession period, Zhang (2009) proposed a win-win concession 
period determination methodology, wherein PPP is addressed as a principal- 
agent maximization problem. The proposed simulation-based approach 
combines the critical path method and Monte Carlo simulation technique in an 
effort to quantify construction and market risks for decision making. Both 
deterministic and simulation-based methods are provided to determine the 
concession period using conventional MCS. Further, Li et al. (2011) proposed 
a methodological framework including optimization, sensitivity analysis, and 
genetic algorithms for BOT projects. Through this framework, the reasonable 
construction duration of a BOT project can be obtained.  
Lianyu and Tiong (2005) carried out their research on minimum feasible 
tariff model for a real BOT water supply project. This model provides a 
mechanism to quantitatively examine the effectiveness of risk allocation 
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arrangements. Through a case study, risk analysis is performed to demonstrate 
the application of the simulation model on the key factors and critical risks such 
as inflation, exchange rate and demand risk. Their analysis shows that for 
inflation risk, a pre-set tariff adjustment formula is useful in lowering minimum 
feasible tariff. For exchange rate risk, the reference rate should be set lower than 
the best estimate. Lowering of minimum feasible tariff can also be achieved if 
the tariff for additional demand is lower than the tariff for guaranteed demand. 
The tariff and concession period of a BOT project are the most important 
variables at the negotiation stage of a BOT project. While the initial version of 
contractual terms is normally based on pro forma financial statements conducted 
during the feasibility study or the appraisal stage, a change in terms will most 
likely alter the financial parameters. 
A number of capital investment decision methods can take risks into account, 
but each of them focuses on different factors and has its limitations. Therefore, a 
more robust method is needed. Through Monte Carlo simulation, Ye and Tiong 
(2000a) provided a method called the NPV-at- risk by combining the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) and dual risk return methods. It incorporates the 
time value of money into the mean-variance method using NPV concept and 
takes financing methods into account using WACC as the discount rate. The 
results show that this combination can overcome some problems inherent in 
other methods, and the method can be used in decision making for privately 
finance infrastructure projects. Moreover, Risk-return trade-off was studied to 
make sure a sufficiently long concession period for generating financial returns 
that can compensate the risks. Their method shows that NPV-at-risk as a more 
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dynamic method can provide a better decision for risk evaluation of 
investment in privately financed infrastructure projects (Ye and Tiong, 2000a). 
Ye and Tiong (2003) provided a method for evaluating the mean and 
variance of NPV, and NPV-at-risk of different concession period structures. So 
both government and concessionaire can understand their risk exposure and 
rewards. Then they analyse the influence of project characteristics on concession 
period design to evaluate the feasibility of the design. It is concluded that a well-
designed concession period structure can create a “win-win” solution for both 
concessionaire and host government. 
Malini (1999) used the conventional Monte Carlo simulation model to 
analyse the risk of BOT bridge projects and concluded that the simulation 
model accurately estimates the financial risk of BOT projects. Variables used 
as simulators consist of tariff structure, tariff revision schedule, extent of the 
grant, and duration of the concession period.  
Islam and Mohamed (2007) developed an intelligent algorithm using a 
combination of GA and the fuzzy set theory to optimize conflicting financial 
interests in deriving the right mix of three key decision variables: equity ratio, 
concession length and base price; as concession items which are called NCIs in 
this research. Later on Islam and Mohamed (2009) developed a concession-
investment optimization model to optimize the winning potential of a 
concession-bid from the prospective promoter’s viewpoints by taking into 
account imprecise investment parameters. A financial performance measure 
has been developed to quantify bid-winning potential. The developed model 
yields global near-optimal solution of bid-winning potential with contributing 
values of concessionary items: concession length, base price, and quality level 
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under uncertain investment environment. A clear research gap in this study is 
perceived in simultaneous evaluation of profitability and bid-winning potential 
from the promoter’s perspective. 
As can be seen, concession period, tariff/toll design and royalty are the 
main NCIs and are decided in the negotiations within the development phase 
before the contract award. The concession period, as one of the most important 
decision variable and concession items in arranging a BOT-type contract, 
should be determined by considering the existing risks and uncertainties. The 
construction duration (CD) and operation period (OP) form the concession 
period (CP) in a BOT contract.  Basic toll/tariff rate (toll/tariff rate prescribed) 
is determined based on consideration of affordability, benefits derived from 
the project and end user willingness to pay analysis. The basic toll/tariff 
structure is fed as input to the model, and hence, the model can accommodate 
any desired combination of toll rates for the various modes. As PPP-BOT 
projects are generally characterized by long concession period, it is necessary 
to revise the toll structure periodically to partially compensate for inflation. 
Thus, the periodicity of toll/tariff increase and the rate of increase are fed to 
the model as inputs to compute the toll/tariff rate for each mode for every year 
of the operating period (Malini, 1999). The problem of determining optimal 
NCIs is a multi-objective multi-party decision making problem. Thus to find 
optimal solution of this problem, considering multi-objective multi-party using 
Pareto efficiency is helpful. 
Research on simulation and concession items optimization techniques has 
been motivated in the recent years. Consequently, a number of simulation 
based models with specific aims are developed for PPP-BOT project. The 
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results of such developed models point out the important and significant role 
in decision making. Among the sampling techniques, Monte Carlo simulation 
(MCS) has been applied more. One of the major advantages of this technique 
is that through the MCS the impact of risk has been taken into account. 
However, there remain some shortcomings and limitations in this technique. 
Such shortcomings and limitations are particularly critical when dealing with 
complex and long term infrastructure projects that involve high risks and 
uncertainties about concession items and decision parameters. 
Firstly, in addition to associated risks in the PPP-BOT projects, complexity 
and long term estimation impose strong uncertainty associated to concession 
items and decision parameters of the PPP-BOT projects. Most of the existing 
models lack the capability to manage uncertainty modelling and to incorporate 
and combine uncertainty and risk modelling in associated decision making 
under risk and uncertainty. This drawback neglects the usefulness of available 
models under uncertain circumstances. Secondly, almost all proposed models 
have focused merely on one party’s perspective. Neglecting other parties’ 
perspective during the development phase, may leads to impracticable 
decisions. Thirdly, in a real decision making situation, it is recognized that 
human judgment on qualitative criteria is always subjective and imprecise and 
it combines with data from experiences and past projects. The existing models 
cannot manage this issue well and this is a research gap. 
2.6 Research on Real Options Valuation and Analysis 
This section presents a review of Real Options Valuation and Analysis 
application in PPP-BOT projects. The use of Real Options in infrastructure 
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development decision makings has gained popularity although it is still in its 
infancy. Rose (1998) evaluated the concession period and deferral of the 
concession fee options. Ford et al. (2002) proposed a binomial option pricing 
model using strategic flexibility to capture project values hidden in dynamic 
uncertainties and represent alterations in design. Ho and Liu (2002) developed 
a real option pricing model, incorporated project net cash flow and 
construction cost, to evaluate the impact of the government debt guarantee and 
the developer negotiation option on the financial viability of the privatized 
infrastructure projects. Yao and Jaafari (2003) presented a combining decision 
tree with Real Options Valuation model. They demonstrated that the Real 
Options approach can be used as a clear and simple method to integrate 
appropriate project evaluation with optimal project management strategy in a 
bid to avert or reduce project risks from the perspective of a real project. 
Garvin and Cheah (2004) discussed methods for valuing private investments 
in public infrastructure and evaluated deferment option. Wibowo (2004) 
studied valuing the government guarantees and their financial impact on BOT 
toll roads from the government and sponsor’s perspective. Huang and Chou 
(2006) developed a compound option pricing model. The combination of 
minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) and the option to abandon in the pre-
construction phase are studied as a series of European style call options. 
Vassallo and Solino (2006) described the applied model and results of the 
MRG mechanism implementation in Chile. Cheah and Liu (2006) applied 
Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate government guarantees and subsidies as 
Real Options. Mattar and Cheah (2006) introduced a new category of risks, 
which is called private risk. Methods for pricing private risks are evaluated 
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and the effects of private risks in real option analysis are studied. The 
difference in real option values can be considered as a form of private risk 
premium. Chiara et al. (2007) presented least-squares Monte Carlo method for 
quantifying the value of a minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) as Bermudan 
(American) options in a BOT project. This approach is presented and 
illustrated to determine the fair value of real option. Liu and Cheah (2009) 
illustrated the analysis of two types of options: the incentive scheme, 
guarantee, and repayment feature, the placement of a cap on the tariff/toll 
rates. They demonstrated that a negotiation band incorporating these option 
values can be constructed which would enlarge the feasible bargaining range 
for both parties to prevent a total negotiation breakdown. Huang and Pi (2009) 
applied a sequential compound option approach for valuing multi-stage BOT 
projects, in the presence of dedicated assets. Shan et al. (2010) presented 
collar option, which is a combination of a put and call option, as a technique to 
manage revenue risks. Furthermore, its potential features are derived from an 
exploration of existing risk management practices in real toll projects. Galera 
and Solina (2010) developed a real option-based methodology to value 
minimum traffic guarantee of highway concessions. Qiu and Wang (2011) 
developed a model to examine the incentives, efficiency and regulation in 
BOT contracts. Ashuri et al. (2012) applied the Real Options Theory to price 
MRG and traffic revenue cap (TRC) options as compound options in BOT 
projects and determined their effects on the concessionaire’s economic risk 
profile.  
In PPP projects, it is often necessary for host governments to provide 
guarantees to investors due to the large scale of investments involved, long 
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tenure of the project, and hence greater risks. Although PPP has become a 
matured topic in construction management, research on evaluation of 
restrictive competition in PPP projects remains surprisingly scarce. With real 
option theory, Liu et al. (2014) analysed government's guarantee of restrictive 
competition in PPP projects, and constructs an evaluation model for restrictive 
competition. The results illustrate the significance of the valuation to both host 
government and investors, and provide them with a clear reference when 
negotiating on the level of restrictive competition. 
PPPs are adopted throughout the world for delivering public infrastructure. 
Despite the attractiveness of the PPP structure, its implementation has not 
been without trouble due to multiple uncertainties embedded with PPP 
projects. Private investors often require some mitigation of these risks through 
government support. One of the most common forms of government support is 
minimum revenue guarantee (MRG). Carbonara et al. (2014) developed a real 
option-based model that uses a new mechanism for setting the revenue 
guarantee level secured by the government, which balances the private 
sector’s profitability needs and the public sector’s fiscal management interests 
and uses the concept of fairness for structuring MRGs. The model uses Monte 
Carlo simulation to take into account the uncertainty. The model is applied to 
the projected 1 kilometre long ‘Camionale di Bari’ toll road that will link the 
port of Bari (located in Puglia, Southern Italy) with the existing road network 
without affecting the urban traffic. It was found that government support is 
often needed to make the project attractive to private investors and that the 
developed model can be, for both public and private sectors, a valid tool for 
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defining the fair value of the minimum amount of revenue secured by the 
government. 
As can be seen, options which arise from certain clauses of the contract are 
more valuable in risky projects. The correct evaluation of the concession in a 
bidding process is essential for government and bidders. There are two main 
aspects as research gaps. Firstly there is need for a means for valuing of early 
fund generation option. Secondly there is need for a procedure to calculate 
equitable bound for guaranteed rate of return for project sponsor under 
uncertainties and risks. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks, Research Gaps: Motivation for Required 
Studies 
As the reader has seen so far, a comprehensive literature review was 
conducted as part of this research to examine the current state of knowledge 
regarding long term infrastructure projects, PPP-BOT projects and risk 
management in this kind of projects. Over 100 journal articles and other 
publications pertaining to PPP-BOT projects were collected and reviewed.  
According to this comprehensive literature review, it can be inferred some 
useful and reasonable results that led to the current research titled 
“Negotiation-based risk management of PPP-BOT infrastructure projects” 
under uncertainty and risk - using fuzzy game theory, simulation and Real 
Options Analysis. The broad gaps identified frame the direction of this 
dissertation. We discuss these results that led us to this research in more detail. 
1. Negotiation-based risk management: according to research records 
about failure and success in PPP-BOT projects, interview with the 
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experts and PPP-BOT project managers and also the author’s 
experiences in some PPP-BOT projects (author was involved in some 
PPP-BOT projects in his home country), the crucial and essential part of 
the these long term projects is negotiation and in a better word 
negotiation series management that lead the project to success or failure. 
So risk management of these projects must be done from a negotiation 
perspective. 
2. Negotiable Concession items: when the idea to manage risks and 
uncertainties of these projects is through the negotiation, determination 
of negotiable concession items under the combination of uncertainty and 
risk is very crucial. This will lead to answer the commonly asked 
question of how to pursue a win-win-win scenario among the public 
sector (government), the private sector (concessionaire), and ultimate 
general public users (end users). 
3. Dynamic environment: Methods, models and tools are needed to move 
on to dynamic situations properly to evaluate financial viability 
mechanisms for PPP-BOT project in order to manage the financial 
vulnerability which is crucial in PPP-BOT projects as long term 




CHAPTER 3 TOWARD A PARETO FRONTIER NEGOTIATION 
POSITION USING FUZZY GAME THEORY IN PPP-BOT 
PROJECTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The use of game theory (GT) in analysing realistic problems of competitive 
situations in PPP projects has proved fruitful. Game theory is used in order to 
simulate the negotiation behaviour aimed to analyse, characterize and forecast 
parties’ behaviour in the negotiations and observe players’ tendency and 
characteristic of behaviour. It also aims to determine the equilibrium solution 
and negotiation positions in such a way as to manage conflicts of parties’ 
interests. 
In most of the literature using game theory application in PPP-BOT 
procurement process, particularly for negotiations, the solution of the Game is 
obtained based on the Nash equilibrium. The solution of the cooperation game 
obtained via the Pareto optimum is superior in payoffs when compared to the 
competition game solution obtained via the Nash equilibrium. This is proved 
mathematically and is illustrated through a real case study. With the project 
procurement as the Game, it is assumed that all parties involved, as players, 
have complete information about the game. This is a simplified and unrealistic 
assumption. 
This chapter studies negotiations between public and private sectors based 
on the game theory perspective under uncertainties and risks. The two main 
aspects that this study contributes in the use of game theory when applied to 
PPP-BOT are finding the superior negotiation positions based on Pareto 
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optimality and considering the PPP negotiations as a game under uncertainty 
and risk by utilizing fuzzy game theory. The scope of this research is 
negotiations in the development phase of PPP-BOT projects. Recognizing and 
understanding the use of game theory when applied to PPP enables decision 
makers to realize negotiation behaviour of parties involved in the development 
phase under uncertainties which results in choosing an optimal strategy that 
leads to reduction in costs and potential losses and mitigate the risks of the 
conflicts involved in a project. 
This chapter is organized as follows: first classifications and types of 
games are reviewed. Furthermore it is shown how game theory is used as a 
decision making tool in solving Multi-objective Optimization Problem (MOP) 
in various negotiations in development phase. The application of the game 
theory in PPP-BOT projects is discussed in order to overcome to 
aforementioned problems in the development phase by using Pareto optimality 
concepts. A mathematical model aimed to enhance the Nash equilibrium 
solution using Pareto optimality concept is presented. The concepts of 
cooperative and non-cooperative game theory and fuzzy set theory are then 
combined to bring in a new optimization method that takes into account the 
uncertainty involved which is referred to herein as fuzzy game theory. The 
concept of the proposed game model is also validated through an illustrative 
case study in this chapter and has been examined in a real case study in 
chapter 7 in detail. 
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3.2 Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
In Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects the responsibility for the 
delivery of public facilities is shifted from a public institution to a private 
sector firm for a particular period of time. The motivation and role of PPP is to 
attract private sector capital, resources, assets, management skills, experiences 
and innovation for the provision of public sector infrastructures and services 
(Mustafa 1999, Forshaw 1999, Allen et al. 2002). PPP also has two other 
important characteristics: an emphasis on provision of service/product, as well 
as investment, by the private sector; and significant risk transferred from the 
public sector to the private sector. This delivery is in such a manner that the 
service delivery objectives of government are fulfilled along with the profit 
objectives of the private partner. Figure 3-1 shows the three-phase PPP-BOT 
project life-cycle: development, concession (CP), and post-concession (PCP) 
with key time points. It also demonstrates the procedure steps together with 
the effective and closing dates. 
 
Figure 3-1 Life-cycle of PPP-BOT project, procedures steps and key time points 
Not all PPP projects have been implemented successfully because of 
problems due to inappropriate administration policies during the negotiations 
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negotiations, while a few are found in post-contract negotiations (Zhang 2005, 
Tiong et al. 1992). Negotiation failure has been identified as the principal 
cause of unsuccessful implementation of PPP projects. This is due to firstly, 
disagreements between public and private parties on the negotiable contractual 
parameters and consequently unbalanced allocation of project risks and 
returns. Secondly, an “unfair” closing of the pre-contract award negotiations 
that post-contract award renegotiations were unable to recompense. In fact, it 
is often advocated that the main problems associated with PPP, as long-term 
contracts, are uncertainty, informational asymmetries, and renegotiation 
(Chiara, 2009). The average tendering period is 33-34 months (NAO, 2007). 
The primary obstacle to PPP success was found to be “lengthy delays in 
negotiation” (Chan et al. 2010). 
The application of game theory in the field of construction management is 
a recent approach, in particularly, for PPP-BOT negotiations (Ho and Liu, 
2004; Ho, 2005). The main reason why game theory is appropriate in these 
circumstances is because it is an exploratory study of decision making process 
where several players must make decisions that potentially affect the interest 
of the other players. Furthermore, game theory is used to simulate negotiations 
between two main parties involved in PPP-BOT project: “government agency” 
as public sector and “concessioner” as private sector consortium. It has been 
shown that GT is one of the best tools to simulate these types of negotiations. 
By using this method, the equilibrium solutions which are strategically stable 
respective positions in the sense that no player would have an incentive to 
deviate from its action given the actions of the other players (Nash 
equilibrium), can be found. 
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Game theory could be applied to PPP-BOT projects in two main areas, (1) 
Bid competition model and policy, (2) Renegotiation model and policy-
bargaining, e.g., Financial Renegotiation to negotiate a subsidy in order to 
rescue a distressed project, Renegotiate on extension of concession period, 
debt guarantee, and more tax exemption for a certain number of years, and 
Renegotiate on extra loan or equity investment, refinancing issue. 
Many common decision problems in PPP projects can be thought of as a 
game. For instance in the development phase, before the effective date 
milestone, both parties (concessionaire and government) meet each other 
around the negotiation table, maybe on several occasions, in order to make 
decision to promote the project and allocate responsibilities, risks and benefits 
to each party. This game has been called bargaining-game (Nash, 1950). This 
bargaining-game can be categorised by types of objectives and decision 
variables. The most common bargaining process is negotiations over 
negotiable concession items (NCIs): concession period, tariff/toll and royalty 
which are the most important concession items. A less common bargaining 
process is negotiations over subsidy and claim. 
Research shows that game theory principles have been applied in PPP 
procurement, particularly during negotiations that immediately precede the 
concession agreement: pre-contract negotiations. Ho (2005 and 2006) applied 
game theory to analyse the information asymmetry problem during the 
procurement of a BOT project (bid compensation model) and its implication in 
project financing and government policy (financial renegotiation model). Ho 
and Liu (2004) developed a game theoretic model for analysing the 
behavioural dynamics of builders and owners in construction claims. In PPP-
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BOT projects, conflicts and strategic interactions between public and private 
parties are common, and thus game theory can be a natural tool to analyse the 
problems of interest. Shen et al. (2007) utilized game theory to find the 
equilibrium solution for negotiation over the concession period, one of the 
most important NCIs. 
A majority of the papers from the literature review, particularly those 
dealing with the application of game theory in PPP-BOT, made simplified and 
unrealistic assumptions. Firstly they assume that each player’s payoff, 
objective and utility function and strategies is common knowledge with 
certainty for all players involved in PPP-BOT project. The game is then 
considered as a game of “complete information”. Secondly researchers have 
found equilibrium solutions of the game based on the Nash equilibrium. 
(Dhingra and Rao, 1995; Ho and Liu, 2004; Ho, 2005, 2007; Wu and Parlar, 
2011). The solution of the cooperation game obtained via the Pareto optimum 
is superior in payoffs when compared to the competition game solution 
obtained via the Nash equilibrium. However, these assumptions were barriers 
to successful implementation of game theoretic ideas. For instance, in a PPP-
BOT sealed-bid process, the bidders do not know each other’s valuations. 
There are a small number of studies that deal with games played under 
uncertainty, incomplete information. Furthermore, the existing game solution 
does not reflect the maximum possible gain/payoff for players. These are 
research gaps and this study contributes to the literature by proposing methods 
to overcome these limitations and problems. 
In order to fill these gaps, firstly this study proposes to combine concepts 
of game theory and uncertainty modelling such as fuzzy logic to investigate 
77 
 
and analyse negotiation processes under uncertainty, with incomplete 
information. Secondly it proposes to incorporate Pareto efficiency/Pareto 
optimality concept to enhance the game solution. The scope of this chapter is 
bid competition negotiations in the development phase of PPP-BOT projects.  
3.3 Game Theory 
Game theory (GT) is a mathematical tool used in the study of the 
resolution of conflicting claims for multi-party decision making (Myerson, 
1991). A game may be viewed as a multi-objective optimization problem 
(MOP) where each player equates to an objective function. Each player seeks 
to improve his overall position subject to constraints. In a MOP, it is rarely 
possible to find a single solution that would optimize all the objectives. Some 
objective vectors may be better than others. When this occurs the 
improvement in one objective vector leads to a degrading of one or more of 
the other objective vectors. 
Nash (1950) demonstrated that finite games always have an equilibrium 
point at which each player chooses the best response to each other players’ 
strategies. Thus, each player’s predicted strategy must be that player’s best 
response to the predicted strategies of the other players. Such prediction, 
which is called Nash equilibrium (NE), is strategically stable, because no 
single player wants to deviate from his/her predicted strategy. Moreover, in 
GT, each player attempts to maximize his/her utility/payoff. The preferences 
of each player are expressed by a utility function/ payoff function. Therefore, 
GT assumes rational players based on the desire of utility/payoff 




GT can be described formally at various levels of detail. Within the scope 
of this research, three levels of GT classifications are described, namely 
approach, movement and information. Under the approach classification in 
traditional game theory, there are two main types: the competitive (non-
cooperative) game, and the cooperative game. In the competitive game, 
players consider only their own strategic objectives and they try to maximize 
their own benefits. Competitive games require players to form strategies that 
directly oppose the other players in the game, i.e. the goals of the players are 
opposed. 
In contrast, a cooperative game models a situation where two or more 
players have interests that are “neither completely opposed nor completely 
coincident” (Nash, 2002). In other words, a cooperative game is a game where 
groups of players (coalitions) may enforce cooperative behaviour, hence the 
game is a competition between coalitions of players, rather than between 
individual players. In the cooperative game, players cooperate to acquire the 
maximum benefits and at the same time try to allocate gains on an equitable 
basis. Although opportunities exist for players to be able to work together to 
achieve a win-win solution, a cooperative game does not always guarantee that 
cooperating players will benefit equally or even benefit at all. An example is a 
coordination game, when players choose the strategies by a consensus 
decision-making process. The classic cooperative game is the iterative version 
of the prisoner’s dilemma (Dawkins, 1989). 
A third category of games also exists under the approach classification, 
namely collaborative game. In a collaborative game, all the participants work 
together as a team, sharing the payoffs and outcomes; if the team wins or 
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loses, everyone wins or loses. Collaboration as a team differs from 
cooperation among individuals in that cooperative players may have different 
goals and payoffs where collaborative players have only one goal and share 
the rewards or penalties of their decisions. The challenge for players in a 
collaborative game is working together to maximize the team’s utility. 
Collaborative games necessitate collaboration. 
There are two kinds of games in terms of the phasing of decision making 
based on the movement: static games and dynamic games. In a static game, 
the players act simultaneously, in the sense that each player makes his 
decision without knowing the decisions made by others. The bid compensation 
decision process model (Ho, 2005) is demonstrated as a non-cooperative static 
game. This model aims to study the impacts of bid compensation and to 
develop appropriate bid compensation strategies. The strategic form is used 
for illustration of this game. This form is represented in Table 3-1. On the 
other hand, in a dynamic game, the players act sequentially. The financial 
renegotiation model (Ho, 2006) and construction claims (Ho and Liu, 2004) 
are non-cooperative dynamic game, where private parties and government take 
turns in making decisions after observing the other party’s action. Extensive 
form (game tree) is used for illustration of this game. The structural 
components of game tree involve nodes (initial, decision and end), branches 
(alternative) and payoffs for each player. 
There are two categories of games based on information and is used to 
describe what the players know during the game course, complete information 
and incomplete information. In a game of complete information, the players 
know not only the structure of the game (strategies) and their own payoff 
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functions but also the payoff functions of the other players. In other words, 
they know the available strategies and preferences of all of the players. 
Otherwise, the game is incomplete information. A game has perfect 
information when at any point in time only one player makes a move, and 
knows exactly all the actions that have been made until then. Otherwise, it is 
imperfect information game. Perfect information is often confused with 
complete information, which may appear to be a similar concept. Complete 
and perfect information are importantly different. 
3.4 Pareto Optimality vs. Nash Equilibrium, Illustrative Example 
Generally two theories and models have been used to abstract the conflicting 
interest’s situation between the players; the non-cooperative model based on 
the concept of Nash equilibrium, and the cooperative model based on the 
concept of a Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality solution (Dhingra and Rao, 
1995). 
In a non-cooperative game, each player is unconcerned how his choice will 
affect the payoffs of other players. With this outlook each player selects a 
suitable strategy for himself. The parties as game players then engage in 
bargaining on contractual parameters and exchange risks and the benefits until 
equilibrium is reached. The resulting solution, referred to as Nash equilibrium, 
is the basic solution of the game and is the best strategy a player can choose 
based on the other players’ strategies. It is a solution where players have no 
incentive by changing their strategy and no player can improve his payoff by 
altering and choosing another strategy, and attaining different amount of risks 
and benefits (Nash, 1950; Dhingra and Rao, 1995; Gibbons, 1992). 
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In contrast, a cooperative game proceeds with the intent to ensure an 
appropriate balance of risk and return allocation such that all players are in the 
best position as possible, which would not be worse than the Nash solution, 
and an improvement in the payoff for one player does not result in loss for 
another player. The bargaining scheme postulated by the concept of Pareto 
optimality yields a unique and optimal distribution of risk and return such that 
the arbitrated outcome is Pareto optimal (Dhingra and Rao, 1995). The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is considered as an illustrative example and demonstrated 
in Table 3-1 (Osborne, 2004). 
Table 3-1 Prisoner’s Dilemma (values: payoff, maximum is in favourite.) 
  Player 2 
  Confess Not Confess 
Player1 Confess (2 , 2) (0 , 3) 
Not Confess (3 , 0) (1 , 1) 
 
“Not Confess, Not Confess” is pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium as denoted 
by underline in payoff table. The arrows in the game table denote the flow to 
Nash Equilibrium position. “Confess, Confess” is Pareto optimal solution. 
These solutions are shown in Figure 3-2. As can be seen, the dash curve 
constitutes the Pareto optimal frontier which represents the best payoffs both 
players can hope for. As can be observed, by cooperation game players could 
gain more and move to better position i.e. from Nash equilibrium solution to 





Figure 3-2 Pareto optimal frontier of payoff for Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
3.5 Framework of the Study in the Development Phase 
As various parties engaged in PPP project, such as government, project 
sponsors, investors, lenders, construction companies, operators, insurers, etc. 
where they have different and conflicting objectives and aims, the cooperation 
of parties is needed instead of competition to achieve best payoff for them at 
win-win solution. This cooperation could be considered as multistage games. 
The focus of this chapter is negotiation in the bid competition at development 
phase, particularly between the government and the private sector (SPV). 
The framework of PPP-BOT negotiations in development phase is 
demonstrated in detail in Figure 3-3. Development phase is divided into two 
stages, Bid preparation and tendering and Final Negotiations. The negotiation 
risk management planning steps are shown as well. It starts by risk 
identification, evaluation and analysis. Risk allocation table is established 
based on the agreeable concession items. The risk allocation procedure is 
closed to achieve financial closure of the project. Following this risk 
monitoring and control process will be started. 







































Figure 3-3 Framework of PPP-BOT negotiations in development phase - risk analysis and 
management perspective 
The stages of the development phase and corresponding actions by each 
party are shown in Figure 3-4. At the first stage shortlist tenderers are selected 
by the government via the prequalification procedure. Then the project is 
awarded to the selected bidder by considering the evaluation criteria such as 
price (tariff/toll), concession period and royalty are considered. At the second 
stage risk negotiation, pricing and allocation procedure is carried on by the 
government and the selected bidder till reach financial closure. Game theory in 
PPP-BOT projects is concerned with how parties make decisions. Either static 
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Stage1: Bid preparation and tendering 
 


















Stage1: Bid preparation and tendering 
 










Invitation to tenderers for negotiations 
Opening and evaluation of tenders 
Evaluation of offers to reach best and final offer 
Evaluation criteria: 
 Price (tariff/toll) 
 Concession period 
 Royalty 
 Quality of service/ good 
 Deliverability  
 Technical factors 




Awarding of project to selected bidder 
Effective date 
milestone, EF 
Creation of a procurement committee 
Preparation of tender documents  
Prequalification proceedings 
Short list tenderers selected 
Preparation and submission of prequalification documents 
Clarifications prior to tender submission through first stage 
negotiation and meeting series  
Preparation and submission of firm tender and alternative 
proposal 
Government Private sector 
Risk negotiation, through detailed negotiations and 
meeting series  
Risk pricing methods and 
models  





Date milestone, COD 
Figure 3-4 Stages in development phase of PPP-BOT procurement procedure 
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In practice, two methods are adopted to grant concession and nominate 
concessionaire in PPP-BOT projects by public sectors: bid competition and 
direct negotiation. Bid competition which is more common and accepted by 
concerned governments, is the focus of this chapter. Direct negotiation is used 
when information of similar projects including the contractual parameters such 
as price are available to public sector. So in direct negotiation method, the new 
project is granted based on the experience of previous projects. Direct 
negotiation bargaining process (Shen et al., 2007), financial renegotiation 
model (Ho, 2006) and construction claims model (Ho and Liu, 2004) are direct 
negotiation game model. 
3.6 The Proposed Game Model 
Divergence of interests and motivations cannot be prevented in a PPP-
BOT project. Different types of negotiations with diverse objectives are 
realized between main parties involved in PPP-BOT in the development 
phase. Of course, each party is going to increase its proportion of the payoff 
(in the payoff matrix). On the contrary it can be seen simultaneously that each 
party is going to decrease and cut its proportion of the risks. Therefore, the 
decision making criteria of PPP-BOT model should be to satisfy all 
stakeholders. Interest and motivation of main parties involved in PPP project 
are represented in Table 3-2. The private sector aims for profit maximization 
and the Private sector interest is financial returns. Return on equity (EIRR) 
and NPV of equity cash flow are taken as the indicator for SPV (Expression: 
Max ROE). In contrast, the public sector aims for the accomplishment of 
service delivery, risk transfer and value for money (VFM) by means of PPP-
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BOT approach. Although two parties have different objectives, they are able 
to adopt a win-win approach eventually. 
Table 3-2 Interest and motivation of main parties involved in PPP project 
Party involved in PPP 
project 
Interests/ motivations Expression 
Private sector Financial returns/profit maximization 
Max ROE/EIRR/NPV of 
equity cash flow 
Public sector 




Timely Return on principal and interest with 
repayment security 
DSCR/LLCR Not less than 
specific amount 
The public/end users Reasonable quality and cheaper goods/facility Min Tariff/Toll (Levelized) 
 
We make the assumptions that both parties observe rational behaviour and 
have different information for the model building. All parties contribute to the 
project financial plan by injecting capital into the project in different forms 
such as fund, loan and guarantee. The objective function of each party and 
also project could be represented mathematically as follows. 
Private sector (concessionaire) objective function: 
Π𝑝  =  NPV𝛼
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Project Objective function: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥Π𝑝                     3.3 
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𝑉𝐹𝑀𝛼

































The decision variables, known as independent variables, in the multi-
objective model shown by Equations (3.1) - (3.10) are negotiable concession 
items (NCIs). Most important items are tariff/toll, concession period and 
royalty. These are the components of other parameters like revenue (apart 
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from decision variables like toll, in some cases, the parameters like capacity, 
are also decision variables). 
The conceptual feasible negotiation space (negotiation yield) of the project 
based on the defined project objective functions is demonstrated in Figure 3-5. 
The x-axis is private sector payoff (Π𝑝) which is between the payoffs at the 
hurdle rate (minimum internal rate of return, MIRR) and maximum return 
acceptable by the public sector. The y-axis is public sector payoff (Π𝑔) which 







assumed to be same for all bid submissions by tenderers). So the feasible 
negotiation space is the shaded area which is limited to the maximum and 
minimum value of public and private sectors’ payoffs. This area is also 
restricted by DSCRmin and 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝑅min to meet the lenders requirements (they 
are assumed to be linear functions of Π𝑝 and Π𝑔). The Nash equilibrium 
solution would be located at the bottom area near to the intersection point. The 
Pareto optimal solution is located at the top area near to Pareto frontier curve. 
Within these two areas indifference curves could be defined based on the 




Figure 3-5 Conceptual feasible negotiation yield (negotiation space) for a PPP-BOT project 
during development phase 
3.6.1 The Conceptual Negotiating Model for PPP-BOT Projects 
Consider a game theory problem with two players, government and 
concessionaire, at development phase of a PPP-BOT project. Assume Ui(x) is 
the utility function (payoff) associated with each player i (i=1, 2) such that if 
strategy X (X ∈ S, S is the possible negotiation space) is selected, player i’s 
payoff will be Ui(x) (i=1, 2). These two players are involved in negotiating 
and wish a deal such that their payoff functions are maximized. There also 
exists a status quo point Xw ∈ S that is called Nash equilibrium position such 
that if both players decide not to cooperate (bid preparation and tendering 
stage), their payoffs will be u∗ = U1 (XW) and v
∗ = U2 (XW) respectively. 
Status quo is a Latin term meaning the current or existing state of affairs. To 
maximize their payoffs and utilities, player 1 wishes a deal denoted by a point 
as far to the right as possible in S, while player 2 desires a point as high in S as 
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possible. Using the diagram of S, it can be seen that the Polygon Pareto 
optimal frontier of Payoffs (Polygon Ω) represents the best payoffs both 
players can hope for (see Figure 3-6). The negotiating model developed in this 
study is an extension and modification of the model presented by Dhingra and 
Rao (1995). 
 
Figure 3-6 Pareto optimal frontier 
Assume set of options S is a convex bounded and closed area and a special 
point 𝑋𝑤 ∈ 𝑆 corresponding to point of initial agreement between the players 
called Nash equilibrium position, and a set of payoff functions 𝑈𝑖(𝑥), i=1,2, 
associated with each player: 𝑈1(𝑥) = U𝑝, 𝑈2(𝑥) = U𝑔. 
To determine a fair solution, a plausible negotiating function is defined as: 
𝐵(𝑥) = ∏ [𝑈𝑖(𝑋) − 𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑤)]
2
𝑖=1 = [U𝑝(𝑋) − U𝑝(𝑋𝑤)][U𝑔(𝑋) − U𝑔(𝑋𝑤)]                         3.11 
For all 𝑋𝑤 ∈ 𝑆
∗, 𝑆∗ = [𝑋|𝑋 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) − 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑤)  ≥ 0]                                        3.12 
An optimum compromise solution X𝑜𝑝𝑡 is then given as 
B(𝑋𝑜𝑝𝑡)= 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐵(𝑥), 𝑋𝑤 ∈ 𝑆
∗.                         3.13 
This negotiating scheme returns an option 𝑋𝑜𝑝𝑡 which maximizes the product 
of each player’s distance from the Nash equilibrium position. Consider now an 
MOP problem with 2 objective functions, Π𝑝 and Π𝑔. A game theory 
formulation for this problem consists of 2 players where each player 
































corresponds to an objective function. The bargaining function 𝐵(𝑥) for this 
MOP problem is given as: 
𝐵(𝑥) = ∏ [Π𝑖(𝑋) − Π𝑖(𝑋𝑤)]
2
𝑖=1 = [Π𝑝(𝑋) − Π𝑝(𝑋𝑤)][Π𝑔(𝑋) − Π𝑔(𝑋𝑤)]                         3.14 
Here objective functions Π𝑖  (𝑋) and the utility functions 𝑈𝑖(𝑋) have to be 
maximized. In equation (3.14) Π𝑖(𝑋𝑤) is the worst value (status quo) of 
objective function Π𝑖 that player i is willing to accept. Implicit in the 
negotiating function given is the assumption that all objective functions are 
equally important. If we associate differing degrees of importance with 
objective functions, the plausible negotiating function 𝐵(𝑥) is generalized as: 
𝐵(𝑥) = ∏ ([Π𝑖(𝑋) − Π𝑖(𝑋𝑤)] ∗ 𝑤𝑖)
2
𝑖=1                                                   3.15 
where 𝑤𝑖’s are relative degrees of importance of objective function Π𝑖. The 
weights 𝑤𝑖 can be determined using the Saaty’s method of paired comparisons 
(Saaty, 1997). Thus game theory formulation for an MOP problem bring in: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐵(𝑥) = ∏ ([Π𝑖(𝑋) − Π𝑖(𝑋𝑤)] ∗ 𝑤𝑖)
2
𝑖=1                                              3.16 
Subject to X ∈ 𝑆∗ and ∑ 𝑤𝑖
2
𝑖=1 = 1 
The game theory formulation for an MOP problem yields an optimum 
solution that is Pareto optimal and insures that at the final solution all 
objective functions attain acceptable values. This computational procedure 
helps each player analyse the maximum benefit that can be obtained while 
negotiating with other players in different stages. The conceptual negotiating 
model given in equation 3.16 permits a trade-off between various goals; 




3.6.2 Fuzzy Game Theory: Dealing With Uncertainty and Risk 
To be realistic, by considering PPP projects as a game, it is necessary to take 
into account that it is a game played with imperfect and incomplete 
information. This means that players involved in the negotiations maximize 
their bargaining power and consequently their payoff by expanding their 
access to information.  
Zadeh (1965) introduced the concept of fuzzy set theory. Based on the 
extension principle, the arithmetic of fuzzy numbers can be derived. Generally 
a fuzzy interval is represented by two fuzzy numbers and membership 
functions, such as triangular and trapezoid fuzzy numbers (T.F.N and Tr.F.N). 
An α-cut operation can be applied to the fuzzy numbers. If we denote an α-cut 
interval for fuzzy number ),,,(
~
4321 aaaaATrFN   as A
~
, the obtained 
interval A
~
 is defined as   32 ,
~
aaA  . Table 3-3 demonstrates public-private 
general game of PPP decision model under risk and uncertainty. The expected 
utility of each party associated with each strategy is also established. The 
payoff functions may be obtained as fuzzy numbers using fuzzy Delphi 
method:  4321
~
iiiii aaaaA   and  4321
~
iiiii bbbbB  . 𝑖 is ordered 
pair index in payoff table. Then by applying fuzzy operational laws the 
expected payoff of each player is computed. ( 𝑎𝑖1 < 𝑎𝑖2 < 𝑎𝑖3 < 𝑎𝑖4 and 
𝑏𝑖1 < 𝑏𝑖2 < 𝑏𝑖3 < 𝑏𝑖4) 
Table 3-3Two-parties general fuzzy game of PPP Decision Model 
 Public Sector ( Player2) 
 Probability  q 1- q 
Strategy F1 F2 
 Private 
investor             
( Player1) 




















?̃?1 = (𝑎11, 𝑎12, 𝑎13, 𝑎14), ?̃?2 = (𝑎21, 𝑎22, 𝑎23, 𝑎24), ?̃?3 = (𝑎31, 𝑎32, 𝑎33, 𝑎34), ?̃?4 =
(𝑎41, 𝑎42, 𝑎43, 𝑎44), ?̃?1 = (𝑏11, 𝑏12, 𝑏13, 𝑏14), ?̃?2 = (𝑏21, 𝑏22, 𝑏23, 𝑏24), ?̃?3 =
(𝑏31, 𝑏32, 𝑏33, 𝑏34),         ?̃?4 = (𝑏41, 𝑏42, 𝑏43, 𝑏44) 
Fuzzy operational laws (Zadeh, 1965, 1975) are as follows. Assuming: 
Fuzzy addition: ?̃?1 + ?̃?2 = (𝑎11 + 𝑎21, 𝑎12 + 𝑎22, 𝑎13 + 𝑎23, 𝑎14 + 𝑎24), Fuzzy 
subtraction: ?̃?1 − ?̃?2 = (𝑎11 − 𝑎24, 𝑎12 − 𝑎23, 𝑎13 − 𝑎22, 𝑎14 − 𝑎21), Fuzzy 
multiplication: ?̃?1 ∗ ?̃?2 = (𝑎11 ∗ 𝑎21, 𝑎12 ∗ 𝑎22, 𝑎13 ∗ 𝑎23, 𝑎14 ∗ 𝑎24), Fuzzy 













Scalar multiplication:  𝑘 ∗ ?̃?1 = (𝑘 ∗ 𝑎11, 𝑘 ∗ 𝑎12, 𝑘 ∗ 𝑎13, 𝑘 ∗ 𝑎14) 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 > 0, 
(k: scalar) 𝑘 ∗ ?̃?1 = (𝑘 ∗ 𝑎14, 𝑘 ∗ 𝑎13, 𝑘 ∗ 𝑎12, 𝑘 ∗ 𝑎11) 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 < 0  
Since the expected payoff of player 1 is: 
𝐸[𝑈(𝑌1)] = 𝑞[?̃?1*p+?̃?3*(1-p)] + (1-q)[?̃?2*p+?̃?4*(1-p)], So: 
𝐸[𝑈(𝑌1)] = 𝑞[(𝑎11, 𝑎12, 𝑎13, 𝑎14)𝑝 + (𝑎31, 𝑎32, 𝑎33, 𝑎34)(1 − 𝑝)] +
(1 − 𝑞)[(𝑎21, 𝑎22, 𝑎23, 𝑎24)𝑝 + (𝑎41, 𝑎42, 𝑎43, 𝑎44)(1 − 𝑝)]=  
(
 
𝑞[𝑝𝑎11 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎31] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑎21 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎41],
𝑞[𝑝𝑎12 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎32] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑎22 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎42],
𝑞[𝑝𝑎13 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎33] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑎23 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎43],
𝑞[𝑝𝑎14 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎34] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑎24 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎44] )
  






∗ = 𝑞[𝑝𝑎11 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎31] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑎21 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎41],  
𝑦12
∗ = 𝑞[𝑝𝑎12 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎32] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑎22 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎42], 
𝑦13
∗ = 𝑞[𝑝𝑎13 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎33] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑎23 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑎43], 
𝑦14
∗ = 𝑞[𝑝𝑎14+ (1− 𝑝)𝑎34]+ (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑎24+ (1− 𝑝)𝑎44].                       3.17 











∗ = 𝑞[𝑝𝑏12 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑏32] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑏22 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑏42], 
𝑦23
∗ = 𝑞[𝑝𝑏13 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑏33] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑝𝑏23 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑏43], 
𝑦24
∗ = 𝑞[𝑝𝑏14+ (1− 𝑝)𝑏34]+ (1− 𝑞)[𝑝𝑏24+ (1 − 𝑝)𝑏44].                         3.18 
3.6.3 Crisp Games: No Uncertainty and Risk 
Table 3-4 demonstrates public-private general game of PPP decision model 
under deterministic assumption of payoffs or the case of crisp games. The 
expected utility of each party can be established.  
In classical set theory, the membership of elements in relation to a set is 
assessed in binary terms according to a bivalent condition. An element either 
belongs or does not belong to the set, the boundary condition of the set is 
crisp. 
Table 3-4Two-parties general game of PPP Decision Model 
 Public Sector ( Player2) 
 Probability  q 1- q 




p S1 (𝑎1, 𝑏1) (𝑎2, 𝑏2) 
1-p S2 (𝑎3, 𝑏3) (𝑎4, 𝑏4) 
 
Pure strategies selected by player2(Y2) Expected payoff for player1(Y1) 
F1 (w.pr.: q) 𝑎1𝑝 + 𝑎3(1 − 𝑝) 
F2 (w.pr.: 1-q) 𝑎2𝑝 + 𝑎4(1 − 𝑝) 
⇒ 𝐸[𝑈(𝑌1)] = 𝑞[𝑎1𝑝 + 𝑎3(1 − 𝑝)] + (1 − 𝑞)[𝑎2𝑝 + 𝑎4(1 − 𝑝)] 
 
Pure strategies selected by player1(Y1) Expected payoff for player2(Y2) 
S1 (w.pr.: p) 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2(1 − 𝑞) 
S2 (w.pr.: 1-p)  𝑏3𝑞 + 𝑏4(1 − 𝑞) 
⇒𝐸[𝑈(𝑌2)] = 𝑝[𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2(1 − 𝑞)] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝑏3𝑞 + 𝑏4(1 − 𝑞)] 
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3.6.4 Bid Competition Game Model 
The bid competition includes two types of games, game with the 
government and game with competitors. The pure strategy NE solution of the 
game with competitors is examined by Ho (2005). The mixed strategy NE 
solution of this game as well as the game with the government is studied and 
developed in this present chapter. Fuzzy game is implemented by applying the 
equations that were developed in section 3.6.2, fuzzy game theory. 
Game with the Government 
The first type of game in bid competition is the game with government. 
This game is studied in the present chapter. The strategies and corresponding 
payoff functions are illustrated in Table 3-5. Private investor’s strategies are 
contract fulfilment (keep the project at contracted quality and price at the 
agreed level) and profit maximization (deviate from contract by lowering 
quality or increasing prices from agreed level). The government’s set of 
strategies consists of regulate the contract/bid (i.e. enforcement of contract 
specificity, quality standards and marginal cost pricing (tariff/toll cap)) and 
not regulate the contract/bid. Under strategy profit maximization, the private 
investor is subject to pay its cost. Under strategy regulate the contract/bid; the 
government is subject to pay the cost of regulation and also to pay royalty to 
the private investor. 












Not regulate the 
contract/bid 
Regulate the contract/bid 
Contract 
fulfilment 
(Π𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, Π𝑔) (Π𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑅, Π𝑔 − 𝑅 − 𝐶𝑟) 
Profit 
maximization 




The normalized payoff functions of the above game are as follows. 




Contract fulfillment (−𝑅, 𝑅 + 𝐶𝑟) (0, 0) 
Profit maximization (Π𝑝Δ − 𝑅, 𝐶𝑝 +
𝐶𝑟 + 𝑅) 
(Π𝑝Δ, 𝐶𝑝) 
Where Π𝑝Δ = 𝑁𝑃𝑉∆: 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 
So (Profit maximization, Not regulate the contract/bid) strategy is the pure 
strategy Nash Equilibrium solution. 
Game with Competitors 
The second type of game in bid competition is the game with competitors. 
The pure strategy NE solution of this game is examined by Ho (2005). In the 
present chapter, by introducing the probability distribution over the strategies, 
the mixed strategy NE solution is studied. Table 3-6 illustrates this game. The 
optimal mixed strategy for bidder 1 is considered. The expected payoff for 
player1 is illustrated as follows. These expected payoffs are plotted on a graph 
to implement Minimax theorem. By drawing L1 & L2 and using minimax (or 
maximin) criterion, optimal mixed strategy for player 1 could be found (Figure 
3-7). For example, in the case that players choose strategies (H, H) and (A, A), 
since both have same level of efforts the compensation and profit are divided 
equally. 
Table 3-6 Two-bidder game of Bid competition/compensation Decision Model 
 Bidder 2 
 probability  𝑞 1 − 𝑞  















− 𝐸) (𝑇 − 𝐸, 𝑆) 













Explanations and Notations: 
1. Level of efforts as strategies: High ( denote by H-with extra cost “E” to improve the 
quality of the proposal) and Average (denote by A-without extra cost) 
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2. Fixed amount of bid compensation, “S”: the fixed amount can be expressed by a 
certain percentage of the average profit, denoted as “T”. 
3. Probability of choosing each strategy H&A (H,A) for bidders 1 & 2: (𝑝, 1 −
𝑝)𝑌1 , (𝑞, 1 − 𝑞)𝑌2  
Pure strategies selected by player2(Y2) Expected payoff for player1(Y1) 







− 𝐸) 𝑝 + (𝑆)(1 − 𝑝) 
𝐴 (w. pr. : 1 − q) 






) (1 − 𝑝) 
 
Pure strategies selected by player1(Y1) Expected payoff for player1(Y1) 







− 𝐸)𝑞 + (𝑇 − 𝐸)(1 − 𝑞) 






) (1 − 𝑞) 
 
 
In other words, player1 expected payoff is: 






− 𝐸) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑆)]







Player 2 aims to minimize this expected payoff for player1. Given 𝑝, 
player 2 can minimize this expected payoff by choosing the pure strategy that 
corresponds to the “bottom” line for that 𝑝 in Figure 3-7. According to the 
minimax (or maximin) criterion, player1 wants to maximize this minimum 
expected payoff. Consequently, player 1 should select the value of 𝑝 where the 
bottom line peaks, i.e., where the 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 lines intersect, which yields an 













































Figure 3-7 Graphical procedures for solving Game 
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)                                3.19 
On the other hand: 






− 𝐸) + (1 − 𝑞)(𝑇 − 𝐸) 







Expected payoff for player1: 












)]            3.20 






















To solve algebraically for this optimal value of p at the intersection of the two 





















3.6.5 Application of Game Theory before Nominating the Selected Bidder 
In the course of the prolonged and costly development phase, the aim of 
each bidder is to be nominated as selected bidder (the first best bidder: 
concessioner). It is common for failed negotiations to conduct on 
contemplation of the reserved bidder. So bidders try to carry out better than 
their competitors. Thus the game type in this stage is non-cooperative game. 
Each consortium’s bid is treated as a game. It is a “Simultaneous Move 
Game” where players make their strategy choices simultaneously, without 
knowing thoroughly the strategies that have been chosen by other players. The 
games at this period are played on the basis of incomplete information, as 
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players may not know some/complete information about the other players, e.g. 
strategies, payoffs and priorities. 
So, the games at the first part of development phase, bid preparation and 
tendering stage, are non-cooperative non-zero incomplete information 
simultaneous static games. Each bidder principally is inclined to play a two-
person game with the government agency. Thus the government agency will 
play several games simultaneously with the respective bidders. Furthermore, 
the public sector has a tendency to play pure strategies before the a bidder is 
nominated, while the private sector consortia “concessionaire” tends to play 
by means of mixed strategies. 
At this stage lengthy, costly and complex negotiations are held between 
the two main parties, i.e. public sector “government agency” and private 
sectors “concessionaire” as PPP project investors. All necessary issues are 
highlighted and negotiated. They bargain on NCIs such as length of 
concession “concession period”, tariff/toll and royalty. For the sake of 
simplicity of decision making in the bid, normally government agency is 
willing to provide complete and standard bid documents and employ it in the 
bid. In this kind of bid documents every component of contract, including all 
contractual parameters such as technical, financial, and etc. aspects of the 
project are set and predetermined clearly. Only one contractual parameter such 
as tariff/toll is remained as decision variable for bid participants to propose 
and the government agency will decide and nominate the best bidder as 
concessionaire based on this remaining contractual parameter. 
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3.6.6 Application of Game Theory after Nominating the Selected Bidder 
At this stage, lengthy, costly and complex negotiations are held with third 
parties such as insurers and EPC contractors. The results of these negotiations 
may affect main negotiations between two main parties, i.e. the public sector 
“government agency” and the private sector consortium “concessioner”.  As a 
major result, two main parties will revisit and verify the risk allocation and re-
assess the risk profile of the project. Benefits and risks could be shared while 
negotiating. These issues lead negotiating parties to finalize the terms of 
concession agreement. A life-cycle financial model is often used to evaluate 
the financial outcome of the project in long-term perspective. The 
concessioner and government agency’s attitude at this stage is changed to co-
operative type of game, with the objective of achieving a win-win result. The 
“extensive form” can be used to represent the games at this stage. Information 
is agreed to flow easily between two players. The open book approach is 
adopted here, as it is beneficial to the two parties to do so. This is applicable in 
direct negotiation method.  
Here the two parties negotiate several issues i.e. NCIs, especially the 
project risks and their consequences for payoffs. Some of the risks may be 
shared between the two parties. Where the private sector feels it is being asked 
to bear an unusual risk, it will propose to either refuse or charge a high 
premium for it. The government agency would then respond. By means of 
“Alternating Offers Bargaining” the two parties would negotiate such an issue 
until it is resolved to their satisfaction. Briefly, the games at final negotiations 
stage are cooperative non-zero complete and perfect information dynamic 
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games. The solution of the game at this stage is proposed to achieve based on 
the “Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality” concept. 
3.7 Illustrative Hypothetical Example 
Chapter 7 covers a real case study with full detail. Here, a hypothetical 
simple example on bid competition, game with competitors, is used to 
illustrate the basic concepts and the applicability of the proposed game model 
and its analysis. Bid competition, game with competitors, was studied in 
section 3.6.4. Following assumptions are adopted in this hypothetical simple 
example. The profit is assumed as uncertain variable and is estimated as 
triangular fuzzy number (T.F.N). T=〈0.85,1,1.1〉 M$. S=0.07T, E=0.05T. The 
game is illustrated in Table 3-7. 
Table 3-7 Hypothetical example on bid competition, game with competitors 
 Bidder 2 
 probability  0.4 0.6 
 Strategy 𝐻 𝐴 
Bidder 
1 
0.6 𝐻 (0.485𝑇, 0.485𝑇) (0.95𝑇, 0.07𝑇) 
0.4 𝐴 (0.07𝑇, 0.95𝑇) (0.535𝑇, 0.535𝑇) 
 
By using equations 3.17 and 3.18, the expected payoff of players 1 and 2 are 
computed: 
 𝐸[𝑈(𝑌1)]=〈0.585,0.689,0.758〉 and 𝐸[𝑈(𝑌2)] = 〈0.496,0.583,0.642〉. 
As can be seen the expected payoffs are fuzzy numbers. 
3.8 Conclusion Remarks 
Game theory is a tool which enables decision makers to understand 
players’ behaviour and model games, foreseeing outcomes based on the rules 
and determine the negotiation position. This chapter has presented the game 
theory model for determining negotiation positions. The aim of this chapter 
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was to ensure each player the highest possible expected payoff under 
uncertainties and risks. The game theory was applied in development phase of 
PPP-BOT project. Based on these results, the development phase of PPP-BOT 
project is divided into two stages. The proposed mathematical model reveals 
that by increasing the cooperation between public and private sectors, the 
game type of negotiation is changed from incomplete static game to complete 
and perfect dynamic game. By this movement the payoff of both players are 
increased from Nash equilibrium position to Pareto optimality position. One 
advantage of game theory is that it can capture and anticipate behaviours in 
complex projects with multiple players and multiple diverse and inconsistent 
objectives.  
This chapter proposes appropriate type of game to solve the problems and 
difficulties involved. This capability facilitates the generation of alternative 
negotiation outcomes for both public and private sectors which are 
strategically stable during the development phase of PPP-BOT projects. In 
addition, game theory provides a method and module for achieving win-win 
solutions.  
Currently, the payoff of game theory is deterministic and this is a major 
drawback of game theory application. Thus, current research has focused on 
the integration of game theory and possibility theory (fuzzy logic) to manage 
the uncertainties involved in the game. This limitation has been omitted by 
extending to fuzzy game theory.  
By using this chapter’s approaches both parties gain more in PPP-BOT 
projects in compare to conventional approaches. The expected earnings can be 
calculated properly based on the fuzzy game theory approach for the strategy 
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outlined for each player. Thus, if players cooperate together (cooperation 





CHAPTER 4 FUZZY RANDOMNESS SIMULATION OF LONG 
TERM INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Conventional simulation model in prediction of long term infrastructure 
development systems such as PPP-BOT projects assumes single probabilistic 
values for all of the input variables. Traditionally, all the input risks and 
uncertainties in the Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) are modelled based on the 
probability theory and then the simulation is performed. Its output result is 
also presented by a probability distribution function (PDF) and a cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) and is utilized for analysis decision making. 
However, in reality, some of the variables are estimated based on the experts’ 
judgment and some are derived from historical data (pervious projects). Also, 
the parameters’ data of probability distribution for the simulation model input 
are subject to change and are difficult to predict. Therefore, a simulation 
model which is capable of handling both types of fuzzy and probabilistic input 
variables is needed and vital. Recently fuzzy randomness, which is the 
extension of classical probability theory, provides additional features and 
improvements for combining fuzzy and probabilistic data to overcome 
aforementioned shortcomings. 
Fuzzy Randomness Monte Carlo Simulation (FR-MCS) technique is a 
hybrid simulation approach for risk and uncertainty evaluation. The proposed 
approach permits any type of risk and uncertainty in the input values to be 
explicitly defined prior to the decision analysis being undertaken. It extends 
the practical use of the conventional MCS by providing the capability of 
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choosing between fuzzy sets and probability distributions. This is done to 
quantify the input risks and uncertainties in a simulation. A new algorithm for 
generating fuzzy random variables is developed as part of the proposed FR-
MCS technique based on the α-cut. FR-MCS output results are represented by 
fuzzy probability and the decision variables are modelled by fuzzy CDF. The 
FR-MCS technique is demonstrated in a PPP-BOT case study. The FR-MCS 
results are compared with those obtained from the conventional MCS. It is 
shown that FR-MCS technique facilitates decision making for both the public 
and private sectors’ decision makers involved in PPP-BOT project by 
determining a negotiation bound for negotiable concession items instead of 
crisp value as posed to do in conventional MCS’s output result. This approach 
prevents prolonged and costly negotiations in development phase of PPP-BOT 
projects by providing more flexibility for decision makers. Both parties could 
take benefit of this technique at negotiation table. 
This chapter proposes a new technique, FR-MCS, for uncertainty and risk 
modelling and their propagation in the simulation model. The proposed 
technique generalizes the conventional MCS. FR-MCS can be utilized in risk 
assessment as an alternative to the conventional MCS. In this chapter a 
comparison of the two approaches relative to their computational 
requirements, data requirements and availability is provided. Understanding 
negotiation bound and maximizing gains within the bound are the main benefit 
and advantage of this approach. 
This chapter is organized as follows:  firstly, after a discussion on decision 
making under uncertainty and risk, the related works in the literature are 
reviewed. Secondly, conventional MCS and value at risk are considered. 
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Thirdly, FR-MCS technique is proposed and studied in detail. A new 
algorithm is proposed to generate fuzzy random variables. Finally, FR-MCS is 
applied for decision making under uncertainty and risk in a real case of PPP-
BOT project. 
4.2 Decision Making Under Uncertainty and Risk 
A majority of decision making in real projects takes place in an 
environment in which the objective functions, the constraints and the 
consequences of possible actions are not precisely known. Moreover, the 
historical data for long term infrastructure development systems are not 
normally available and therefore are not directly determinable. Even the 
available data from previous projects cannot be used since in general each 
project is unique. Difficulties arise if the available information is limited and 
is of a fuzzy rather than of a stochastic nature. To use historical data expert 
knowledge must be applied. Expert knowledge is especially useful in the 
development phase when insufficient data are available for negotiations. 
In order to achieve an appropriate simulation modelling in accordance with 
the nature of the underlying input data, it is common to use non-deterministic 
methods. Typically, there are two types of uncertainties: Randomness due to 
inherent variability and fuzziness due to imprecision and lack of knowledge 
and information. The former type of uncertainty is often referred to as 
objective, aleatory and stochastic whereas the latter is often referred to as 
subjective, imprecise and being a major source of imprecision in many 
decision processes. Our argument is that there is a need for differentiation 
between the two types of imprecision modelling. The distinction between 
aleatory and imprecise uncertainty plays a particularly important role in the 
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quantitative risk assessment framework (e.g., MCS) that is applied to complex 
and long term infrastructure development systems. 
Risk (randomness characteristic) that refers to probabilistic features is 
expressed by stochastic models (probability theory and statistical methods) 
and uncertainty (fuzziness characteristic) that refers to non-probabilistic, also 
called possibilistic, features is represented by fuzzy sets (theory of possibility). 
In this research for simplicity, the former is called stochastic and the latter is 
called fuzzy. 
A fuzzy set (Zadeh, 1965) is a non-probabilistic method and model used in 
subjective modelling which overcomes the short comings of the probabilistic 
methods. Briefly, fuzzy approach is used due to unique aspects of a project, 
lack of data and subjectivity. In these circumstances subjective judgment and 
linguistically information obtained from the practitioners of a PPP-BOT 
project, is often necessary and leads to non-probabilistic uncertainty 
modelling, or fuzziness. 
The distinction between risk (stochastic) and uncertainty (fuzzy) helps to 
avoid inappropriate modelling of the non-deterministic input data, especially 
when both probabilistic and non-probabilistic components appear. Because 
practical situations of risk computation often involve both types of vagueness, 
methods are needed to combine these two modes of ambiguity representation 
in the propagation step of simulation. Also, a more vigorous investment 
decision method that incorporates both risk and uncertainty in simulation and 
financial modelling and evaluation is needed. 
In the current risk assessment practice, both types of uncertainties are 
represented by means of probability distributions. In other words, to deal 
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quantitatively with imprecision, traditionally the concepts and techniques of 
probability theory have been employed. This approach has some shortcomings 
to overcome uncertainties in decision makings. The conventional simulation 
approach presented in the literature review is incapable of fuzzy modelling. 
Hence, the estimation and simulation of the project data and decision variables 
is unreliable. Therefore, other theories and computational methods that 
propagate uncertainty and variability in exposure and risk assessment are 
needed.  
This chapter presents an adequate hybrid simulation model and its 
procedure regarding risk analysis process and uncertainty propagation in PPP-
BOT projects using non-deterministic approaches. The focus of this chapter is 
non-probabilistic features of the simulation input data and the representation 
of the uncertainty by fuzzy numbers. This approach leads to better decisions in 
negotiations for main parties involved in long term infrastructure projects. In 
the proposed fuzzy randomness simulation model, random variables and 
random processes are utilized to cater for the objective input variables and 
their assessment. Furthermore, fuzzy variables and fuzzy inference system 
(FIS) are utilized to cater for the subjective input variables and their 
assessment. Fuzzy probability approach is used to combine these two variables 
in the simulation process. Having a simulation approach that can deal with 
stochastic and fuzzy process is fundamental and crucial in risk analysis 
process of PPP-BOT projects. Then probabilistic and possibilistic risk and 
uncertainty assessment technique is carried out instead of the conventional 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This approach introduces a new concept 
and uncertain characterization method that is called uncertainty modelling. 
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The negotiation simulation problem including parameters with undeclared 
and vague probabilities is solved by a combination of stochastic simulation 
and fuzzy analysis. The simulation output is then captured in terms of fuzzy 
probability which denotes success/failure in project objectives based on the 
predetermined criteria. In this context fuzzy probability approach provides a 
powerful tool to combine the observed data and judgmental information. 
Fuzzy randomness simultaneously describes objective and subjective 
information as a fuzzy set of possible probabilistic models over some range of 
imprecision. This generalized uncertainty and risk model contains fuzziness 
and randomness as special cases. 
The output of a risk analysis based on the conventional MCS is therefore a 
probability distribution (PDF, CDF) of all probable expected returns, offering 
the prospective investors an incomplete return profile which is called risk 
profile of the project showing all the probable outcomes that could result from 
the investment decision. Conversely, the output of a risk and uncertainty 
analysis based on the FR-MCS is a set (range) of probability distribution 
(PDF, CDF) of all probable and possible expected returns, offering the 
prospective investors a complete return profile which is called risk and 
uncertainty profile of the project showing all the probable and possible 
outcomes that could result from the investment decision. 
If sufficient information to generate PDFs and CDFs of the parameters as 
random variables are not available, but expert knowledge or scarce data exists 
to represent the PDF and CDF of the parameters as fuzzy numbers with 
appropriate membership function, then fuzzy set theory can be utilized to treat 
the uncertainties in these parameters.  In the subjective probabilities approach, 
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there are two cases for possibility risk assessment. In the first case, instead of 
describing the parameters of PDFs and CDFs as crisp value, e.g. mean (µ) and 
standard deviation (σ) for normal distribution, they can be described as fuzzy 
numbers. This case is called Alternative 1, fuzzy randomness. Alternatively, in 
the context of PPP-BOT projects, fuzzy parameters and numbers are directly 
used to address lack of data or subjective issues. This case is called Alternative 
2, pure fuzzy. 
As can be seen in literature review, section 2.3, varieties of mathematical 
models are developed to address risk and uncertainty modelling. In this 
chapter, fuzzy randomness (Moller and Beer, 2004) is used as an appropriate 
approach. The proposed fuzzy randomness simulation of long term 
infrastructure projects is a modification of Moller and Beer (2004). 
Uncertainty of the simulation input data can be modelled appropriately with 
the aid of non-probabilistic methods under possibility theory. Fuzzy set is 
common non-probabilistic model for uncertainty modelling. Furthermore, 
fuzzy probability which is the focus of this chapter is applied properly when 
risk and uncertainty appear simultaneously. 
The possibility theory is utilized directly to reflect uncertainties based on 
the experts judgments. Fuzzy set theory is used in combination with 
probabilistic methods to generate hybrid approaches for risk and uncertainty 
assessment studies. Vague probabilistic models for the uncertain variables and 
parameters are determined with the aid of fuzzy numbers. However, the 
proposed algorithm for generating fuzzy random variable and FR-MCS is 
simpler to implement because it is an interval analysis based on the α-level 
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sets (α-cuts) of the input fuzzy sets. FR-MCS is carried out for finding the 
inferior and superior values of the output α-cuts intervals. 
4.3 Monte Carlo Simulation Technique 
The MCS is a method for analysing risk propagation, where the goal is to 
study outcome variability of a system (Wittwer, 2004). The MCS is currently 
regarded as a powerful technique for cash flow analysis and analysing its 
problems especially for long term infrastructure projects. To do this the 
conventional PRA technique is carried out. (Reilly, 2005; Dey and Ogunlana, 
2004; Stock and Watson, 2005). Full statistical analysis of outcomes using the 
MCS, incorporating sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis (worst/best 
cases), gives more realistic risk analysis and representation in terms of range 
(confidence intervals) of probable outcomes, and provides the most detailed 
comparisons. Sensitivity Analysis measures the impact on project outcomes of 
changing one or more key input values about which there is uncertainty. 
(Akintoye et al., 2001a, b, c; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Stock and Watson, 
2005). Since the MCS can only treat input parameters as random variables by 
using probabilistic (stochastic) models, its main problem is observed when 
some of the input parameters are stochastic and some are fuzzy.  
The MCS is unable to address this general situation. Mathematically, 
random variable X is represented by: 𝑋𝑅.𝑉. = μ + 𝑧 ∗ 𝑆𝐷 where µ 
is mean, SD is standard deviation; z is the number of SD. A key task in the 
application of MCS is the generation of the appropriate values of the random 
variables in accordance with the respective prescribed probability 
distributions. This can be accomplished systematically for each variable by 
first generating a uniformly distributed random number between 0 and 1, and 
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through an appropriate transformation the corresponding random number with 
the specified probability distribution is then obtained (Ang and Tang, 1984). 
4.3.1 Value-at-Risk 
Value-at-risk (VaR) is related to the percentiles of probability distributions 
and measures the predicted maximum portfolio loss at a specified probability 
level over a certain period. Mathematically, VaR at a probability level 
100(1 − θ)% is defined as the value γ such that the probability that the 
negative of the investment return will exceed γ is not more than θ: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅1−θ(?̃?) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{γ|𝑃(−?̃? > γ) ≤ θ} 
where ?̃? denotes the random variable representing the investment return, and 
−?̃? is associated with the portfolio loss. (e.g., θ = 0.05 , then 100(1 − θ)% =
95% means that decision maker is interested in the 95% VaR which is the 
level of the investment losses that will not be exceeded with probability of 
more than 5%). 
VaR is the difference of the mean value and a multiple of standard 
deviation. It can be expressed as deviations from the mean VaR in units of the 
standard deviation. Every percentile can be expressed as a sum of the mean of 
the distribution and the standard deviation scaled by a multiplier as confidence 
coefficient indicating the degree of confidence for an individual risk level 
(number of standard deviations) with general form: 𝑉𝑎𝑅(1−θ)  = − μ + β𝜎 
and in the case of the normal distribution: 𝑉𝑎𝑅(1−θ)  = − μ +  𝑍1−θ𝜎, where µ 
is the mean and σ is the standard deviation of the underlying data distribution, 
respectively. The number  𝑍1−θ is the 100(1 − θ)
th percentile of a standard 
normal distribution (e.g.:  𝑍0.95 corresponding to the 95
th percentile is 1.64). 
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VaR could be generated for a PPP-BOT project from different perspective 
at a specific confidence level. VaR in the PPP-BOT projects context, is 
defined as the minimum expected value at a given confidence level.  Figure 
4-1 presents the cumulative probability for the VaR of a PPP-BOT project 
with low risks. In the context of PPP-BOT projects, a project manager as a 
decision maker is typically interested in two important statistics issue aim to 
final decision making: (1) an arbitrary and subjective quantile, and (2) the 
probability of exceeding (or not exceeding) a specific threshold. In most cases, 
project managers are concerned in finding the probability that a project will 
exceed a certain value (a specific threshold) of interest (meet the target on cost 
or time). At the given confidence level,(1 − θ)%, the value-at-risk (VaRθ) is 
shown in Figure 4-2. VaR∗ is defined as acceptable threshold value from 
party’s perspective based on its objective. It represents the worth of Value-at-
Risk at confidence level of 1 − θ∗. θ∗ represents the confidence level at the 
point of VaR∗ (See Figure 4-1). In this case VaRθ is more than VaR
∗. Value-at-
risk at a given confidence level,1 − θ, is computed by making the integration 
between −∞ and VaRθ equal to θ, and the confidence level at the point of 
VaR∗ is obtained by integration between −∞ and VaR∗ (See Figure 4-2). 
Literature review of the current simulation and financial risk evaluation 
methods shows that VaR system provides decision criteria with a confidence 
level. Ye and Tiong (2000) defined the NPV-at-risk based on the VaR system 
as a particular NPV generated for a project at some specific confidence level. 
Their definition of NPV-at-risk can be used to derive the decision rule: the 
project is acceptable with a confidence level of 1 − θ if the NPV-at-risk at 
given confidence is greater than zero. According to the requirements of 
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decision rules, there are two approaches to investment decision making: the 
calculation of NPV at a given confidence level and the calculation of a 
confidence level at the point of zero NPV. NPV-at-risk at a given confidence θ 
and the confidence level at the point of zero NPV can be obtained using 
percentile analysis on the cumulative distribution function (CDF). The NPV-
at-risk method takes into account all probable returns resulting from various 
risks associated with PPP-BOT projects. 
 
Figure 4-1 Cumulative 
distribution function of VaR 
 
Figure 4-2 Probability distribution function of VaR 
The decision rule emerging from the use of this criterion indicates that a 
PPP-BOT project investment should be selected for implementation if its 
indicator at risk (IND-at-risk) as VaR expected shortfall exceeds an investor 
defined limit. As can be seen, although VaR analysis has been successfully 
performed in previous research projects, it could only take randomness into 
account and cannot deal with fuzziness involved. Following sections will 
address this essential gap. 
4.4 Fuzzy Variables/Numbers 
Fuzzy set theory introduced by Zadeh (1965) permits the gradual assessment 
of the membership of the elements in relation to a set. It provides a suitable 





























specification of a smooth transition for elements from belonging to a set to not 
belonging to a set. This is described with the aid of a membership function. 
Membership values are assigned to the estimation results by subjective 
assessment. A fuzzy set ?̃? is defined as follows. Ã = {(x, μA(x)), x ∈
X, 0 ≤ μA(x) ≤ 1 }. Membership function,μA(x), associates each x ∈ Ã to a 
real number in the interval [0,1]. μA(x) represents the membership degree of x 
in set Ã. The fuzzy set Ã is referred to fuzzy variable x̃ (Moller and Beer, 
2004). A fuzzy number is said to be normal if there is an x ∈ A such that 
μA(x) = 1 and it is a convex fuzzy subset of the real line if  μA(λx1 +
(1 − λ)x2) ≥ min(μA(x1), μA(x2)), for λ ∈ [0,1]. The definition of fuzzy 
random variables (FRVs) is due to Kwakernaak (1978, 1979); “fuzzy random 
variables (FRVs) are random variables whose values are not real, but fuzzy 
numbers”. 
Fuzzy numbers are a generalization and refinement of intervals for 
representing imprecise parameters. This modelling corresponds to the theory 
of fuzzy random variables and to fuzzy probability theory (Kratschmer, 2001; 
Beer, 2010). 
4.4.1 α-level set (α-cut) 
α-level set (α-cut) is one of the important features of fuzzy set Ã and is 
useful in processing fuzzy variables through engineering computation. For the 
fuzzy set Ã, the crisp sets Aαk = { x ∈ X, μA(x) ≥ αk } can be extracted for 
real numbers αk ∈ (0,1]. These crisp sets are called α-level sets. All α-level 
sets Aαk are crisp subsets of the support S(Ã). The support S(Ã) is defined as 
follow: S(Ã) = {𝑥 ∈ ℝ, μA(x) > 0 }. For a convex fuzzy set, its α-level sets 
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are intervals Aαk = [𝑥𝛼𝑘
𝐿 , 𝑥𝛼𝑘
𝑅 ], see Figure 4-3. This aids the illustration of the 
fuzzy set Ã using its α-level sets as follow: 
Ã = {(Aαk , μ(Aαk)) , μ(Aαk) = αk ∀αk ∈ (0,1] } , 
Aαk ⊆ Aαi  ∀𝛼𝑖, 𝛼𝑘 ∈ (0,1], 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑘 
 
Figure 4-3 α-level set (α-cut) of a fuzzy variable 
If the fuzzy set Ã is convex, each α-level set Aαk is a connected interval 
[𝑥𝛼𝑘
𝐿 , 𝑥𝛼𝑘
𝑅 ] in which: 
𝑥𝛼𝑘
𝐿 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, μA(x) > αk], 𝑥𝛼𝑘
𝑅 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, μA(x) > αk]. 
In the other word, the α-cut of a continuous convex possibility distribution, 
Ã, could be understood as the inequality as follows: 
 Ãαk = {𝑥|𝑝(𝑥 ∈ [𝑥𝛼𝑘
𝐿 , 𝑥𝛼𝑘
𝑅 ]) ≥ 1 − αk} 
The α-level set of each fuzzy input parameter represents a set of values 
within an interval with max-min values which is called superior-inferior 
values corresponding to specific α-level set. Fuzzy alpha-cut (FAC) technique 
uses fuzzy set theory to represent uncertainty or imprecision in the concerned 
parameters at different level of uncertainties (α-levels). Uncertain parameters 
are considered to be fuzzy numbers with some assumed membership 
functions. There are many types of functional formulations for the 
membership functions. Two common used membership functions are 























numbers/variables can be represented by the following notations. Triangular 
fuzzy number “T.F.N” x̃𝑇𝑟𝑖: 〈𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3〉, Trapezoidal fuzzy number “Tr.F.N”  
x̃𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑝: 〈𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, 𝑎4〉. Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 show parameter x 
represented as a triangular and trapezoid fuzzy number with support of A0. 
The wider the support of the membership function, the higher the uncertainty. 
The fuzzy set that contains all elements with a membership of 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] and 
above is called the α-cut of the membership function. At a resolution level of 
α, it will have support of Aα and the higher the value of α, the higher the 




































Defining the α-cut, the interval of confidence at level α, T.F.N is characterized 
as follows: ∀𝛼 ∈ (0,1], 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑎2 ≤ 𝑎3 
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Figure 4-4 Triangular Fuzzy membership function 




















Defining the α-cut, the interval of confidence at level α, Tr.F.N is 
characterized as follows: ∀𝛼 ∈ (0,1], 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑎2 ≤ 𝑎3 ≤ 𝑎4 






) , 0) 
𝐴𝛼 = [𝑥𝛼
𝐿 , 𝑥𝛼
𝑅] = [(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)𝛼 + 𝑎1, −(𝑎4 − 𝑎3)𝛼 + 𝑎4]  
The proposed FAC method is based on the fuzzy extension principle 
(Zadeh, 1975), which implies that functional relationships can be extended to 
involve fuzzy arguments and can be used to map the dependent variable as a 
fuzzy set. In simple arithmetic operations, this principle can be used 
analytically. However, in most practical modelling applications where 
relationships involve partial differential equations and other complex 
structures, the analytical application of this principle is difficult. Therefore, 
interval arithmetic is used to carry out the analysis. 
4.5 Fuzzy Randomness-Monte Carlo Simulation (FR-MCS) Technique 
To address aforementioned shortcomings, this chapter proposes a new 
simulation technique which is called Fuzzy Randomness-Monte Carlo 
simulation (FR-MCS) technique. The structure of FR-MCS technique is 
demonstrated in Figure 4-6. Numerical processing of fuzzy probabilities can 
be realized with a combination of stochastic and fuzzy analysis. Whilst 
probabilistic model is analysed with a traditional stochastic approach, the 
imprecision of the probabilistic model is transferred to the results via fuzzy 
analysis. The purpose of proposing FR-MCS is to provide an alternative 
approach to conventional MCS for treating uncertainties in the simulation 
input including the parameters of the PDFs using fuzzy set theory. This 
technique can model uncertainties involved in simulation input efficiency, 
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accompanied with random variables and deterministic input parameters. For 
instance 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑚, ?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑛−𝑚 ) is a function of 𝑛 variables includes 
of both types of non-deterministic variables: risky and uncertain variables. 
Risky (randomness) variables group: 𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑚, uncertain (fuzziness) 
variables group: ?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑛−𝑚. 
 
Figure 4-6 Fuzzy randomness Monte Carlo Simulation technique structure 
FR-MCS, which is used to combine multiple PDFs and CDFs in a risk 
calculation, is a means of quantifying uncertainty or variability in a hybrid 
fuzzy-probabilistic framework using simulation. The simulation output, based 
on the conventional MCS, will be exactly a CDF. On the other hand, FR-MCS 
is proposed as a general form of MCS technique. The output of a FR-MCS 
analysis is a collection of CDFs for each simulation and it results in a bound of 
CDFs (CDF series). 
FR-MCS combines MCS (Random Sampling) with the extension principle 
of fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1975; Gerla and Scarpati, 1998; Moller and Beer 
2004, 2008). FR-MCS utilizes a combination of probability and possibility 
theories to include probabilistic and possibilistic information in the risk 
analysis model. Fuzzy approach provides all the possible risks and likelihood 
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membership value of 1.0 is the most possible/likely risk. Higher uncertainty 
and variability involved can be seen from the supports of the membership 
functions of fuzzy risks generated for various percentiles. The resulting fuzzy 
risk has a larger range of possibilities (i.e., the support of the membership 
function is larger). Fuzzy calculations take into consideration all possible 
combinations of parameter values rather than random sampling. Similar to 
conventional MCS, the variability in the random variables of the risk equation 
(i.e., exposure frequency/probability and consequence) is treated using normal 
PDFs and the uncertainty associated with them is treated by using fuzzy 
numbers for the parameters of these random variables. That is, the means and 
the standard deviations of these PDFs are modelled as fuzzy numbers. Similar 
to MCS, the independence of the input parameters has been assumed in 
generating fuzzy random variables and producing fuzzy randomness; the 
output may be overestimated when using fuzzy randomness for a function 
with dependent input parameters. Algorithms are required to generate random 
variables and fuzzy random variables to implement FR-MCS. In the following 
section an algorithm is proposed for generating fuzzy random variables.  
FR-MCS technique results in multiple CDF of function y which is called 
F(y) series. It considers the spread of CDFs membership functions. Based on 
the resulted F(y) series, lower bound, 𝐹(𝑦), as inferior value and upper bound, 
𝐹(𝑦), as superior value of CDFs are determined. The appropriate membership 
degree, µ, corresponding to each CDF is then determined. This procedure is 




Figure 4-7 Fuzzy CDF and membership degree (µ) corresponding to each CDF 
The FR-MCS produces two CDFs (i.e., one for upper and one for lower 
bound) for each alpha-cut level except for alpha-cut 1.0 since the lower and 
the upper bound at alpha-cut 1.0 is the same. For each specific value of y e.g.: 
y', based on the lower and upper bounds, fuzzy probability of y' can be 
calculated and drawn. Also for each membership degree, lower and upper 
bound of CDFs are determined. Consequently, a corresponding fuzzy 
probability is established which is represented as a confidence level interval 
[CLαL, CL
α
R] as demonstrated in Figure 4-8. For each specific value of F(y) as 
a confidence level e.g.: θ, based on the lower and upper bounds, fuzzy 
probability of y' can be calculated and drawn. Also for each membership 
degree, lower and upper bound of CDFs are determined. Consequently, a 
corresponding fuzzy probability is established which is represented as 






















Figure 4-8 Analysis of fuzzy distribution function F̃(x) of 
a fuzzy function y and its membership function on a 
specific value y’ to determine confidence interval 
(confidence level bound) 
 
Figure 4-9 Analysis of fuzzy 
distribution function F̃(x) of a 
fuzzy function y and its 
membership function on a 
specific probability   to 
determine negotiation interval 
Compatible decisions that are made using conventional MCS can be made 
based on the FR-MCS technique only for the case of pure random variables of 
simulation input (no fuzziness). In the case of pure probabilistic (absence of 
fuzziness) in the input of FR-MCS technique the result of simulation will be 
exactly a CDF. As the number of fuzzy variables in the simulation input is 
increased, the CDF function in the simulation output has more fuzziness (i.e. 
more uncertainties are involved). Consequently CDF bound is wider. In the 
case of pure fuzzy random variables of simulation input (no randomness), the 
results are similar with the fuzzy set theory analysis. In this case the CDF 
bound is widest. The fuzzy inference mechanism is an applicable technique for 
this case. Mamdani and Sugeno are two types of fuzzy inference mechanism 
(Sivanandam et al., 2007). The Mamdani style is the most famous types of 
fuzzy controllers. α-cut levels signify uncertain level and represent the amount 
of uncertainty involved. On the contrary, α-confidence levels signify risky 
level and represent the amount of risk involved. Thus if the decision maker is 
optimistic and assumes high precision (µ = 1), (s)he works with the cores of 





































corresponding supports. In the case of in between, a corresponding value 
within µ = [0, 1] is chosen by decision maker. 
The method of decision making using fuzzy sets is based on the 
confidence level between 0 and 1 to get a range of values for the simulation 
final output. This range is calculated by finding the α-cut at the value of 1 
minus the confidence level. In this manner, the decision maker can choose 
from a range of values (interval) instead of a crisp output which is the result of 
conventional MCS. An arbitrary quantile can also be determined using the 
inverse of the fuzzy CDF. Fuzzy CDF has the unique feature of representing 
both fuzzy and probabilistic (uncertainty and risk) in a single diagram. 
4.5.1 Algorithm for Generating Fuzzy Random Variable 
The procedure of generating fuzzy random variable is not the same as that 
for generating random variable described earlier, in section 4.3 Monte Carlo 
Simulation technique. Current literature provides some knowledge on specific 
procedure for generating fuzzy random variable. Moller and Beer (2004, 2008) 
proposed a procedure which could be summarized as follows. They argue that 
fuzzy variables need to be treated separately. The fuzzy variables (let’s say n 
fuzzy variables), for each alpha-level (alpha cut), form an n-dimensional 
hypercube. For each point (vector) out of this hypercube Monte Carlo can be 
performed with the random variables and a CDF obtained for the result, e.g. a 
failure probability or some other probability of interest. Now it is needed to 
select another point out of the hypercube and repeat the Monte Carlo to get 
another result. When repeating this analysis, the aim is to find those points in 
the hypercube, which lead to the max and min final results (e.g. the failure 
probability). This is called global optimization (Moller and Beer, 2004, 2008). 
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When some knowledge about simulation function is available, this analysis 
may be significantly simplified. For example, when the simulation function is 
monotonic in every direction, then the extreme points are the corners of a 
hypercube. Only these points need to be checked for optimization. 
In this chapter, a modified and simplified procedure is developed. 
Generating fuzzy random variable procedure is explained in detail for two 
main types of fuzzy numbers and variables: triangular fuzzy number T.F.N,  
x̃𝑇𝑟𝑖: 〈𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3〉 , trapezoidal fuzzy number Tr.F.N, x̃𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑝: 〈𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, 𝑎4〉 in 4 
operative steps for a hybrid function of both randomness and fuzziness type of 
variables: 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑚, ?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑛−𝑚 ). Randomness (probabilistic) 
variables group: 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑚, which is characterized by probability distributions, 
and fuzziness (possibilistic) variables group: ?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑛−𝑚 which is represented 
in terms of possibility distributions (membership function) measuring the 
degree of possibility that the linguistic variables are. 
Step 1: The membership function is cut horizontally at a finite number of α-
levels between 0 and 1, α = {α1, α2, … , α𝑖, α𝑗 , . . . , α𝑁}. Consequently, for each 
α-level, an interval (a boundary) of concerned fuzzy values is achieved. For 
each α-level of the parameter, the model is run to determine the minimum and 
maximum possible values of the concerned output. This information is then 
directly used to construct the corresponding membership function (fuzziness) 
of the output which is used as a measure of uncertainty. If the output function 
is monotonic with respect to the dependent fuzzy variables, the process is 
rather simple since only two simulations will be enough for each α-level (one 
for each boundary in left and right). Otherwise, optimization routines have to 
be carried out to determine the minimum and maximum values of the output 
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for each α-level. This approach is used to model the interested output subject 
to imprecise boundary conditions and properties. 
The α-cut can be repeated for a number of iteration, N. Apply α-level set 
(α-cut) for a set of α to a fuzzy number, T.F.N or Tr.F.N (Figure 4-10). The 
resulted intervals are varied, when the membership function is characterized 
by convex and concave shape instead of common linear shape. 
Step 2: The boundary and resulted interval corresponding to α-level is 
demonstrated as follows: Aα = [𝑥α
𝐿 , 𝑥α
𝑅], The resulted intervals for T.F.N are 
characterized as follows: 
 Aα = [𝑥α
𝐿 , 𝑥α
𝑅] = [(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)α + 𝑎1, −(𝑎3 − 𝑎2)α + 𝑎3] , ∀α ∈ (0,1]. 
The resulted intervals for Tr.F.N are characterized as follows: 
Aα = [𝑥α
𝐿 , 𝑥α
𝑅] = [(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)α + 𝑎1, −(𝑎4 − 𝑎3)α + 𝑎4] , ∀α ∈ (0,1]. 
Step 3: Generate random variables from resulted intervals: Aα = [𝑥α
𝐿 , 𝑥α
𝑅], 
corresponding to each set of  α- level (α-cut) e.g.: 𝑥α
𝑟 = 𝑥α
𝐿 + 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐷() ∗
(𝑥α
𝑅 − 𝑥α
𝐿), (This procedure is demonstrated in Figure 4-10). 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐷() is a 
function to generate random numbers in the interval (0,1), by assuming a 
uniform distribution function. These random numbers multiply by the range of 
resulted intervals. Having more information, other type of distribution 
function may apply. 
Step 4: Take the resulted values in steps 1, 2 and 3, including the boundary 
values in left and right and random variables generated for each α-level, as a 








Figure 4-10 Algorithm for generating fuzzy random variable 
4.6 Fuzzy Probability Distribution 
Fuzzy probability provides a suitable framework for a realistic modelling 
of risk and uncertainty to ensure that both risky and uncertain input data type 
is appropriately reflected in computation results. In the framework of fuzzy 
probability, both the probabilistic and the non-probabilistic data can be 
considered simultaneously and transferred and reflected combinedly and 
jointly to the results (Moller and Beer, 2004; Baudrit et al., 2006). 
The processing of fuzzy randomness simulation can be realized with a 
combination of stochastic simulation and fuzzy analysis in a nested form. 
Fuzzy numbers with appropriate membership function as uncertain variables 
are input parameters for a fuzzy analysis. With each set of crisp values and 
random variables for the simulation input parameters, a traditional stochastic 
analysis is performed. The extreme results from the various conventional 
stochastic computations and also incorporating the uncertain variables 
subsequently define the bounds on probability or fuzzy probabilities 
respectively. This issue is important for the loss caused by catastrophic risks, 




































































probability are obtained as fuzzy variables. Their range of possible values 
reflects the non-probabilistic feature of uncertain variables from the 
specification of the probabilistic model for the input variables. The reader may 
also refer to Moller and Beer (2004) for more discussion on the same topic. 
For the propagation of probabilistic and possibilistic uncertainty 
information, the conventional MCS technique (Kalos & Whitlock, 1986) can 
be combined with the extension principle of fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965, 
1975) by means of the following 3 main steps: 
I. Repeat Monte Carlo sampling of the probabilistic variables to process 
their risk (generating random variable). 
II. Apply fuzzy interval analysis to process the uncertainty connected with 
the possibilistic variables. 
III. Employ fuzzy probability procedure for joint propagation of 
probabilistic and possibilistic uncertainty. 
A possibility value α as uncertain level is selected. The generic kth random 
values for ith iteration, 𝑥𝑘
𝑖 , 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑚, are sampled by Monte Carlo from the 
probabilistic distributions. A fuzzy set 𝜋𝑙
𝑓
, estimate of possibility distribution 
for 𝑙𝑡ℎ possibilistic variables ?̃?𝑙
𝑖 of 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑋), 𝑙 = 1,… , 𝑛 − 𝑚, is constructed 
by fuzzy interval analysis according to the assumed α-level. After m repeated 
samplings of the probabilistic variables, 𝑥𝑘
𝑖 , the fuzzy set estimates 𝜋𝑙
𝑓 , 𝑙 =
1,2, … , n − m, are combined with those of random values to give an estimate 
of 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑋) as a fuzzy random variable (or random possibility distribution) 
according to the rules of evidence theory (Shafer, 1976). This is repeated for a 
number of iteration (i=1,..,N). 
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The steps of the fuzzy probability distribution procedure are as follows: 
(Baraldi and Zio, 2008; Guyonnet et al., 2003) 
Step 1: Select a possibility value α and the corresponding cut of the possibility 
distributions (𝜋1
𝑓 , … , 𝜋𝑛−𝑚
𝑓
) as intervals of possible values Aα = [𝑥α
𝐿 , 𝑥α
𝑅] of 
the possibilistic variables ?̃?𝑙
𝑖  (?̃?1
𝑖 , … , ?̃?𝑛−𝑚
𝑖 ). 
Step 2: Sample the ith realization of the probabilistic variables 𝑥𝑘
𝑖 (𝑥1
𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝑚
𝑖 ). 
(Generating random variable for ith iteration) 
Step 3: Interval calculation, compute the supremum and infimum (largest and 
smallest) values of 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥1
𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝑚
𝑖 , ?̃?1
𝑖 , … , ?̃?𝑛−𝑚






Step 4: Return to Step 2 to generate a new realization of the random variables. 
The above procedure is repeated for i = 1,2, … , N; at the end of the procedure 
an ensemble of realizations of fuzzy intervals is obtained, that is, (𝜋1
𝐹 , … , 𝜋𝑁
𝐹 ). 
Step 5: Return to step 1, choose another α-cut and repeat the process for new 
α-cut; after having repeated steps 2 to 4 for all the α-cuts of interest, the fuzzy 
random realization (fuzzy interval) 𝜋𝑖
𝐹  of 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑋) is obtained as the 









found in this step, as lower and upper limits of α-cuts of 𝑦 =
𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑚, ?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑛−𝑚 ) and denote them by 𝐹𝛼
𝑖  and 𝐹𝛼
𝑖
.  In other words, 𝜋𝑖
𝐹  
is defined by all its α-cut intervals [𝐹𝛼
𝑖, 𝐹𝛼
𝑖
] (Refer to Figure 4-12). 
Hence, a fuzzy probability distribution function F̃(𝑥) can be formulated as 
a fuzzy set of traditional probability distribution function F(𝑥) of random 
variable X, which is given by: 
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F̃(x) = {(F(x), μ(F(x))) | X ∈ X̃, μ(F(x)) = μ(X) } 
The functional values of F̃(x) are fuzzy variables and possess membership 
functions. Interval probabilities Fα(x) = [Fαl(x), Fαr(x)] weighted by the 
membership degree μ(Fα(x)) that can be obtained for each α-level. This 
interval probability contains the probability of all possible states describing the 
occurrence of X ∈ X̃. Thus, a fuzzy probability function can be described as a 
fuzzy set of interval probabilities. For introducing the F̃(x) in numerical 
procedures the α-discretization is applied. This leads to fuzzy functional value 
for each specified x. 
F̃(x) = {
(Fα(x), μ(Fα(x))) | Fα(x) = [Fα l(x), Fα r(x)],
μ(Fα(x)) = α ∀α ∈ (0,1]
} 
Fα r(x) = max F̃(x) , Fα l(x) = min F̃(x) 
The fuzzy probability distribution function F̃(x) of X̃ may thus be 
interpreted as being the set of the probability distribution functions F(x) of all 
originals X of X̃ with the membership values μ(F(x)). This representation is 
suitable for numerical processing of fuzzy probabilistic variables. The 
description of fuzzy probability distribution functions can be realized with the 
aid of fuzzy variables for parameters in the probability functions. For instance, 
if the underlying uncertain random variable X is assumed to be normal 
distribution N(?̃?, ?̃?) with fuzzy expected value ?̃?𝑥 = ⟨5.5,6.0,6.8⟩ and fuzzy 


























and are shown in Figure 4-11. The functional value of F̃(x) at a specified 
value x is a fuzzy variable. For instance, F̃(6) = ⟨0.15,0.5,0.75⟩. All PDFs 
and CDFs used to describe the variability in a fuzzy probability model have a 
certain degree of uncertainty (µ: membership function). 
 
 
Figure 4-11 Fuzzy CDF and fuzzy PDF of a fuzzy normal distribution 
4.7 Reliability Modelling and Evaluation with Fuzzy Data 
Fuzzy probability can be generalized as is represented in Figure 4-12. Two 
ways to fuzzify the series curves F̃(x) are shown. F(x) and F(x) are upper and 
lower CDF bounds. F1(x) is the expected CDF. As a rule, minimization and 
maximization algorithm can be used for finding Inf and Sup values of a 
general model. However, when the simulation model is a simple monotonic 
function, as in our study, the Inf and Sup values are identified directly without 
using minimization or maximization algorithms. 











































Figure 4-12 Fuzzy distribution function F̃(x) of a fuzzy random variable X̃ and its membership 
function on a specific value (Left-hand), on a specific probability (Right-hand) 
When it is known which combination of parameters from the alpha-level 
sets of fuzzy variables in simulation input leads to the boundary/extremes 
curves in simulation output, any software can be utilized to plot output fuzzy 
probability curves and gray out the area in between. When it is unknown 
which combination of parameters leads to the extremes, the best way to get a 
figure is to perform FR-MCS over the parameter space and plot curve by 
curve for the result. Now we consider the membership function of the series 
curves F̃(x) as follows. 




, 𝑖𝑓 F(x) ≤ F(x) ≤ F1(x), 
μ(F(x)) =
F(x)  − F(x)
F(x) − F1(x)
, 𝑖𝑓 F1(x) ≤ F(x) ≤ F(x) 
and using the α-cuts: 
F̃𝛼(x) = [F(x) + (F1(x) − F(x))𝛼, F(x) − (F(x) − F1(x)) 𝛼] 
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In this section it is shown that when an uncertainty is associated with the 
estimates, the simulation output function and other related concepts can be 
modelled using the intervals of confidence, and fuzzy numbers instead of the 
probabilistic characterization. The extension principle, which is one of the 
most important concepts of fuzzy set theory, is used to conduct arithmetic 
operations on interval of confidence and fuzzy numbers. As can be seen the 
simulation and financial evaluation method based on the Value-at-risk and 
uncertainty (VaRaU) approach, which incorporates both risk and uncertainty 
analysis using confidence and uncertain levels and discount rate concept give 
more equitable results for all parties involved in the PPP-BOT project. 
Therefore by these simulation results, negotiations objectives will be promptly 
obtained. 
4.8 Illustrative Case Study- MCS vs. FR-MCS 
Typically case studies assume deterministic assumption. FR-MCS has 
been employed to estimate volatility of parties’ objectives like volatility of 
investment project value and the impact of uncertainties on the project cost 
estimation, contract decision variables/indicators and the optimal outcomes. 
This is to simulate cash flows of a PPP-BOT investment project with 
appropriate risk and uncertainty models and further to describe fuzzy 
probability distribution of cost estimation and returns by iterating large 
number of simulations. The application of the FR-MCS model for the 
evaluation of uncertainties including demand uncertainty for a BOT toll road 
and bridge project is demonstrated with a realistic case study. To do this, a 
special program has been developed by MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., 
Natick, Massachusetts). In this study our focus is on the representation of the 
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uncertainties by fuzzy numbers. Basic input data of the project comprises 
deterministic, uncertain and risky parameters. Uncertain and risky parameters 
consist of three components i.e. macroeconomic indicators and indexes, fuzzy-
stochastic variables (FSV) and negotiable concession items (NCIs). Main 
project data including expected value of parameters and their distribution or 
membership function is tabulated in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 Basic input data of the case study 
Input data Expected 
Value 
Distribution/Membership function 
Macroeconomic indicators and indexes   
Project Economic life, project life cycle (yrs) 40 Deterministic 
Costs regime during construction - <0.1,0.3,0.5,0.1> 
Escalation rate during construction/inflation rate 
during operation period (%) 
4 Log Normal distribution, LnN(4,1) 
Amortization period (yrs) 20 Deterministic 
Tax rate (%) 30 Deterministic 
Gov. discount rate (%) 8.16 Deterministic 
Cost of debt (%) 5.25 Deterministic 
Cost of equity (hurdle rate) (%) 14 Deterministic 
Loan Interest rate (%) 7.5 Deterministic 
Loan repayment period/debt maturity (yrs) 10 Deterministic 
Annual growth rate of unit price (%) 5 Normal distribution, N(5,1) 
Annual growth rate of quantity of demand (%) 5 Normal distribution, N(5,1) 
Cost of finance coefficient for Pre concession 
period costs calculation 
0.05 Deterministic 
Cost of tender coefficient for Pre concession 
period costs calculation 
0.05 Deterministic 
Annual revenue coefficient for O&M 
calculation 
0.07 Deterministic 
Increasing rate of annual growth rate of unit 
price (%) 
10 Normal distribution, N(10,1) 
Expected Base Cost coefficient for Asset value 
calculation at transfer date 
0.1 Normal distribution, N(0.1,0.01) 
Fuzzy-Stochastic Variables (FSV)   
Total project costs (M$) 170 Normal distribution, N(170,25) 
Operation and maintenance costs (M$/year) 1.8907 Normal distribution, N(1.8907,0.25) 
Annual growth rate of O&M costs (%) 5 Normal distribution, N(5,1) 
Initial daily traffic (vehicles/day) 20,000 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈19,178, 
20,000, 20,000, 20,822〉 
Quantity of demand (vehicle per year) 7,300,000 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈7,000,000, 
7,300,000, 7,300,000, 7,600,000〉 
Operating revenue (M$/year) 27.01 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈25.9, 27.01, 
27.01, 28.12〉 
Pre concession period (yrs) 2 Log Normal distribution, LnN(2,0.5) 
Negotiable concession items (NCIs)   
Construction period (yrs) 4  
Operation period (yrs) 21  
Concession period (yrs) 25  
Unit price of services (service in first year of 
operation) ($) 
3.7  
Debt, Equity (%) 40%,30%  






The expected value of parameters is taken from The Toolkit for Public-
Private Partnerships in Roads and Highways provided by the World Bank-
PPIAF (V1.1, 2009). The distribution or membership function of parameters is 
taken based on the expert knowledge through interview. The fuzzy approach 
has been used as a measurement of uncertainty, e.g., demand uncertainty (See 
Figure 4-13). The level of uncertainty is represented and considered by 
membership value between 0 and 1. The membership function of operating 
revenue by considering demand uncertainty is represented in Figure 4-14. 
 
Figure 4-15and Figure 4-16 represent PDF and CDF of total project costs 
for the same case resulted from conventional MCS by considering no 
uncertainties. The result is just a PDF/CDF that does not take into account any 
uncertainty. Consequently by taking a value for probability (θ) in CDF, just a 
deterministic value will be intersected. Based on this result, as engineering 
implication, decision maker will come to negotiation table with a deterministic 
value for decision variables. 
 
Figure 4-13 Membership function of uncertain 
random variable-quantity of demand 
 
Figure 4-14 Membership function of 
operating revenue 














trapmf, P=[7,000,000 7,300,000 7,300,000 7,600,000]












trapmf, operating revenue (M$/year) =[25.9 27.01 27.01 28.12]
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In this case a total of 1000 iterations are performed to carry out FR-MCS 
and generate fuzzy CDFs. Figure 4-17 illustrates three dimensional view of 
fuzzy CDF for total project costs (TPC) resulting from the FR-MCS that are 
generated by MATLAB. Figure 4-18 and Figure 4-19 represent the x-y and x-
z views of fuzzy CDF resulted in Figure 4-17 respectively. 
 
Figure 4-17 three dimensional view of fuzzy CDF for total project costs resulting from the 

















Figure 4-15 PDF of total project costs by 
MCS 
 
Figure 4-16 CDF of total project costs by 
MCS 
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Figure 4-18 x-y view of fuzzy CDF resulted 
in Figure 4-17 
 
Figure 4-19 x-z view of fuzzy CDF resulted 
in Figure 4-17  
As for decision variables the procedure is the same. Figure 4-20 shows the 
three dimensional view of fuzzy CDF for the debt service cover ratio (DSCR) 
resulting from the FR-MCS. Figure 4-21 and Figure 4-22 represent the x-y and 
x-z views of fuzzy CDF resulted in Figure 4-20 respectively. 
 
Figure 4-20 three dimensional view of fuzzy CDF for debt service cover ratio (DSCR) 
resulting from the output of FR-MCS, x-axis: TPC, y-axis: probability, z-axis: α-value 
























































Figure 4-21 x-y view of fuzzy CDF resulted in 
Figure 4-20 
 
Figure 4-22 x-z view of fuzzy CDF 
resulted in Figure 4-20 
As can be seen, the result of conventional MCS is a CDF which no 
uncertainty is taken into account while the result of FR-MCS is fuzzy CDFs 
and has taken uncertainties into account i.e. means to take into account the 
possibility that uncertainty may increase or reduce. As a result, by taking a 
specific value of the confidence level in fuzzy CDF, an interval for the 
decision variable will be obtained. On the contrary, by the same approach for 
CDF resulted from MCS, just a deterministic value will be achieved. Decision 
makers are more comfortable with interval on the negotiation table. 
4.8.1 Sensitivity Analysis of FR-MCS Technique 
The outputs of FR-MCS are sensitive to fuzziness of input variables. In the 
absence of fuzziness (pure probability in inputs) the result of FR-MCS is 
exactly equal to a CDF which is the same with the results of conventional 
MCS. In the absence of randomness (pure fuzziness in inputs) the result of 
FR-MCS is represented by CDF bound. It can be shown that the fuzziness of 
the output expands when the number of fuzzy random variables increases. 
Reasonably, for smaller number of fuzzy random variables, the CDF function 
has less fuzziness, and the CDF bound is narrower. More detailed discussion 
was illustrated in Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-9. 


























4.8.2 Decision Making Based on the Generated Fuzzy Probability 
Distributions  
Similar to the CDF function concluding from conventional MCS (refer to 
value-at-risk section), a decision maker can use the fuzzy CDF of the decision 
variable/indicator in the simulation output to do decision making on not just 
probability but also possibility of acquired desirable output (i.e. probability 
and possibility that the decision variable/indicator will be more/less than a 
specific amount) and probability and possibility of success. Furthermore, it 
can be used to find an appropriate contingency value (arbitrary quantile) of 
project decision variable/indicator. 
Figure 4-23 represents intersecting of x-y view of fuzzy CDF of return on 
equity (EIRR) resulted from FR-MCS with hurdle rate. It indicates the 
probability that the rate of return on equity will not be less than hurdle rate, 
14%. This probability is in the form of a fuzzy set, as shown in Figure 4-23. 
The Level Rank defuzzification method (Moller and Beer, 2004) is used to 
convert the output fuzzy variable into a crisp value. By defuzzifying the output 
in Figure 4-23, it can be stated the probability that the rate of return on equity 
will not be less than hurdle rate, 14%, is around 79.5% (=1-20.5%). 
 
Figure 4-23 Intersecting of x-y view of fuzzy CDF of return on equity (𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑅) resulted from 
FR-MCS with specific amount to find the probability of interest (right), fuzzy set of 
probability of acquired desirable output (left) 














































































The arbitrary quantile in a Fuzzy CDF is represented as a fuzzy set. Figure 
4-24 illustrates intersecting of x-y view of fuzzy CDF of return on equity 
(EIRR) resulted from FR-MCS with specific confidence levels, 0.10 and 0.50, 
to find the appropriate contingency values (arbitrary quantile). It represents the 
10th and 50th quantile of return on equity (EIRR). By defuzzifying the outputs 
in Figure 4-24, it can be stated that with 10% and 50% probability the rate of 
return on equity are around 17.10% and 15.20% respectively which are much 
greater than hurdle rate, 14%. 
 
Figure 4-24 Intersecting of x-y view of fuzzy CDF of return on equity (𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑅) resulted from 
FR-MCS with 10% and 50% confidence levels to find the appropriate contingency values 
(arbitrary quantile) (right), fuzzy set of the appropriate contingency values (arbitrary quantile) 
with 10% confidence level (middle) and with 50% confidence level (left) 
As can be seen, the FR-MCS technique and obtained fuzzy CDF have 
improved decision making based on the conventional MCS by incorporating 
the uncertainties involved in the project. FR-MCS helps and facilitates 
decision makers to come up with negotiation interval for negotiable 
concession items (NCIs) that takes players’ characteristics into account. 
4.9 Concluding Remarks 
Probability theory has been successfully used in modelling random 
variables; however, this is insufficient for modelling imprecise information. 
Currently, the most popular method to carry out the PRA is MCS and its 
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analysis. Typically the data required to conduct the conventional MCS is not 
readily available or it is too costly to collect the required data. However, 
available data can be utilized through other mathematical tools such as fuzzy 
set theory. Thus, it is risk analysts responsibility to investigate, gather and 
efficiently include all the existing information using the most appropriate 
methods and mathematical tools. 
This chapter introduced a new approach to simulation techniques under 
risk and uncertainty, which is called FR-MCS technique. The aim of this 
development is for generalization the conventional MCS to make decision 
based on the hybrid simulation approach of randomness and fuzziness of input 
parameters. The basic requirement of FR-MCS is to be able to randomly 
produce random/fuzzy/crisp number in simulation procedure. Consequently, 
determine inferior and superior of output values of simulation function by 
using fuzzy probability (fuzzy CDF). The proposed methodology has been 
introduced to integrate fuzzy set theory into PRA studies. α-cut method is used 
to perform algorithm for generating fuzzy random variable and to implement 
FR-MCS. Practically, given enough iterations of FR-MCS technique, it will 
produce a sufficiently small error. 
The main idea proposed here is to utilize subjective probabilities, i.e. 
available information to represent the uncertain variable as a fuzzy number, 
and produce outputs which reflect all variable and uncertain information (i.e., 
uncertainty due to randomness, imprecision or due to both). In this approach, 
random variables parameters are treated as fuzzy numbers (Alternative 1). 
Alternatively, by using subjective approach, random variables are treated as 
pure fuzzy numbers (Alternative 2). 
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For cases where the necessity of conventional MCS and its analysis is 
justified but necessary information to conduct this analysis does not exit, the 
new approach proposed in this research can be conducted as an alternative to 
conventional MCS. The proposed FR-MCS technique allows fuzzy and 
probabilistic uncertainty to be considered simultaneously for the risk analysis 
of PPP-BOT projects. Depending on the project host country, the decision 
maker can adjust the conservative nature of FR-MCS using lower percentiles 
of risk and uncertainties. As for FR-MCS, the decision making will be based 
on the intervals while in MCS the decision making is based on the 
deterministic values. This advantage facilitates decision making. 
The proposed technique is applied to a case whose data requirements are 
comparatively less or easier to obtain. The membership functions of the 
parameters of the fuzzy random variables can be formed using imprecise, 
vague information or expert judgment. Thus, application of the FR-MCS 
approach to risk assessment problems instead of conventional MCS 
approaches may be more realistic for many PPP-BOT cases and may provide 
decision makers with sufficient information for decision making. The results 
of conventional MCS and its analysis cannot easily be compared with fuzzy 
results of FR-MCS. It is not straightforward. Extensions of possibilistic 
concepts to various situations of reliability evaluation expand these results in 
the PPP-BOT context. 
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CHAPTER 5 DEVELOPING A HYBRID SIMULATION-BASED 
INTEGRATED SYSTEM FOR DETERMINING NEGOTIABLE 
CONCESSION ITEMS FOR PPP-BOT PROJECTS UNDER RISKS 
AND UNCERTAINTIES 
5.1. Introduction 
Determination of negotiation and concession items such as concession period 
and tariff which are called negotiable concession items (NCIs), directly affects 
the financial return and risks of both the government and concessionaire in 
long term infrastructure development projects. 
According to the literature review, current methods for determining NCIs 
have some shortcomings and limitations. Firstly, the problem of how to 
simultaneously deal with fuzziness and randomness in determining NCIs is not 
studied. They do not map well the uncertainties in the simulation input to the 
simulation output, i.e. concession items determination taken as a deterministic 
value is unreasonable. 
Secondly, they do not meet and guarantee all parties’ interest. They 
generally focus on single party’s objective e.g. private sector. As a PPP-BOT 
project cannot be successful without all main parties’ agreement and 
involvement, considering the individual perspective is fruitless. So the 
obtained solutions are not equilibrium solutions and are not consensus 
solutions for all main parties. Thirdly, current methods do not provide a 
framework to prioritize NCIs for parties based on their goals. Finally, they do 
not address subjective information based on the experts’ judgment and 
experience in the process of NCIs determination. 
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This chapter proposes a mechanism for determination of financial and 
contractual negotiation parameters (NCIs) under life cycle risks and 
uncertainties that could meet all parties’ objectives. On the other hand, the 
proposed technique is tried to find the most satisfying agreement on NCIs as 
negotiation parameters under risks and uncertainties that meet all main parties’ 
interest.  
FR-MCS technique, which was introduced in chapter 4, has been used to 
overcome aforementioned problem by determining concession items (NCIs) as 
a bound (interval) via its fuzzy CDF instead of deterministic value from each 
party’s perspective. In the last step of the proposed method, NCIs are 
considered by utilizing multi fuzzy numbers based on the multi party’s 
objectives involved in the project. Subsequently, consensus on NCIs is 
represented by a fuzzy number based on the fuzzy operation. Finally, agreed 
NCIs are derived as a crisp value for final decision makings by using 
defuzzification methods at specific α-cut/θ-confidence level. 
By applying the proposed method, both parties’ decision makers are able 
to see a clear picture of risk and uncertainty involved in PPP-BOT project and 
make better decisions on NCIs. It also guarantees multiparty interests and it 
can meet all players’ objectives under risk and uncertainty. Furthermore, it 
prevents prolonged and costly negotiations in the development phase of PPP-
BOT projects by providing more flexibility for decision makers. 
The next sections present the proposed technique and its application to 
facilitate negotiations for determining agreeable NCIs. The proposed method 
is examined in a real case study. 
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5.2. Determining NCIs under Risks and Uncertainties 
PPP-BOT projects’ investment is through project finance rather than 
corporate finance. This induces other active parties moreover to private sector 
(first party) such as public sector (second party). Thus PPP-BOT negotiation 
model become bilateral, trilateral or even quadripartite negotiation games with 
complicated interactions and complete/incomplete information instead of a 
simple unilateral decision making process. PPP-BOT could offer a course of 
achieving project objectives by attaining a win-win-win solution among the 
public sector (government), private sector (concessionaire) and end user 
(public). A delicate balance has to exist among the private sector capacities 
and benefits, government regulatory function, and public and end user 
satisfaction simultaneously. 
Negotiation is an important collaborative decision making and 
coordination behaviour in PPP-BOT projects, which can take place at any 
stage and phase of project to fulfil the parties’ objectives such as the terms of 
the concession agreement. Success or failure of whole project is tied to 
success or failure of negotiations especially in the development phase. 
Concessionaire and public sector have several negotiations in the development 
phase to bargain on essential negotiation parameters which are called 
negotiable concession items (NCIs) in this research. Through this approach, 
the amount of risk can be rightly apportioned during the negotiations in the 
development phase by choosing reasonable, effective and efficient NCIs. This 
basic work and the process of updating the risk assessment and the process of 
risk mitigation and control–often summarized under the term risk 
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management– are supported and organized by the especial and proper process 
(Attarzadeh, 2007).  
The negotiable terms of a PPP-BOT concession agreement, mainly 
including concession period, tariff/toll design, and royalty, are often discussed 
intensively during negotiations in the development phase. While the 
preliminary version of contractual terms is normally grounded on pro forma 
financial statements conducted during the feasibility study or the appraisal 
stage of the BOT project, change in any one of the terms will most likely alter 
the cash flow and deviate from the expected project return for all parties 
involved in the project (Liou and Huang, 2008). 
Decision variables are defined based on the objectives of active and 
passive parties involved in the negotiations. NCIs are policy parameters that 
active parties negotiate on them at the negotiation table. Passive parties’ 
interest should also be taken into account in determining NCIs. Negotiation 
pattern in a PPP-BOT project is demonstrated in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1 Negotiation pattern in PPP-BOT projects 
In the course of analysing risks and uncertainties, five techniques are 
employed: probability analysis, possibility analysis, sensitivity analysis, 
variance analysis and scenario analysis. Probability analysis requires the 
















as probability distribution with a predefined spread (risky variable follows a 
specific probability distribution). Possibility analysis entails the uncertain 
variables in input of simulation (or financial) model (uncertainties) expressed 
as membership function using fuzzy logic (uncertain variable follows a 
specific membership function). Sensitivity analysis, variance analysis and 
scenario analysis are techniques as supplements evaluation methods to aid 
decision makings under risks and uncertainties in the course of risks and 
uncertainties management. Sensitivity analysis considers the effect on the 
project’s decision variables of changes in the value of each input variable 
which poses potential serious risk to the project. On the other hand, variance 
analysis indicates how much the risk and uncertainty in a variable affects the 
goal and objective’s variation. Scenario analysis examines a number of 
different likely scenarios (pessimistic, expected and optimistic scenarios) 
involving a simultaneous change of values for a number of key project 
variables. 
Fuzzy sets are used for decision making based on incomplete or 
insufficient data, and probabilistic models are used as a decision making based 
on complete information about the probability distribution. Due to the 
difficulties in estimating the long-term uncertainties and wider-risk profiles at 
the tendering stage, this research suggests using a hybrid simulation approach 
of uncertainty modelling methods and probabilistic and stochastic risk analysis 
techniques (such as fuzzy sets, probability and possibility models and Monte 
Carlo simulation). This is called fuzzy randomness Monte Carlo simulation 
(FR-MCS) technique. Readers are recommended to refer to the chapter 4 for 
the details of definitions and procedures. 
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The advantage of hybrid probabilistic and fuzzy approach (fuzzy 
randomness) lies in the fact that by using values lying within a bound 
(interval) and model those by a defined distribution density or a membership 
function, the reality can be modelled better than by using deterministic and 
probabilistic figures solely. Actually, FR-MCS is performed to generate a 
distribution of decision variables of parties involved under risks and 
uncertainties over the project’s economic life, practically NCIs. Based on the 
generated distribution, a range of NCIs for PPP-BOT players is obtained to 
negotiate. 
5.3. Proposed Technique and Methodology 
The step-by-step process of system structure of the proposed technique, 
aimed to determine consensus of NCIs, are represented in the following 
flowchart. This flowchart which represents stages of determining the NCIs by 
using the proposed multiple objective fuzzy randomness Monte Carlo 
simulation (MOFR-MCS) approach is shown in Figure 5-2. Briefly, the 
methodology consists of the following main steps. The first step is 
determining influential factors of NCIs (NCIs derivers) including stages 1 to 6. 
The second step is structure and process of simulation model which includes 
stages 7 to 9 i.e. consensus on the policy parameters (simulation input), 
simulation model and consensus on the NCIs (simulation output). The third 
step is fuzzy objective function determination including stages 10 to 12. The 




Figure 5-2 Framework of stages for determining consensus of NCIs by MOFR-MCS 
5.3.1. NCIs Drivers 
Determining the influential factors of NCIs is important. Sensitivity 
analysis as quantitative method could be helpful to this aim. The most 
important NCIs during bid (tender) period of the development phase are 
concession period, price (tariff/toll), and royalty. An investigation of the 
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influential factors of concession period length determination (CPLD) in 
transportation project is conducted by Yu et al. (2014). Their study indicates 
that there are mainly seven factors involved in this issue, namely, interest rate 
(I), inflation rate (Inf), traffic flow, toll, the cost of different period (Ct), 
Investor's expected return rate (R), and investor's capital investment (Ic). 
Briefly, the previous studies show that the risks and uncertainties, such as a 
change in inflation rate, project demand and revenue (traffic flow) and 
operation cost could influence the decision on the concession period 
effectively. Furthermore, in this research a survey-based case study is 
conducted to find and complete the existing list of NCIs influential factors. 
The results of this survey are demonstrated in Figure 5-3. NCIs drivers could 
be demonstrated through the fish bone diagram. This diagram shows 
influential factors of concession period as NCI derivers. Key factors are shown 
in bold. 
 
Figure 5-3 NCIs derivers, Fish bone diagram 
5.3.2. Simulation Model Structure and Process 
Descriptions of the simulation model and its components proposed by 
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PPP-BOT projects are given in this section. Risk and uncertainty analysis is 
performed using the FR-MCS technique. A simplified flowchart for the 
structure and process of simulation model is given in Figure 5-4. 
 
Figure 5-4 Structure and process of simulation model for feasible NCIs determination 
5.3.2.1. Simulation Input 
Simulation input parameters are categorized into two main categories: a) 
deterministic parameters and b) uncertain and risky parameters. The first 
category consists of parameters which values could be considered as stable 
over long period of time, e.g. tax rate and some kind of operation expenses 
that could be mitigated by contract such as insurance fee, rental fee and 
management expenditure. 
In contrast, the second category consists of those input parameters that 
could be subject to variation and change due to risk and uncertainty involved 
and difficulties in long term estimation and prediction. It comprises three main 
types of simulation model inputs through the life cycle negotiation simulation. 
1. Macroeconomic indicators and indices, which is depended on the host 
country economy, such as debt capital interest rate, discount rate, inflation 
rate, exchange rate, demand growth rate (e.g.: traffic growth rate), 
debt/equity (D/E) ratio, etc. 
Identifying uncertainties and risks 
in the model input 
(Involved in the project) 
Formulate and build the 
model 
Define decision variables and 
concerned negotiable concession 
items in the model output 
Measuring project uncertainties 
(Fuzzy model) 




Negotiable concession items-at risk and uncertainty 
Decision variables-at risk and uncertainty 
(Fuzzy probability distribution) 




For instance, the discount rate, which is also called the hurdle rate, is the 
measure of the minimum expected rate of return that the concessionaire aims 
to get from the project implementation. It is generally influenced by the cost of 
capital (debt and equity) for the concessionaire. Estimation of the appropriate 
discount rate requires substantial judgment and often involves an inherent lack 
of precision. The D/E ratio is specific to the host country and depends on how 
keen the host government is to stimulate private investment in infrastructure 
project (Malini, 1999). Financial performance indicators of a PPP-BOT 
project is quite sensitive to the selected D/E ratio and decline rapidly as the 
project promoter borrows more than the optimal amount in an attempt to reach 
the project’s debt capacity level (Dias and Ioannau 1995). Demand growth rate 
depends on the host country economic. For instance, traffic growth rate in a 
BOT urban infrastructure project depends on toll rates, willingness to pay, 
perceived benefits to the users, proximity of toll-free roads, availability of 
alternate modes of transport, industrial activity, development of new growth 
centres, and efficiency of the toll road (Malini, 1999). 
2. Fuzzy-Stochastic Variables (FSV), which are appraised based on the past 
project experiences and data or estimated based on the experts’ judgment, 
such as construction cost, operation cost, maintenance cost, etc. Each 
risky/uncertain parameter follows specific probability 
distribution/membership function (probability (pure stochastic) /possibility 
model (pure fuzzy)). Furthermore, in some cases, the probability 
distributions of stochastic variables are derived subjectively from an expert 
knowledge base, due to the nonexistence of relevant data on PPP-BOT 
projects. In these cases, probability distribution’s parameters, such as mean 
152 
 
and standard deviation, are derived using fuzzy variables/numbers (fuzzy 
probability model (fuzzy randomness)). In most cases, variables are 
derived subjectively from an expert knowledge and are represented 
directly by fuzzy variables/numbers. Construction, operation and 
maintenance costs are normally defined as stochastic variables in the 
simulation model input. Construction costs are derived based on the past 
projects. The yearly operation costs are traditionally represented as a 
percentage of annual revenue generated from toll/tariff. Annual 
maintenance costs consist of two main components, regular maintenance 
costs and overhaul maintenance costs. Yearly regular maintenance costs 
are typically represented as a percentage of construction costs. Overhaul 
maintenance costs are periodically costs to maintain a standard level of 
project. Typically, construction cost and completion time is assumed to 
follow lognormal distribution, O&M cost obey uniform distribution and 
market demand, sale price (income) follow normal distribution. 
3. Negotiable concession items (NCIs), which are policy parameters, such as 
concession period, tariff/toll design including the initial level of tariff/toll 
and tariff/toll adjustment scheme, royalty, construction and operation 
period, financial return, etc. 
5.3.2.2. Simulation Model 
Fuzzy Randomness Monte Carlo Simulation (FR-MCS) technique, which 
was introduced in chapter 4, is used to generate the values of stochastic and 
fuzzy variables and also their combination approach for each run and iteration. 
The life cycle cash inflow is generated by toll/tariff revenue which is 
calculated through the product of toll/tariff rate and yearly quantity in demand. 
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Normally, cash outflow consists of construction costs and operation and 
maintenance costs. The indicators as parties’ objectives representation and 
decision variables and also NCIs are calculated for each run and iteration. 
Simulation functions make links between simulation input and output. 
Conventionally, spreadsheets and VBA Macros programming are used to 
implement these links (Malini, 1999). The life cycle computation would not 
stop at one simulation run. The simulation is repeated for many runs and 
iterations, each of them using a randomly generated set of values for the 
stochastic and fuzzy parameters based on the respective probability 
distributions and membership functions. The experiment is stopped after a 
sufficiently large number of replications are made so that the steady state is 
achieved. The proposed simulation produced a rage (an interval) of NCIs with 
the impact of risks and uncertainties taken into consideration using FR-MCS 
technique. That would be advantageous to parties, the government and private 
sector. Otherwise, the decision making is based on the deterministic values 
which do not have any flexibility. 
5.3.2.3. Simulation Output 
As PPP-BOT negotiation/re-negotiation is a multi-party multi-stage 
decision process, meeting of all parties’ objectives are crucial to the success of 
the project. Considering multi parties’ objectives, involves multi-party risk 
and uncertainty modelling and management process. So, a method that takes 
risk and uncertainty into account simultaneously for multi parties is required. 
Typically, specific financial performance indicator is used to represent each 
party’s perspective and objective. Ye and Tiong (2000) defined the NPV-at-
risk, a measure of minimum expected return from the project at a given 
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confidence level. There are some shortcomings with their approach that 
current research addresses them. Indicator-at-risk and uncertainty system: 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛼
μ
, which is proposed in this research, offers a decision criterion with a 
confidence level at a uncertain level (fuzzy randomness approach). These 
indicators are demonstrated in Table 5-1 for different parties involved. 
Indicator at given confidence (α) and uncertain level (µ), 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛼
μ
, is 
computed. According to the definitions and requirements, the following 
decision rules as two approaches for decision making can be derived. (1) The 
calculation of IND at a given confidence and uncertain level. (2) The 
calculation of confidence and uncertain level at the threshold point of IND. 
The project is acceptable from the party’s perspective at the given confidence 
 (α) and uncertain (µ) levels, if the 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛼
μ
 is greater than threshold point; 
otherwise, it is unacceptable. Alternatively, the project is acceptable if the 
computed confidence and uncertain level at the threshold point of IND is equal 
to or greater than (more favourite) the predetermined confidence and uncertain 
level; otherwise, it is unacceptable. Based on this consideration, IND-at-risk 
and uncertainty is defined as a particular IND that is generated from a project 
at specific confidence and uncertain level, that is, the minimum expected IND 
with the given confidence and uncertain level. In other words, IND-at-risk and 
uncertainty is the value at which α% of probable IND is smaller and 1-α% is 
larger at specific uncertain level, μ. 
IND-at-risk and uncertainty = 𝐼𝐷𝑁𝛼
μ
= ∫ (μ𝐼𝑁𝐷 − 𝑍𝛼𝜎𝐼𝑁𝐷)
1
μ=0
        5.1 
Where 𝑍𝛼 is number of units of standard deviation corresponding to the given 
confidence level of α; for example, at the 95% confidence level and normal 
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distribution assumption, 𝑍𝛼 = 1.65. This means that 95% of probable 
outcomes fall within the range from μ𝐼𝑁𝐷 − 1.65𝜎𝐼𝑁𝐷 to ∞. 
The simulation output gives indicators in the form of derived random 
variables (fuzzy and stochastic variables) with associated probability 
distribution and membership function. Using the details of generated output, 
one can construct the risk-uncertainty profile for each indicator, which 
quantifies the risk and uncertainty in terms of the fuzzy probability (i.e. fuzzy 
CDF) of obtaining a threshold value for the corresponding indicator for a 
given set of conditions. 
The simulation model facilitates evaluation of long term infrastructure 
PPP-BOT project proposal for financial feasibility and viability, and throws 
light on the risks and returns under the chosen set of parameters (Malini, 
1999). As a consequence, various options and scenarios can be examined with 
the use of the simulation model. The impact of such options on the financial 
indicators may be used as management information to facilitate fair 
negotiations between the government and the concessionaire, and to enable 
rational decisions regarding sharing of risks and costs. Quantity variation in 
simulation output is crucial and it is necessary to identify the factors driving 
variation. 
Table 5-1 Indicators of main parties’ objectives and perspective 
Indicator Deterministic  environment 




VFM (Value for Money) 
SLR (‘Total Revenue/Total Cost’ ratio @ 
end of Concession period) 
VFM- at-risk and uncertainty 






EIRR- at-risk and uncertainty 
NPV- at-risk and uncertainty 
Lenders’s 
perspective 
DSCR (Debt Service Cover Ratio)  
LLCR (Loan Life Cover Ratio ) 
DSCR- at-risk and uncertainty 





The value for money (VFM) has been used as a criterion to measure 
whether the government has obtained the maximum benefit within the 
available resources. VFM not only measures the cost, but also takes into 
account the quality and fitness for purpose to determine whether goods and 
services represent desirable value. The government thus selects a preferred 
bidder to obtain the maximum VFM through its proposal. In assessing the 
VFM, the public sector comparator (PSC) is first identified, probably based on 
similar projects. The difference between the PSC and the bidding price 
(proposal) is the VFM of the potential project. The SLR is the ratio of the total 
revenue to the total cost at the end of the concession period. 
Private sector’ perspective 
The main objective of the private sector is to maximize profits, and their 
decisions are mainly based on the financial viability of PPP-BOT projects. 
Thus, they look at the financial cash flows to check the project’s financial 
viability and to assess whether they are able to meet their financial obligations, 
especially debt service. The project may include additional income such as 
government subsidies or may be limited to the concession agreement. The 
NPV of equity cash flow and EIRR (return on equity) indicators were, 
therefore, selected for this research. The return on equity may not be fixed, 
and may be obtained from the market, such as using capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) as a guide, with all its limitations such as market volatility, 




For lenders, the nature of non-recourse or limited recourse funding clearly 
carries a rather different credit assessment than a conventional full recourse 
loan. The key difference between the lenders and the investors is that holding 
debt rather than equity never has a potential upside gain in the project, only a 
downside risk (Grimseya and Lewis, 2002). In this case, lenders want to be 
satisfied that the indicators can measure whether the project can service its 
debt with a sufficient allowance to cover any contingencies. This research uses 
the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) to represent the principal and interest 
payment ability. DSCR is the ratio of the net operating income to the annual 
debt service and signifies the ability of project’s cash flows to meet the annual 
debt service requirements. This ratio is calculated each year and therefore 
provides a continuous view of the project’s ability to service its debt. The 
DSCR is typically acceptable if it is more than 1.5. 
The loan life cover ratio (LLCR) is another most commonly used debt 
metrics in Project Finance. It is the ratio of NPV of available cash for debt 
service during the debt period to total debt. Unlike period-on-period measures 
such as the DSCR, it provides an analyst with a measure of the number of 
times the cash flow over the life of the loan can repay the outstanding debt 
balance. Most banks have a requirement for a LLCR of around 1.4:1 or 1.5:1. 
DSCR and LLCR need to be modelled clearly and accurately. Other measures 
can also be implemented. 
5.3.3. Consensus on the Policy Parameters-Simulation Input 
Experts and project managers of parties involved in the PPP-BOT project 
i.e. the concessionaire and the government; have to reach a consensus on the 
type and parameters of probability distribution for risky variables and the 
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possible range (e.g. membership function type and parameters) of uncertain 
variables in simulation input. These risky and uncertain variables affect 
parties’ objectives functions which are called simulation functions. The 
consensus is reached on key simulation input variables (e.g. financial 
variables) that affecting the simulation (e.g. life cycle cash flow) and decision 
variables in simulation output (e.g. project return). 
It is needed to observe objective and subjective variables of the project, 
obtain a consensus of them and feed simulation input. To do this, it is 
proposed that, subjective variables are observed from a number of experts and 
are represented as a fuzzy number for each expert. Then for consolidation and 
combination of gathered values, weighted Fuzzy-Delphi Method (WFDM) is 
applied to reach a fuzzy number that is representative of experts’ opinions of 
each party involved. At the end, a fuzzy number that represent each party’s 
opinion on specific variable is established. 
5.3.3.1. Fuzzy-Delphi Technique 
Traditional Delphi method is a structured communication technique, 
originally developed as a systematic, interactive forecasting method which 
relies on a panel of experts. The success of the Delphi method depends 
principally on careful selection of the panel of experts. In the standard version 
of Delphi method, the experts answer questionnaires in two or more rounds. 
After each round, a facilitator provides an anonymous summary of the experts’ 
forecasts from the previous round as well as the reasons they provided for 
their judgments. Thus, experts are encouraged to revise their earlier answers in 
light of the replies of other members of their panel. It is believed that during 
this process the range of the answers will decrease and the group will 
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converge towards the “correct and precise” answer. Finally, the process is 
stopped after a pre-defined stop criterion (e.g. number of rounds, achievement 
of consensus, and stability of results) and the mean scores of the final rounds 
determine the results (Rowe and Wright, 1999). 
Although the traditional Delphi method as a survey technique has offered 
helpful capability, but the problems of uncertainty modelling still exist. The 
problems may exist in the survey question and the response. Therefore, the 
fuzzy set theory can be an appropriate method to deal with these problems. 
Fuzzy Delphi method (FDM) is a generalization of the classical Delphi 
method which was developed in the sixties by the Rand Corporation at Santa 
Monica, California. Kaufmann and Gupta (1988) proposed steps for 
implementation of the FDM (Bojadziev and Bojadziev, 1997). The following 
are modified steps which are compatible with the research context. 
Step 1: The experts and PPP-BOT project managers (of main parties included 
concessionaire, government, lenders, etc.) E𝑝𝑖 , E𝑔𝑖 , E𝑙𝑖 , ect. (i = 1, 2, … , n)  are 
asked to provide their estimates and appraisal on the key simulation input 
variables (risky and uncertain variables), 𝑋𝑗 (j = 1, 2, … ,m). This is done by 
determining the minimum a𝑗
𝑝𝑖 , a𝑗
𝑔𝑖 , a𝑗
𝑙𝑖 , 𝑒𝑡𝑐. the most plausible b𝑗
𝑝𝑖 , b𝑗
𝑔𝑖 , b𝑗
𝑙𝑖 , 𝑒𝑡𝑐. 
and the maximum c𝑗
𝑝𝑖 , c𝑗
𝑔𝑖 , c𝑗
𝑙𝑖 , 𝑒𝑡𝑐. values for these appraisals. The data given 
by the experts and PPP-BOT project managers are presented in the form of 













𝑙𝑖〉, etc. These appraisals could also be represented by 



















Step 2: First, the fuzzy average of all key simulation input variables, X̃j, for 














𝑙ave〉 , etc. 
Then for each expert the deviation between fuzzy average and appraised fuzzy 
triangular numbers by experts is computed respectively. It is also a triangular 
number. The corresponding deviations of each party are given back to the 
experts and PPP-BOT project managers for revision. 
Step 3: Each expert gives a new fuzzy triangular number. The process defined 
by steps 2 and 3 is repeated until two successive means become, according to 
the decision makers, reasonably close. Then the process is terminated. 
5.3.3.2. Weighted Fuzzy-Delphi Technique 
In subjective decision making, the knowledge, experience and expertise of 
some experts is often preferred to the knowledge, experience and expertise of 
other experts. This is expressed by weights w𝑖
𝑝 , w𝑖
𝑔, w𝑖





𝑖=1 = ∑ w𝑖
𝑙𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1, i = 1, 2, … , n) assigned to the expert i. They 
represent the relative importance of expert i to others in each party’s group.  
Fuzzy Delphi method is a typical multi-experts forecasting procedure for 
combining views and opinions. Fuzzy Delphi method (FDM) has been 
examined by Khanzadi et al. (2010) to determine the concession period. 
However, there are some shortcomings and limitations to their study which 
have been addressed in this research. 
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5.3.4. Fuzzy objective function determination  
Turning to the concept of a decision, intuitively, a decision is basically a 
choice or a set of choices drawn from the available alternatives. It could be 
suggested that a fuzzy decision be defined as the fuzzy of alternatives resulting 
from the intersection of the goals and constraints. This idea could be 
formalized in the following definition. In defining a fuzzy decision as the 
intersection of the goals and constraints, we are tacitly assuming that all of the 
goals and constraints are of equal importance. There are some situations, 
however, in which some of the goals and perhaps some of the constraints are 
of greater importance than others. In such cases, the goal might be expressed 
as a convex combination of the goals and constraints, with the weighting 
coefficients reflecting the relative importance of the constituent terms. 
Since multiparty are involved in the PPP-BOT project the consensus on 
NCIs is tied to the determination of each life cycle’s objective function under 
risks and uncertainties of each party. The government’s objective (Π𝑔) is to 
maximize the expected total social welfare and economic performance. It is 
quantitatively computed by VFM (including the customers’ surplus), earning 
during concession period from royalty (Φ) and post-transferring period from 
project operation (Ψ). It is mathematically represented by equation 5.2. 







































≥ 0   
𝑉𝐹𝑀𝛼
μ = ∇𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶−𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶 − 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃, 𝑉𝐹𝑀𝛼
μ ≥ 0 , 
C𝑡α
μ = O&M𝑡α
μ + Tax𝑡 
The private sector only care about their own financial profits during the 
concession period to repay the debt (principal and interest) and initial 
investment and make acceptable return on investment(𝐼𝑐𝑅). Their object 
function (Π𝑝) is mathematically represented by equation 5.3. 



























− 𝐼0                       5.3 
As an example, life cycle fuzzy objective function from private sector 
perspective (NPV of accumulated cash flow) is demonstrated in Figure 5-5. As 
can be seen, the optimistic scenario which is under optimal performance case, 
is plotted with α cut=0r, the most likely scenario which is under planned 
performance is plotted with α cut=1 and pessimistic scenario which is under 




Figure 5-5 Life cycle fuzzy objective function-private sector perspective NPV of accumulated 
cash flow 
5.3.5. Consensus on the NCIs – Simulation Output 
The concessionaire and the government also have to reach consensus on 
the NCIs as decision variables (in simulation output) that fulfil and satisfy 
lenders and end-users expectation and interest. To do this, based on each 
party’s objective and by using the FR-MCS results, NCI is represented as 
fuzzy number for each party. Then through using the fuzzy operation (fuzzy 
intersection) consensus on NCI is achieved as a fuzzy number. Lastly, through 
defuzzification methods, NCI at specific µ-cut/α-confidence level is 
determined as a crisp value for final decision makings. Defuzzification is the 
conversion method of fuzzy output (possibility distribution of the output) to 
crisp (precise) value. This crisp value is a NCI that meet all parties’ interests 
and objectives. So the obtained NCI could guarantee the success of the 
negotiations and prevents prolonged and costly negotiations especially in the 
development phase of PPP-BOT projects. Figure 5-6 demonstrates the idea of 
using multiple objective fuzzy representation to establish consensus on NCI. 
NCI is determined based on the perspective of government, lender and private 











α cut=0r, optimistic scenario 
α cut=1, most likely 
scenario 




negotiation, as benchmark of consensus on the NCIs. It is represented as 
shaded area in the Figure 5-6. 
 
Figure 5-6 Fuzzy intersection of multiparty fuzzy objectives to find common ground for 
multiparty negotiation 
For establishing an appropriate NCI under risks and uncertainties, it is 
necessary to follow these three steps:  Firstly, identify essential and significant 
risky and uncertain factors as well as concession items involve in life cycle 
negotiation PPP-BOT project from each party’s standpoint (as CSFs if manage 
properly) that could have serious effects on decision variables. Secondly, 
having established the deterministic, risky and uncertain parameters in 
simulation input, the simulation can proceed by feeding these parameters 
through generating random and fuzzy random variables. By repeating the 
simulation cycle an enough number of times, the fuzzy CDF of the NCIs can 
be generated. Likewise, the fuzzy CDF for each possible NCI can also be 
identified. Thirdly, with the simulation results, NCI that could meet and ensure 
main parties’ objectives is determined (i.e. guarantee the concessionaire to 
gain the anticipated financial return under the proposed tariff/toll structure at a 
particular confidence and uncertain levels (fuzzy probability) and ensure the 
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public sector to meet its objective by considering the constraints of end users 
and lenders). 
The simulation output would include the fuzzy CDF of all different NPV 
corresponding to various scenarios (NPV min, NPV expected and NPV max) 
and the criteria and constraint for finalizing appropriate NCIs. In addition, 
different scenarios could be considered during the simulation process. This 
approach facilitates trade-off decision making between deterministic and 
uncertain parameters (e.g. a series of IRR or tariff/toll structure) on the one 
side and NCIs (e.g. concession period, tariff/toll rate and royalty) on the other 
side. 
In order to take into account the satisfaction level of the parties, it is 
proposed to use minimum satisfaction of the parties (specific alpha-cut) before 
doing the defuzzification. For instance, in the case that is represented in Figure 
5-6, maxmin of the parties’ satisfaction is 0.6. Robustness of the equilibrium 
solution (defuzzification result) is an essential and crucial issue that must be 
considered. The obtained solutions that are located near to borderline and 
threshold points are not robust. There are so sensitive to uncertainty and risk. 
Because of this, among major defuzzification techniques, the Level Rank 
Method (Moller and Beer, 2004) is proposed for defuzzification to meet the 
requirements of robustness of equilibrium solution. The concept of the Level 
Rank Method is based on the α-discretization. The membership scale of the 
fuzzy variable is discretized with the aid of chosen α-levels, and then the 




The idea of using multiple objective fuzzy representation to establish 
consensus on NCI is consistent with the game theory concept and solution. It 
means that when the intersection of fuzzy representation exists, the 
corresponding Game has an equilibrium solution and vice versa when the 
intersection does not exist, the corresponding Game model does not have any 
equilibrium solution. In some cases, no fuzzy intersection may be derived. In 
such cases an appropriate method such as Real Options Valuation (ROV) that 
could create this common ground is required. This is an interesting issue in 
PPP-BOT context; however, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. Readers are 
recommended to refer to the chapter 6 for the details of definitions and 
procedures. 
5.3.6. Fuzzy Multi Objective Function 
Since the decision making in PPP-BOT projects is a multi-objective 
decision making under uncertainty and risk, fuzzy multi objective function 
based on the centroid method and the fuzzification and defuzziﬁcation 
algorithms after Jain and Chen (Jain, 1985; Chen, 1976; Moller and Beer, 
2004) is developed. It enables decision maker to analyse and identify the most 
preferred negotiation scenario from possible negotiation scenarios that results 
in a win–win–win concession scheme for government, concessionaire and end 
user. By this method, the selected negotiation scenario would balance the 
interests of all major stakeholders simultaneously. Fuzzy set simulation model 
is also applied to evaluate negotiable concession items (NCIs) under 
uncertainty. 
There are some assumptions in this model. At first current objective 
function must be transfer to fuzzy objective function, 𝑓𝑖(𝑥). 𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑓 and 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑝 are 
167 
 
the inferior and superior boundaries of 𝑓𝑖(𝑥). μ𝑖(𝑥) is the membership degree. 








































x    5.5 
The max–min decision role, equation 5.6, is taken to determine the non-
inferior (non-dominated) solution where 𝑖 is the objective index, 𝑗 is the 
scenario index and 𝑤𝑖 is the weight of objective 𝑖. 
  iwij
ij
ij  minmax        5.6 
5.4. Illustrative Case Study 
A case study has been conducted, a BOT toll highway project. The Toolkit for 
Public-Private Partnerships in Roads and Highways provided by the World 
Bank-PPIAF (V1.1, 2009) demonstrated a financial model. This model has 
some shortcomings. Although the toolkit provides the capability to take into 
account some variables as risk; these variables are not able to be changed 
simultaneously. Therefore, it is still a static model. Furthermore, it is unable to 
handle fuzzy variable as an input, as a consequence it cannot perform 
uncertainty modelling. The proposed model for financial modelling has solved 
these limitations. It is implemented using spread sheets and Macro in 
Microsoft Excel. Also a special program has been developed by MATLAB 
(The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts) to perform risk and uncertainty 
analysis using the FR-MCS technique for the evaluation of uncertain and risky 
parameters. FR-MCS technique is a hybrid simulation approach for risk and 
uncertainty evaluation and analysis. The proposed approach permits any type 
of risk and uncertainty in the input values to be explicitly defined prior to the 
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decision analysis being undertaken. The proposed approach extends the 
practical use of the conventional MCS by providing the capability of choosing 
between fuzzy sets and probability distributions in the input. The outcome of 
the FR-MCS technique captures both fuzzy and probabilistic uncertainty. They 
are represented through the fuzzy CDF method. By using the fuzzy CDF 
method in FR-MCS technique, the aforementioned shortcomings to the 
existing method are removed. Uncertain parameters are referred to the 
variables that estimated based on the experts’ judgment and risky parameters 
are referred to the variables that derived from historical data (pervious 
projects). In this case study our focus is on the representation of the uncertain 
parameters such as demand uncertainty by fuzzy variables and risky 
parameters such as total project cost by random variables. The membership 
function of quantity of demand as an uncertain variable is shown in Figure 
5-7. The assumptions and summary of project data including expected value of 
parameters and their distribution or membership function is tabulated in Table 
5-2. A total of 1000 iterations are generated. In this case study the following 
parameters are taken as risks and uncertain variables: concession period, 
construction cost, operation cost, initial daily traffic, traffic growth, toll rate 
(VAT incl.), Investment subsidies, equity, debt maturity, interest rate, grace 
period, inflation rate, corporate tax rate, VAT rate. The components of project 
cash flow at most likely value of quantity of demand are exhibited in Figure 
5-8 and Figure 5-9. The main indicators such as project IRR (PIRR), equity 
IRR (EIRR) and DSCR are calculated and are shown. Debt and dividend 
calculations are shown in Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11. The calculations show 
the associated amount of annual service debt and dividend payment, ADSCR, 
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LLCR, PIRR and EIRR. Sensitivity Analysis of indicators PIRR and EIRR to 
aforementioned key risky and uncertain variables is performed. It is 
represented by Spider diagram in Figure 5-12 and Figure 5-13. As can be 
observed from sensitivity analysis-spider diagrams, the financial model 
outcomes are sensitive to construction cost, toll rate, initial daily traffic, 
concession period, construction period and tax rate. 
Table 5-2 Basic input data of the case study 




Macroeconomic indicators and indexes   
Project Economic life, project life cycle (yrs) 30 Deterministic 
Costs regime during construction - <0.1,0.3,0.5,0.1> 
Escalation rate during construction/inflation 
rate during operation period (%) 
4 Log Normal distribution, LnN(4,1) 
Amortization period (yrs) 20 Deterministic 
Tax rate (%) 10 Deterministic 
Gov. discount rate (%) 8.16 Deterministic 
Cost of debt (%) 5.40 Deterministic 
Cost of equity (hurdle rate) (%) 16 Deterministic 
Loan Interest rate (%) 6 Deterministic 
Loan repayment period/debt maturity (yrs) 10 Deterministic 
WACC-discount rate (%) 8.58 Deterministic 
Annual growth rate of unit price (%) 5 Normal distribution, N(5,1) 
Annual growth rate of quantity of demand (%) 5 Normal distribution, N(5,1) 
Cost of finance coefficient for Pre concession 
period costs calculation 
0.05 Deterministic 
Cost of tender coefficient for Pre concession 
period costs calculation 
0.05 Deterministic 
Increasing rate of annual growth rate of unit 
price (%) 
10 Normal distribution, N(10,1) 
Expected Base Cost coefficient for Asset value 
calculation at transfer date 
0.1 Normal distribution, N(0.1,0.01) 
Fuzzy-Stochastic Variables (FSV)   
Total project costs (M$) 170 Normal distribution, N(170,25) 
Operation and maintenance costs (M$/year) 1.73 Normal distribution, N(1.73,0.25) 
Annual growth rate of O&M costs (%) 2.5 Normal distribution, N(2.5,1) 
Initial daily traffic (vehicles/day) 20,000 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈18,800, 
20,000, 20,000, 20,600〉 
Quantity of demand (vehicle per year) 7,300,000 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 
〈6,862,000, 7,300,000, 7,300,000, 
7,519,000〉 
Operating revenue (M$/year) 27.01 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈25.39, 
27.01, 27.01, 27.82〉 
Pre concession period (yrs) 2 Log Normal distribution, 
LnN(2,0.5) 
Negotiable concession items (NCIs)   
Construction period (yrs) 4  
Operation period (yrs) 21  
Concession period (yrs) 25  
Unit price of services in first year of operation 
($/vehicle) 
3.7  
Debt, Equity (%) 40%,30%  











Figure 5-8 Components of project life cycle cash flow (M$) at most likely value of quantity of 
demand 














trapmf,quantity of demand(vehicle per year)=[6.862 7.3 7.3 7.519]
1 2 3 4 1 2 21 22 30
Yearly traffic (Million vehicles) 7.30 7.67 19.37 20.34 30.05
Operating revenue (MUSD) 27.01 28.36 71.67 75.25 111.18
construction costs (MUSD) -17 -51 -85 -17
construction costs-Cumulative (MUSD) -17 -68 -153 -170
Interest During Construction (MUSD) -0.71 -2.86 -6.43
Financing Fees and insurance (MUSD) -10
O&M costs (MUSD) -1.73 -1.77 -2.94 -3.03 -4.00
Depreciation (MUSD) -8.10 -8.10 -8.10 0.00 0.00
Net operating income (MUSD) 17.18 18.50 60.63 72.22 107.17
Project Cashflow (MUSD) -27.00 -51.71 -87.86 -23.43 17.18 18.50 60.63 72.22 107.17
Cumulative (MUSD) -27.00 -78.71 -166.57 -190.00 -172.81 -154.31 557.71 629.92 1356.02
PV (MUSD) -27.00 -78.71 -166.57 -190.00 -174.17 -158.48 93.84 105.65 187.32
loan interest payment (MUSD) -6.80 -6.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Earning before tax (MUSD) 10.38 12.45 60.63 72.22 107.17
Tax (MUSD) -1.85 -2.05 -6.87
Net earning (MUSD) 8.53 10.40 53.76 72.22 107.17
Depreciation (MUSD) 8.10 8.10 8.10 0.00 0.00
loan principal peyment (MUSD) -12.60 -12.60
DSCR ((EBIT+Dep-Tax)/Debt service) 1.21 1.32
Equity Cashflow (MUSD) -8.10 -15.51 -26.36 -7.03 4.03 5.89 61.86 72.22 107.17
PV (MUSD) -8.10 -23.61 -49.97 -57.00 -53.53 -49.15 46.53 49.29 63.78
Cumulative (MUSD) -8.10 -23.61 -49.97 -57.00 -52.97 -47.08 612.32 684.53 1410.63
IRR and NPV on Project 11.30% $49.99
IRR and NPV on Equity 19.85% $17.90
PV of min Retun on equity (M$) 9.12








Figure 5-9 Project life cycle cash flow diagram (K$) 
 
 
Figure 5-10 Debt cash flow diagram (K$) 
 



































































Figure 5-12 Sensitivity Analysis of indicator PIRR to key risky and uncertain variables 
 
Figure 5-13 Sensitivity Analysis of indicator EIRR to key risky and uncertain variables 
Figure 5-14 illustrates three dimensional view of fuzzy CDF for total 
investment costs (TIC) resulting from the FR-MCS that are generated by 
MATLAB. The x-axis denotes TIC, y-axis is the probability, and z-axis is the 
α-value. Figure 5-15 and Figure 5-16 represent the x-y and x-z views of fuzzy 
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Figure 5-14 Three dimensional view of fuzzy CDF for total investment costs resulting from 
the output of FR-MCS, x-axis: TIC, y-axis: probability, z-axis: α-value 
 
Figure 5-15 x-y view of fuzzy CDF resulted in Figure 5-14 
 
Figure 5-16 x-z view of fuzzy CDF resulted in Figure 5-14 
As for decision variables/indicators the procedure is the same. Figure 5-17 
shows the three dimensional view of fuzzy CDF for the debt service cover 
ratio (DSCR) resulting from the FR-MCS. The x-axis denotes DSCR, y-axis is 
the probability, and z-axis is the α-value. Figure 5-18 and Figure 5-19 


























































Figure 5-17 Three dimensional view of fuzzy CDF for debt service cover ratio (DSCR) 
resulting from the output of FR-MCS, x-axis: DSCR, y-axis: probability, z-axis: α-value 
 
Figure 5-18 x-y view of fuzzy CDF resulted in Figure 5-17 
 
Figure 5-19 x-z view of fuzzy CDF resulted in Figure 5-17 
Figure 5-15 and Figure 5-18 elucidate the CDF bound of the simulation 
output. As expected, for less fuzziness, the CDF bound is narrower. In the 
absence of fuzziness, purely probabilistic, the simulation is conventional 
MCS, there is no range for output and it is a CDF. 
In this case study the objective functions of the private sector, end user and 


















































respectively. Risks and uncertain factors are incorporated in the fuzzy set 
simulation model in five possible negotiations scenarios with following 
assumptions: In scenario 1 (Moderate Scenario), the inflation rate follows 
normal distribution (μ =4%, SD= 2%), traffic volume follows normal 
distribution (SD= 20% of the first year’s expected traffic volume), O&M cost 
follows uniform distribution in the interval [500, 1500]. In scenarios 2 & 3, 
tariff regime are 10% and 20% less than the most likely tariff respectively, and 
minimum expected EIRR (hurdle rate) is assumed 0.12. In scenarios 4 & 5, 
minimum expected EIRR (hurdle rate) is assumed 0.14 and 0.15 respectively. 
The tariff regime is set 20% and 10% more than the basic tariff respectively. 
The concession items of 5 scenarios resulted from simulation are summarized 
in Table 5-3. 




















EIRR (%) 12 12 13 14 15 
Tariff 
coefficient (TC) 




28 26 25 21 24 
 
The proposed equations for fuzzy multi objective function (Equations 5.4, 
5.5 and 5.6) are used to choose the best negotiation scenario that meet parties’ 
objective functions. Based on the experiences and negotiations, the following 
assumptions are made on the objective functions possible intervals. They are 





Figure 5-20 Fuzzy membership function of the objective functions 
To evaluate the five scenarios and choose an appropriate negotiation 
scenario, the membership degree of each scenario to the each objective is 
computed. For instance, the membership degree of scenario 1 to the objective 
of maximal IRR and the membership degree of scenario 1 to the objective of 















This computation is continued to construct membership degree matrix. 
Non-inferior solution can be determined based on the obtained membership 





























It can be concluded that preference order being scenarios 5,1,2,4 and 3. 
In order to consider the objective priority, weighting coefficient has been 






















































As can be seen the preference order now becomes scenarios 3,2,1,5 and 4. So 
by this approach, decision makers can choose a scenario that is more 
comfortable for all parties involved based on their objective in negotiation. 
5.5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has proposed a mechanism that allows the government and 
the concessionaire to reach a consensus on NCIs which are agreeable by other 
parties involved in the development phase of PPP-BOT projects under 
uncertainties and risks. FR-MCS technique is used to overcome existing 
problems and provide more flexibility for decision makers through 
determining NCIs as a bound (interval) via its fuzzy CDF instead of 
deterministic value from each party’s perspective. 
The proposed methodology suggested improved decision makings which 
follow from more knowledgeable assessments of project risks and 
uncertainties that will lead to select improved project’s NCIs which in turn 
results in improved project performance toward the sustainable project 
success. This approach helps to attain solutions that meet main parties’ 
objectives involved concurrently. Through this approach the consensus on 
NCIs could be reached as early as possible to avoid prolonged and costly 
negotiations in the development phase. 
The advantage of hybrid simulation (fuzzy randomness) lies in the fact that 
by using values lying within a bandwidth (interval) and model those by a 
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defined distribution density or a membership function, the reality can be 
modelled better than by using deterministic and probabilistic figures solely. 
Based on the generated distribution, a range of NCIs for PPP-BOT players is 
obtained to negotiate. 
The simulation model developed in this chapter facilitates determining 
feasible NCIs of a PPP-BOT project negotiations as may affected by various 
risky and uncertain drivers relating to the NCIs e.g. toll structure, toll revision 
schedule, extent of government grant, and the duration of the concession 
period. By careful consideration of the results of the simulation study, the 
government and concessionaire can arrive at a reasonable agreement on the 
terms of the concession i.e. NCIs and consequently sharing of risks and 
uncertainties. Both parties could engage in renegotiations to resolve the 
deadlock by using this mechanism. The proposed simulation’s results are 




CHAPTER 6 OPTIONS-BASED NEGOTIATION MANAGEMENT 
OF PPP-BOT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the PPP-BOT project promoters have to reimburse their investment 
costs from project operations, they are concerned not only with expected 
future incomes but also the risk factors influencing the revenues over time. 
The higher the risk and uncertainty of the revenues and profit, the higher the 
return that will be asked for (Ye and Tiong, 2000). The success of PPP-BOT 
projects largely depends on effectively mitigating the impacts of variety of 
involved risks and uncertainties. 
Moreover, since the debt repayments would just depend on the ability of 
the project to generate cash flows (bankability concept), the lenders are 
concerned with the financial performance of the project as well. They are not 
willing to lend unless most of the risks involved in the project life-cycle are 
addressed properly. Their decision making is to balance between the degree of 
secured debt and the interest rate. 
According to experiences (Zhang, 2005; Tiong et al., 1992), PPP-BOT 
projects are more likely to fail in the development phase than in the other 
phases. Also there is low benefit to private sector in some projects due to more 
risk and uncertainty taking. Consequently, no common ground is found for 
associated negotiations in the development phase. In this circumstance the 
government is pushed to take more risks of the project. Subsequently there 
will be better expected return to private sector and accordingly the common 
ground for negotiations could be made. 
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Government support plays an important role in risk-return trade-off and 
project success. Since each party of a PPP-BOT project has its own objective 
and concerns, each has a different risk-return trade-off analysis (Ye and Tiong, 
2000). However, the design of government support is still an open issue and a 
hot research problem. It is very hard to make a decision on awarding the 
government support rightly when there are uncertainties and risks involved. 
The government supports which are expressed as Options should be carefully 
designed and well formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses of the 
contract are more valuable in risky projects. Correct evaluation of the 
concession in a bidding process is essential for government and bidders.  
The methodology developed in this chapter contributes in two main 
aspects. It presents a means for valuing an early fund generation option. Also 
it presents a procedure to calculate equitable bound for guaranteed rate of 
return for project sponsor and equity holders under uncertainties and risks. The 
results show that by applying the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism 
both public and private sectors could take advantage of its flexibility at the 
negotiation table. The proposed mechanisms could facilitate negotiations on the 
verge of break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have been 
slowed down. 
6.2 Government Support 
There are two main motivations for government to provide support to 
concessionaire in a PPP-BOT project. Firstly in order to reduce capital 
requirement and to improve revenues during the project operation. Thus the 
concessionaire is able to extent necessary to cover debt service and to earn a 
reasonable return on equity based on the expected cash flows of the project. 
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Secondly, it is to protect project sponsors, investors and lenders from 
insufficient cash flow risk (or financial viability gap) which will be inadequate 
to cover debt service (Fishbein and Babbar, 1996). Host governments often 
provide supports such as guarantees to attract private sector investors. It 
increases the confidence of investors and enhances project attractiveness. The 
need for government support mainly results from the private sector’s trade-
offs between risk and return. The kind of support given depends on a number 
of factors. 
In addition to cash subsidies, there are a number of government support 
categories that could be offered to concessionaire by government agency. 
These are guarantee support and financial and incentives support. Each type 
of support has its own characteristics, comprising of different structures that 
are appropriate for particular purposes. 
6.2.1 Guarantee Support 
There are several types of support that fall under the rubric ‘guarantee 
support’. These are, inter alia, equity, debt, exchange rate, minimum demand, 
minimum revenue (MRG), tariff/toll and maximum interest rate guarantees. 
6.2.2 Financial and Incentive Support 
Similarly, there are several types of support that fall under the rubric ‘financial 
and incentive support’. These are direct capital contributions (e.g. grants, 
subordinated loans (extra loan), debt and equity investment), shadow 
toll/tariff, concession period extension, revenue enhancements, reduction of 
front-end cost, free use of project site and associated facilities, preferential tax 
incentives (e.g. tax breaks, tax exemption for a certain number of years), 
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comfort letter, interest-free financing, option to defer, to abandon, to alter, to 
switch and the growth option. 
The major objective of these guarantee support and financial and 
incentives support is to reduce perception of risk for the sponsors and financial 
institutions. The reduced perception will result in a reduction of the financial 
cost of the project. With a reduced financial cost, the concessionaire has a 
greater willingness to invest and could result in a lower tariff for the end user. 
It also increases the bidders’ competitiveness in the tender process. Thus these 
mechanisms reduce the cash flow volatility, add flexibility to the project and 
allow for better management of the concession items which are subject to risks 
and uncertainties. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is a big concern of 
existing studies (Galera and Solina, 2010). Additionally a PPP-BOT contract 
could be designed by government supports and incentives to induce the 
promoter firm to invest in the best quality and achieve best efficiency which 
leads to deliver superior VFM. 
Each government support is applicable for special circumstances. For 
instance, the government may grant loan (debt) guarantee to a BOT project 
when the project is not financially viable enough (financial viability gap) or is 
too risky to be undertaken by private sectors. The implementation of an 
unattractive project could require debt guarantee. In another case, the project 
company benefits from negotiation options by negotiating for government 
rescue when adverse events occur during the construction and operation 
stages. Such successful negotiations could fend off project bankruptcy (Ho 
and Liu, 2002; Ye and Tiong, 2000). 
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In PPP-BOT projects one or more government support may be employed. 
For instance both Shajiao B and Laibin B power plant projects were protected 
from force majeure risk to a limited extent. The government’s obligation is to 
make a subordinated loan in case of insufficient revenue. The project company 
was also entitled to extend construction and operation periods and 
consequently the concession period consistently if completion delays and/or 
operation barriers resulting from events of force majeure. Two-period 
structure of concession period is an incentive scheme that both parties could 
benefit from. In the case of operation delay the government obligation is to 
provide funds to meet debt service. In the case of termination, the loan of 
lenders will be repaid and the equity investment of promoters will be 
compensated. Both projects benefit from preferential tax and government loan 
at preferential interest rate policies. Also the government provided the foreign 
partner with early completion bonus. Under unstable economic situation, the 
government is willing to provide more preferential conditions to private 
promoters, to assume more risks, and to allow higher rates of return. In 
contrast, under stable economic condition, the government is interested to 
reduce its involvement and limit promoter’s return and set a cap on the equity 
internal rate of return (EIRR) of BOT projects.  The concessionaire assumes 
the hurdle rate as minimum acceptable rate of return (floor). Thus the BOT 
project internal rate of return is narrowed to an interval with lower bound 
(floor) and upper bound (cap) (Ye and Tiong, 2000). 
In another case in a toll road project (Attarzadeh, 2007; Vassallo and 
Solino, 2006), the government implements an optional revenue guarantee. If 
the concessionaire decides to request the guarantee in its bid, it will have to 
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share extra revenues with the government if the revenues collected surpass the 
threshold established in the bidding terms. If the concessionaire decides not to 
get the guarantee, it will have to take the whole traffic risk.  
The host governments must identify and distinguish the necessity to offer 
incentives and direct or indirect support in practically all the PPP-BOT 
projects and should adopt suitable types of support consistent with the 
projects’ financial viability to increase the private sector’s participation and 
motivation. As can be seen, the guarantees and financial and incentives 
supports provided by government are represented as risk mitigation strategies 
and mechanisms to infrastructure concessions. On the one hand, government 
guarantees can reduce project risks and uncertainties. Thus the presence of 
guarantees increases the project’s value. But on the other hand, they create an 
uncertain future commitment for the government, which is not free of cost. A 
study shows that a guarantee costs can average as much as a third of the 
amount guaranteed (Lewis and Mody, 1998). The cost of the guarantees must 
be estimated and compared with the equivalent subsidies in order to ascertain 
which of the approaches are more effective in reducing the project risk and 
uncertainty.  
These supports and incentive schemes have feature of enhancing cash flow 
to Project Company by limiting the downside. On the other hand, to avoid 
giving away too much value to concessionaire, the host government would 
also attempt to counterbalance the grant of these incentives by introducing 
additional repayment obligations and features, such as demand a reduction and 
placement of a cap on the tariff/toll rates to benefit the end user. Alternatively, 
the government could seek additional revenue by imposing higher taxes on the 
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concessionaire or even call for direct participation as a sharing mechanism in 
the upside of the project returns. This is similar to hedging feature of Real 
Options. For instance, currency exchange risk can be successfully hedged 
through derivative instruments such as currency swaps. Thus these supports 
and repayments could be formulated as Options that the government provides 
for Project Company by Real Options Analysis (ROA). 
Options add value to the project in such a way that a specific project with a 
negative NPV could be acceptable if the value of the options for the 
concessionaire outweighs the negative value of the NPV. So it facilitates a 
negotiation that is on the verge of break down as well as accelerates an ongoing 
negotiation that has slowed down. Concessionaire would exploit from offered 
options by the government upon the agreement were reached, although more 
risk transferred to the government. Both public and private sectors could take 
advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. 
Government support such as debt guarantee as an option is a liability to the 
government and an asset to the project company. So it is vital for both parties 
to estimate and quantify the value of the support (this is called options 
valuation). Generally, the value of such an option is considerable. Failing to 
consider the value of the option by the government may unknowingly provide 
the concessionaire a huge support. Consequently the concessionaire will be 
over subsidized. Alternatively, failing to consider the value of the option by 
the concessionaire may unwittingly ignore or assign a conservative value to 
the option in view of its ambiguity. Accordingly the concessionaire will 
underestimate or overestimate the investment value. 
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The value of options is often hard to quantify. Usually it is estimated by 
the value of cash flow with supports minus the value of cash flow without 
supports. The equity value is the most important evaluation criterion to 
measure the financial viability of PPP-BOT projects. Then the value of 
government support such as guarantee and negotiation option is reflected in 
equity value aim for comparison and decision makings. 
By incorporating these options the negotiation bound can be constructed 
which would enlarge the feasible bargaining range for both parties. In fact, a 
feasible bargaining range may not even exist between the public and the 
private sectors if the values of the incentive schemes and the repayment 
features are omitted. This advantage facilitates decision making under 
uncertainties and risks. 
As can be seen, many options available and could be applied in PPP-BOT 
negotiations. Early fund generation and guaranteed upper and lower bound of 
rate of return options are taken to examine in this chapter because of case 
study. 
6.3 Real Options Analysis 
In general, an option may be defined as an opportunity to take a beneficial 
action, within a bounded time frame, when a favourable condition occurs. 
Accordingly, option theory studies how to model and price this opportunity 
which is typically either a contractual right (e.g., financial options, flexible 
commodity contracts) or system flexibility (e.g., expansion or delay options). 
(Zhao and Tseng, 2003; Chiara et al., 2007) 
Options mechanism is a hedging opportunity which limits risks and 
uncertainties and encourages private sectors participation. Although there is an 
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option cost to the government, this is considerably less than if the government 
carries the whole project costs. Using the options mechanism it is possible that 
the private party could reach common ground in the negotiations a lot earlier 
because there are obvious financial advantages for them. 
Real options theory concerns options theory applied to non-financial or 
real assets. Real options analysis overcomes some of the shortcomings of 
conventional NPV/IRR discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis and capital 
budgeting methods. There are two types of options: the Call and the Put. An 
option gives the right, but not the obligation to either buy (call option) or sell 
(put option) the underlying asset at a certain price (strike price) on a specified 
future date (expiry date). For this right, the buyer of the option pays a 
premium upfront (non-refundable) to the seller (or writer) of the option. The 
selling or buying of an asset at the strike price is called “exercising the 
option”. As can be seen, the option buyer has unlimited gain and limited loss 
(premium). In contrast, the option seller has limited gain (premium) and 
unlimited loss.  
Call Options are used in order to capitalize on an increasing trend in the 
market (risky project). The payoff for a call option (C) is estimated using the 
following equation: 
𝐶 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝑆 − 𝐾), 0], {
𝐶 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 > 𝐾
𝐶 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 ≤ 𝐾
}       6.1 
Where S is the current price (or stock/market price) and K is the strike 
price (or exercise price). (See Figure 6-1) 
In contrast, the Put Options are used in order to capitalize on a decreasing 
trend in the market (risky project). The payoff for a put option (P) is estimated 
using the following equation:  
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𝑃 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝐾 − 𝑆), 0], {
𝑃 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐾 > 𝑆
𝑃 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐾 ≤ 𝑆
}       6.2 
 
Figure 6-1 European style Call (left) and Put (right) options 
As can be seen, an Option provides an opportunity for the decision maker 
to take some action after risks and uncertaities are revealed. for instance, the 
owner of a call option will exercise the option only after learning that the 
current price S is greater than exercise price K. 
In the PPP-BOT context the underlying cash flow is the underlying asset. 
For instance the highway traffic volume (a non-financial variable) is 
considered as the underlying asset in trasportation projects. The strike price is 
linked to the guaranteed cash flow. The current price is linked to the expected 
cash flow (Charo et al., 2003; Galera and Solina, 2010). For instance, the 
payoff of guaranteed minimum traffic volume (GMTV) as a put option and 
also the payoffs of two cases, with and without this guarantee, are shown in 
Figure 6-2. 
 
















The Cash flow (payoff) at year t, 𝐶𝐹𝑡, Option value at year t, 𝑂𝑉𝑡 and total 
Option value, 𝑂𝑉, are calculated using the following equations. Where 𝑉𝑡 is 
the traffic volume at year t, 𝑉𝐺 or 𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑉 is the guaranteed minimum traffic 
volume, 𝑥 is toll rate, 𝐸𝑡 is O&M costs at year t, 𝑇 is tax rate and 𝑂𝑃 is 
operation period. 
𝐶𝐹𝑡 = {
(𝑉𝑡𝑥 − 𝐸𝑡)(1 − 𝑇)         𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑡 ≥ 𝑉𝐺
(𝑉𝐺𝑥 − 𝐸𝑡)(1 − 𝑇)         𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑡 < 𝑉𝐺
}                     6.3 
𝑂𝑉𝑡 = {
                     0                                  𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑡 ≥ 𝑉𝐺
((𝑉𝐺 − 𝑉𝑡)𝑥 − 𝐸𝑡)(1 − 𝑇)         𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑡 < 𝑉𝐺
} , 𝑂𝑉 =  ∑ 𝑂𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑃
𝑡=1       6.4 
Generally, the guarantee provided by government is a discrete-exercise 
type of real option. Discrete-exercise options are ones that can be exercised at 
discrete points over predetermined period. In general there are three forms of 
discrete-exercise options. European options, an option that can be exercised 
one time, only at the end of its life, American (Bermudan) options, an option 
that can be exercised one time, on specified dates during its life and Australian 
(simple multiple-exercise) options, an option that can be exercised M times, 
on specified N (𝑁 ≥ 𝑀) dates during its life. 
Currently, there are two types of real option pricing and valuation models: 
the binomial lattice model (binary tree) (Hull, 2012) and Black-Scholes model 
(Black and Scholes, 1973). In this research, due to the model assumptions, the 
Black-Scholes model is adopted. Real Options gained popularity through the 
work of Black and Scholes on European style option valuation (1973). The 
Black-Scholes pricing formulas for a call option (C, right to buy) and a put 
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C = Current call option value. 
P = Current put option value. 
N(d)= The probability that a random draw from a standard normal cumulative 
distribution will be less than d. This equals the area under the normal 
curve up to d.  
S = Current price. 
K = Strike (exercise) price. 
T = Time remaining until expiration of option, in years. (T = 0.5 means 6 
months) 
r = Risk-free interest rate, expressed as a decimal (e.g. 0.05), (the annualized 
continuously compounded rate on a safe asset with the same maturity as 
the expiration date of the option, which is to be distinguished from rf, the 
discrete period interest rate.) 
σ = Volatility (e.g. 0.25), Standard deviation of the annualized continuously 
compounded rate of return of the stock. 
6.4 Early Fund Generation Option 
The value of completing a PPP-BOT project earlier is a challenging issue 
especially for the concessionaire. This may lead to an increase in cost but it 
brings the revenue stream on earlier, which enhances the profitability of the 
project. It is necessary to evaluate benefits and disbenefits of early completion 
of the project. This chapter assumes that it is possible to compress project 
construction time which will result in an increase in overall project cost. 
 An example of this is BOT power plant project which is completed earlier 
than scheduled (commercial operating date (COD)). This enables host country 















originally planned. Early project completion is a win-win option. The 
concessionaire, government and end users benefit economically and 
financially from earlier completion of the project and consequently earlier use 
of the facility. 
 The early fund generation (EFG) option needs to be evaluated by both 
government and concessionaire. Figure 6-3 represents cumulative cash flow of 
PPP-BOT project including the EFG option. Figure 6-4 illustrates the life-
cycle’s components of PPP-BOT project including the EFG option. 
 







The present value, PV, of a discrete uniform series of the net benefits stream 
from project operation, 𝑅, at the discount rate 𝑟, starting at time 𝑎 and 
continuing through time 𝑏, is estimated by following formula: (Reinschmidt 



































































Figure 6-4 life-cycle’s components of PPP-BOT project including the EFG 
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Under the assumption that the benefits,𝑅, are constant in time over the 
operation period of BOT-PPP project, PV at time 0 (start of construction) is 





 , 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐶𝐷 + 𝑂𝑃                    6.11 
where 𝐶𝐷 is the construction duration, 𝑂𝑃 is the operation period, and 𝐶𝑃 is 
the concession period. The PV of a uniform series of costs over the 










].                     6.12 
With a = 0 and  b = CD then:  
PVc(r, CD ) =
C0
r
[1− (1 + r)−CD]                 6.13 
The total net present value of the project, difference of present value of the 
benefits and present value of the costs, is estimated as follows: 
𝑃𝑉(𝑟,𝐶𝐷) = 𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟,𝐶𝐷)−𝑃𝑉𝑐(𝑟,𝐶𝐷)                          6.14 
The internal of rate of return, 𝑟0, is calculated by setting the total net PV to 
zero, and solving for 𝑟: 𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟0, 𝐶𝐷) = 𝑃𝑉𝑐(𝑟0, 𝐶𝐷),  
so: 𝐶0[(1 + 𝑟0)
𝐶𝐷 − 1](1 + 𝑟0)
𝐶𝑃 = 𝑅0[(1 + 𝑟0)
𝐶𝑃 − 1]. 
The obtained rate of return, 𝑟0, then compare with hurdle rate to determine 
whether the project construction acceleration is economically desirable and 
justifiable. 
The present value of the benefit stream for project at shorter construction 
duration, 𝐶𝐷′ < 𝐶𝐷, is estimated as follows. 𝑟0 is assumed as the discount rate 
to have same internal of rate of return. 






′ = 𝐶𝐷′ + 𝐷𝐸𝐺 + 𝑂𝑃
′.              6.15 
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Now take the ratio of the discounted present value of the net benefits for the 
accelerated project, 𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟0, 𝐶𝐷
′), to the discounted present value of the net 









−𝐶𝑃                      6.16 
Then the percentage increase in present value of the project benefits due to the 










−𝐶𝑃 ] − 1}                   6.17 
This is the percentage increase in value of the project obtained by shortening 
the construction duration from 𝐶𝐷 to 𝐶𝐷′. At the discounted 𝑟0, this is also the 
maximum percentage increase in the present value of the project costs. The 
maximum acceptable percentage increase in discounted cost to complete 
project earlier is the percentage increase in discounted benefits gained from 
earlier completion. In the case 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃′ then the percentage increase is: 
∇= 100{[(1 + 𝑟0)
𝐶𝐷−𝐶𝐷′] − 1} 
6.5 Guaranteed Upper and Lower Bound of Rate of Return Option 
The government usually grants the concessionaire a guaranteed minimum 
return on equity (Min-GEROR), 𝑟𝑓. This is a right to build and operate the 
project in which the government compensates for any revenue shortfall in the 
life-cycle cash flow. The question is how to determine an equitable guaranteed 
maximum return on equity (Max-GEROR), 𝑟𝑐, under the uncertainty in order 
to limit the concessionaire’s profit. The focus of this section is determining 




Under Min-GEROR guarantee the government subsidizes the shortfall in 
revenue. It is a put option written to the sponsor of the project by the 
government. If the actual revenue in year t (𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑎) don’t reach the level that has 
been guaranteed (𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛), as floor on the rate of return to project sponsor, the 
government would have to make up for the shortfall in revenue. Otherwise, the 
government would not have to pay any subsidy. The option value is 




𝑎)                𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑎 < 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
             0                             𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑎 ≥ 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
},                                          6.18 




SFt, shortfall in revenue in year t, is the value of the option in year t and SF 
is the total value of the option over the operation period. 
Conversely, under Max-GEROR guarantee, if the actual revenue in year t 
(𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑎) surpasses the pre-specified maximum level that has been guaranteed 
𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥  (as cap on the rate of return to project sponsor); the government 
would then have the right to call for excess cash flow. The government could 
equitably demand a cut in tariff rates to benefit the end users, boost taxes, or 
even directly participate in the upside of the project as repayment. The option 




𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥)                𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑎 ≥ 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
              0                            𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑎 < 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
},                    6.19 




𝑅𝑡, excess cash flow as repayment in year t, is the value of the option in 
year t and 𝑅 is the total value of the option over the operation period. Figure 
6-5 illustrates the aforementioned discussion, including Min and Max-GEROR 
195 
 
and the actual revenue equations graphically. As can be seen in Figure, the 
government has to pay to the concessionaire the shortfall revenue in the period 
between A and B. Moreover, the government will call for excess revenue in 
the period between C and D. 
 
Figure 6-5 Minimum and maximum GEROR and their cash flow 
For the purpose of evaluating these two forms of guarantee and determine 
an equitable cap of rate of return (Max-GEROR),𝑟𝑐, Black-Scholes model 
(Black and Scholes, 1973) is applied. To achieve this aim, the following steps 
are proposed. First the cash flow link to Min-GEROR,𝑟𝑓, is determined (put 
option-floor). Fuzzy set theory is applied for uncertainty modelling. The value 
of the Min-GEROR under assumed scenarios for uncertain variables is 
determined by representing the uncertain parameters corresponding to 
different scenarios as fuzzy numbers. Then by assuming the same value of put 
option for call option, the cash flows link to Max-GEROR for assumed 
scenarios are calculated (call option-cap). Subsequently yearly cash flow-cap 
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Max-GEROR are calculated and represented as fuzzy numbers. Finally, by 
utilizing the Level Rank Method of defuzzification (Moller and Beer, 2004), 
the YCF-cap and EIRR (call option-cap, defuzzified) at specific µ-cut/α-
confidence level is determined as a crisp value. The concept of the Level Rank 
Method is based on the α-discretization. The membership scale of the fuzzy 
variable is discretized with the aid of chosen α-levels, and then the arithmetic 
mean of the interval centres of the α-level sets is computed as defuzzification 
result.  
6.6 Illustrative Case Study 
A detailed case study is considered in chapter 7. The following illustrative 
case study is used to show the concept and the applicability of the proposed 
Option model and its analysis. 
In the Iranian statute, “law on construction and development of roads and 
transportation infrastructures projects”, the government is permitted to 
subsidize projects, as cash subsidy, up to 50% of project investment. The 
government is also permitted to provide equity up to the maximum 10% of 
project investment. If the ratio of the actual annual income over expected 
annual income is less than 0.85, the government will make up the shortfall up 
to the maximum of 25% of the project’s expected revenue. This is classified as 
minimum revenue guarantee as a mechanism that aims for risk allocation. The 
Saveh-Salafchegan freeway was constructed under this law with government 
involvement at 60% and private sector involvement at 40% of the project 
investment. This project is under operation now (Iranian statute, 1987; 
Attarzadeh, 2007). Structure of this kind of governmental support is shown in 






Figure 6-6 Bundle of Options of minimum traffic/revenue guarantee based on the Iranian 
statute for Iranian toll road/highway projects 
 
Figure 6-7 Estimated cash flow and Minimum and maximum GEROR based on the Iranian 
statute for Iranian toll road/highway projects 
The proposed method in this chapter is applied to find the equitable 
guaranteed bound of cash flow (cap) under the uncertainty of traffic volume 
for the case study, Saveh-Salafchegan freeway project. The traffic volume is 
represented by triangular fuzzy number “T.F.N” Ẽ𝑣𝑇𝑟𝑖: 〈4.38,7.3,10.293〉 
million vehicles/year. Figure 6-8 demonstrates equitable guaranteed bound of 
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Figure 6-8 Equitable guaranteed bound of cash flow resulted from call and put options for 
Saveh-Salafchegan freeway project 
Base on the Real Options Analysis, the fair bound cap is determined as 
(1.25𝐸𝑣, 1.41𝐸𝑣). The result shows if the ratio of the actual annual income 
over expected annual income is more than 1.25 (i.e. Actual traffic volume 
exceeds the expected traffic volume), the government will share the revenue in 
excess of 1.25 of the expected annual income with concessionaire up to the 
maximum of 16%. If the ratio of actual annual income over expected annual 
income is more than 1.41, the government will take the revenue in excess of 
1.41 of the expected annual income. 
The case study of Iranian toll road/highway projects shows that there are 
three common sets of mechanism in PPP-BOT scheme. First, extending or 
reducing the concession period depending on the evolution of traffic. Second, 
rebalancing the economic terms of the contract when there is a substantial 
variation in the traffic volume from the original contract (e.g., MRG). Third, if 
the traffic volume is outside the agreed minimum and maximum bound a 
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6.7 Concluding Remarks 
Options provide flexibility for concession agreement and add value to the 
project in such a way that a specific project with a negative NPV could be 
acceptable if the value of the options for the concessionaire outweighs the 
negative value of the NPV. Some of the existing or possible Real Options in 
PPP-BOT concessions as guarantees and financial and incentives supports are 
minimum revenue guarantee (MRG), tariff/toll guarantee, direct capital 
contributions (e.g. grants, subordinated loans (extra loan)), and concession 
period extension. The existence of this type of guarantees and financial and 
incentives supports makes the concession considerably more attractive for the 
concessionaire and lenders, because it limits the possible adverse results to 
them. The analysis developed in this chapter shows a valuation model of early 
fund generation option. Furthermore, it contributes to assess project’s financial 
viability under uncertainties and risks by calculating feasible and equitable 




CHAPTER 7 CASE STUDY AND ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the background and relevant data for a case study, which 
has been compiled over two study travels to actual projects site in Iran. It will 
demonstrate the key concepts from earlier chapters. The case study describes 
the applicability of the proposed methods and mechanisms as a holistic 
approach to PPP-BOT negotiations management in order to find or arrive at 
censuses for PPP-BOT negotiation toward negotiation-based risk 
management. 
The framework presented in Chapter 1, research methodology, is used to 
show how the fuzzy game theory, FR-MCS for NCIs determination and Real 
Options Valuation can be explicitly embedded in PPP-BOT negotiations. The 
case study is evaluated and a discussion of how the proposed model differs 
from the traditional approach is also carried out. Conclusions are then 
discussed in detail relation to the problem in the chapter conclusions and 
recommendations. 
7.2 Case Study- South Isfahan Power Plant (SIPP), Iran 
The infrastructures development is considered as one of the important 
requirements of economic growth and higher level of public welfare. Electric 
power infrastructure plays an important role in this issue. One of the most 
important infrastructures of power network is power plant which constitutes 
the subject matter of the case study presented in this chapter. 
Electric power infrastructures, in addition to the improvement of economic 
development and social indices, are effective in the prosperity of other 
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economic sectors. Furthermore, appropriate power system, while allowing for 
using the potentials of other economic sectors, provides invaluable 
opportunities for playing an active role in the region and international 
equations. Also, the effective role of sustainable power infrastructures is 
considerable in strengthening country’s economy in the long term. The above 
short discussion helps for economic justification of the power plants 
development. 
Recently, the limitation of public funds and the low efficiency of the 
public sector in implementing infrastructure projects, have directed the 
attention of different countries including Iran to the capacities and resources of 
the private sector. Along these lines, creating incentives for non-public sector 
and reducing associated risks are of great importance of successfully private 
sector involvement in infrastructures development. 
The case study examines the validity of the approaches and models 
developed in this dissertation. The realistic data and information are utilized 
from 3 Iranian projects (2 failed projects and 1 successful project) based on a 
series of interviews planned with the government and the promoter 
organizations. The causes of successes and failures of the 3 studied projects 
are specified and then the negotiation positions are determined. 
The idea of the construction of a power plant funded by non-governmental 
investors was first raised in the Kerman province in Iran. Kerman BOT power 
plant project (KPP), was the first Iranian independent power producer (IPP) 
proposal initiated by a promoter. Preliminary negotiations started and a 
general consent on the basic aspects including the initial financial package was 
agreed in late 1992. Although the KPP project was then approved and listed in 
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the Ministry of Power (MOP) infrastructure programme, there was no further 
progress after this. The initial negotiations between promoter and local 
government were delayed and finally stopped.  
The bidding for Parehsar BOT power plant project (PSPP) was carried out 
in 1999. An international consortium was selected through an international 
tender. The PSPP was to have been Iran’s first IPP after an ECA (Energy 
Conversion Agreement) was signed in 2001. However, the project was 
stopped due to structural problems in the implementation process. The main 
problem was the lack of governmental support (guarantee). Financial closure 
was delayed due to difficulties in negotiating financial guarantees. 
Thus, although using the PPP-BOT approach was introduced into the 
Iranian infrastructural projects in 1993 but no serious measures were taken 
practically till 2002. In 1998 some tenders on BOT power plant for some 
projects were held that were not get into construction stage. Since cancellation 
of these projects, many projects came into negotiation, but none of them 
reached the stage of implementation. Thus, the authorities in charge of the 
Iranian power industry (IPDC) and MAPNA Company initiated the regulation 
of the PPP-BOT contract and procedure and remove the barriers and 
impediments in the course of implementation of the projects by defining a new 
supported approach and regulation to new projects.  Despite passing some bills 
and the law of encouragement and support of foreign investment (Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA), see appendix 3 for more 
detail) in 2001 which is offering some facilities and incentives and also 
followed by that passing the budget law in the years 2002 to 2004 and offering 
some guarantees of the state firm in charge of the BOT project by the ministry 
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of economics and funding as the governmental representative, few BOT power 
plant projects were successful. 
To this end, the south Isfahan power plant project (SIPP) was defined to 
pioneer and serve as the first Iranian IPP project which has been put into 
operation. Investment, construction, operation and maintenance of SIPP with 
the coordination of TAVANIR Company on the basis of BOT (Build, Operate, 
and Transfer) scheme is considered the first interaction between public and 
private sectors in the power industry of the country. In the other words, SIPP 
is the first BOT project which has got into the development phase during the 
years 2002-2003. The pre-agreement and the ECA contract were signed 
between Iran Power Development Corporation (IPDC) (on behalf of 
TAVANIR Company) and MAPNA International Company in middle and end 
of 2002. SIPP was thus launched. 
According to the memorandum of understanding inked in 2002 between 
IPDC and MAPNA International Company and in compliance with the 
policies of the Energy Ministry and TAVANIR Company to launch private 
power plant projects in Iran, agreement was reached to build South Isfahan 
Gas Power Plant through the investment of MAPNA International Company 
and at least one foreign partner. A consortium made up of an Iranian company 
and a German firm was set up to implement the project. Germany’s IFIC 
Holding AG (IHAG) announced its agreement for joint investment in the 
project with MAPNA International Company (registered in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE)) and the two sides signed the partnership agreement in 
October 2002. SIPP Project Company was registered at Jebel Ali Free Zone in 
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the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in January 2004. The company launched its 
Iran branch in September 2004. Negotiations started with Bank Saderat Iran 
(BSI) in 2002 to receive commercial loans for implementation of the project 
and finally in 2004 a contract was signed with the Dubai branch of Bank 
Saderat Iran (BSI) and London investment group PLC. The SIPP project 
contract structure is shown in Figure 7-1. 
 
Figure 7-1 the contract structure of SIPP project 
The closing date of this project was 2004 when the construction phase 
started. The timetable for project construction and implementation had been 
forecast at 36 months in the ECA contract. However, due to measures taken to 
accelerate the implementation of the project, an intensive timetable was agreed 
by the two sides and introduced through an addendum aimed at speeding up 
unit-to-unit production and operation of the power plant. The construction 
phase finalized in 2007 when the operation phase started.  
A contract for operation and maintenance (O&M) of the power plant was 
signed between SIPP Project Company and a consortium comprising MAPNA 
Company and MAPNA Operation and Maintenance Company in September 
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2005. This contract included operation and maintenance of SIPP for a period 
of 21 years since the start of the contract by taking into account the duration 
cited in the addendum for early production.  
The first unit of this power plant was synchronized in the middle of 2005. 
The whole project became operational by middle of 2006. The power plant 
was officially inaugurated by the president in February 2007. Currently, all 
units of the power plant have been synchronized and have become 
commercially operational, i.e. the project is fully in operation stage. Before 
this project was launched, the government controlled all the power plants in 
the country. 
The power plant has six 159-megawatt units. The synchronization and 
commercial commissioning dates of each unit are shown in Table 7-1. The 
nominal power generation capacity of the plant at ISO and design condition is 
estimated at 954 and 734 megawatts respectively. The project was 
implemented at a cost of 320 million euros in 2002 costs. The concession 
period is 23 years, including 3 years construction period and 20 years 
commercial operation period. The SIPP project is located in Majlesi City, 65 
kilometers (southwest) from the historical city of Isfahan in central Iran. The 
information of these projects is demonstrated in Table 7-2. Full data of the 
SIPP with distribution/membership function and nature of the input variables 
is demonstrated Table 7-3. The rationale behind the selection of distributions 
and membership functions is based on the following assumptions (Fente et al., 
2000; Law and Kelton, 1991; Wall, 1997). 
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1. The parameters, e.g. costs must have a specified lower and upper limit. 
Beyond these limits, the parameters cannot assume any values. Therefore, 
this assumption infers that selected distribution/membership function 
should be close-ended. 
2. The cost parameters may have any value within the defined upper and 
lower limits. This assumption infers that the distributions for the cost input 
variables should be continuous. 
3. The triangular and trapezoidal membership and distribution function of 
parameters can be easily estimated by experts (Chau, 1995). 
4. Costs tend to vary greatly depending on several parameters. This 
assumption suggests that skewness must be expected in the distributions 
that represent the cost input parameters. 
5. Costs probability distributions/membership functions should have a 
convex shape rather than concave (Back et al., 2000).  
6. It has been suggested by many authors that triangular and trapezoidal 
membership function and probability distribution are appropriate for 
modelling cost-related data possibilistically or probabilistically (Back et 
al., 2000). 
The parameters of the triangular and trapezoidal possibility-membership 
function and probability-density function can be estimated using expert 
subjective judgement (Chau, 1995) or from historical data using moment 
matching, maximum likelihood estimation, and least-squares fit of the 
cumulative distribution function (AbouRizk et al., 1994). In any case, 
whatever the form of the distribution that represents the input variables, an 
estimate of these variables can be obtained through the mean-variance method. 
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In this study the mean (µ) of the distribution function of the input variables is 
assumed to be the estimated value of the base case. The coefficient of variance 
of the input variables is assumed to be 0.1, so that the standard deviation (σ) 
will be: 𝜎 = 0.1 μ. If an input variable has a high uncertainty the coefficient of 
variance of this variable can increase depending on the perceived uncertainty 
associated with the variable. 
Table 7-1 Synchronization schedule of SIPP units 
Unit Synchronization Date Commercial Commissioning Date 
1 6/8/2005 15/1/2006 
2 5/10/2005 15/1/2006 
3 6/12/2005 9/5/2006 
4 30/1/2006 20/11/2006 
5 17/3/2006 11/9/2006 







Project KPP PSPP SIPP 
Type of project Gas-fired units Steam units Combined Cycle Gas-fired units 
Construction Period (years) 3 5 3 3 
Operation Period (years) 10 8 20 20 
Concession Period (years) 13 13 23 23 
Nominal capacity (MW) 6*123.4=740.4 3*100=300 4*162+2*160=968 6*159=954 
Yearly generated energy 
(KWH) 
2,905,684,992 147,168,000 6,867,664,530 5,664,000,000 
Construction Cost (US$/€) 
US$ 300 Million 
(in 1992 costs) 
US$ 220 Million  
(in 1992 costs) 
€ 459 million   
(in 2001 costs) 
€ 320 Million  
O&M Costs  
7.25   
US$ Million /year 
2.06   
US$ Million /year 
33.5 
€ Million /year 
22.33 
€ Million /year 
Debt: Equity 100:0.0 100:0.0 70:30 70:30 
Energy tariff 0.017 US$/kWh 0.027 US$/kWh 0.0175 €/kWh 0.0141 € /kWh 
Energy tariff for  excess of 
the minimum output 
0.0012 US$/kWh 0.0012 US$/kWh 0.0074 €/kWh 0.0041 € /kWh 
Yearly payment US$ 57 Million US$ 41 Million €112.5  Million 
Non-indexable portion Indexable portion 
Euro Euro Rials 
57,798,846 12,833,496 21,483,438,156 
Development phase period 
(year) 
2 2 2 2 
Development start date Late 1992 Late 1992 1999 Mid 2002 
Closing Date N/A N/A 2001 5 July 2004 
Commercial Operation 
Date (COD) 
N/A N/A N/A 6 July 2007 
Hurdle rate (%) 12 12 14 16 
Table 7-2 Information of 3 projects under study 
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Table 7-3 Basic input data of the case study-SIPP 




Macroeconomic indicators and indexes 
Project Economic life, project life cycle (yrs) 30 Deterministic 
Costs regime during construction <0.2,0.5,0.3> Fraction of construction costs for 
each year of construction 
Escalation rate during construction/inflation rate during 
operation period (%) 
4 Log Normal distribution, LnN(4,1) 
Amortization period (yrs) 20 Deterministic 
Tax rate (%) 25.00% Deterministic 
Gov. discount rate (%) 8.00% Deterministic 
Cost of debt (%) 6.00% Deterministic 
Cost of equity (hurdle rate) (%) 16.00% Deterministic 
WACC-discount rate 9.00% Deterministic 
Loan Interest rate (%) 8.00% Deterministic 
Loan repayment period/debt maturity (yrs) 8 Deterministic 
Annual growth rate of unit price (%) 5.00% Normal distribution, N(5,1) 
capacity of production (GWH) 6430 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈5658.4, 
6430, 6430, 6687.2〉 
Cost of finance coefficient for Pre concession period costs 
calculation 
0.05 Deterministic 
Cost of tender coefficient for Pre concession period costs 
calculation 
0.05 Deterministic 
Annual revenue coefficient for O&M calculation 0.25 Deterministic 
Increasing rate of annual growth rate of unit price (%) 10.00% Normal distribution, N(10,1) 
Expected Base Cost coefficient for asset value calculation 
at transfer date 
0.1 Normal distribution, N(0.1,0.01) 
Fuzzy-Stochastic Variables (FSV) 
Total project costs (M€) 320 Fuzzy Normal distribution, 
N(320,32) Mean: Fuzzy variable: 
Tr.F.N, 〈314, 320, 320, 334〉 
S.D: Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 
〈29.65, 32, 32, 37.25〉 
Operation and maintenance costs (M€/year) 0.25*REV Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈20.902, 
22.237, 22.237, 22.904〉 
Annual growth rate of O&M costs (%) 5.00% Normal distribution, N(5,1) 
Initial daily production (kwh/day) 17,616,438.36 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 
〈16559452.1, 17616438.4, 
17616438.4, 18144931.5〉 
Yearly generated energy (KWH) 6,430,000,000 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 
〈6044200000, 6430000000, 
6430000000, 6622900000〉 
Quantity of production / yearly (GWH ) 6430 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈6044.2, 
6430, 6430, 6622.9〉 
Operating revenue (ave) (M€/year) 88.95 Fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N, 〈83.61, 
88.95, 88.95, 91.61〉 
Pre concession period (yrs) 1.5 Log Normal distribution, 
LnN(1.5,0.5) 
Negotiable concession items (NCIs) 
Construction period (yrs) 3  
Operation period (yrs) To be 
determined 
 
Concession period (yrs) To be 
determined 
 
Tariff (Unit price of service in first year of operation) (€ 




Debt (%) 70.00%  
Equity (%) 30.00%  





7.2.1 Fuzzy Game Theory Model 
Given the nature of the SIPP project, the direct negotiation procedure was selected for 
the assignment of the project (project awarding) based on the resulted concession items from 
bid competition process of similar project, i.e. PSPP. Among many contracts between a BOT 
plant and a host utility, the agreement on how much energy must be produced at what price 
and for how long of time are essential and fundamental. For instance, in the SIPP the 
government agreed to annually purchase a minimum of 85% of the plant capacity as capacity 
fee (power off-take) based on the “take or pay” form of guaranteed payment and moreover 
pay a fixed price per kilowatt hour for the operation period which is called energy fee. 
The game tree and structure of joining SIPP to the electricity market are illustrated in 
Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3 respectively. SIPP has two strategies, “Enter market” and “Stay 
out”. If SIPP choose “Enter market”, Utility has two strategies, “Start price war” and “No 
price war”. In the case of choosing “No price war” by Utility, SIPP has two options, 
“Contract fulfilment” and “Profit maximization”. Then Utility has two strategies to choose, 
“Not regulate” and “Regulate”. The expected equilibrium (Enter market, No price war) is 
denoted by arrow. The payoff functions were discussed in section 3.6.4 and were shown in 
Table 3-5. The components of payoff and objective functions of both players are computed 
for this case study as follows. It is reasonable to assume that if SIPP stay out the payoff 
functions of both players are less than the case of choosing “Enter to market”. Also if Utility 
chooses start price war, both players are subject to pay a penalty/cost. As it is argued by Xing 
and Wu (2001) the utility should pay for private power generation at a rate which is 
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corresponding with what it would cost the utility to generate the same excess energy using its 
own facilities, i.e. avoided cost. The electricity is sold to the end-user at average cost. Payoff 
functions of both players are computed as follows. Note that all values are calculated in 
present value. 
 
Figure 7-2 Game tree 
 
Figure 7-3 Game structure 
Objective functions 
The objectives for private investor and government are as follows: 
Max Π𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝑂𝑇) = Π𝑃 = ∑ (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
𝑝) 𝑂𝑃𝑡=1                              7.1  
Max Π𝑈 = Π𝑔 = ∑ [𝐷𝑀𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝐴 − (𝐹𝐶𝑡
𝑈 + 𝑉𝐶𝑡
𝑈 ∗ Q𝑡
U)] − 𝑓𝑈𝑂𝑃𝑡=1                              7.2 
The government also tries to minimize the payment to private investor. 
Min 𝑓𝑈 = ∑ (𝑄𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝐵) 
𝑂𝑃
𝑡=1          7.3 
Where:  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝑄𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝐵 ,   𝑃𝐵 = 𝑘(𝑎 ∗ 𝑄






𝐵𝑂𝑇                                                                 7.5 
Breakeven cost “Avoided cost”:  𝑃𝐵 =
𝐶0−𝐶𝐵𝑂𝑇
𝑂𝑃∗𝑄𝐵𝑂𝑇
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𝑃𝐴(Average cost) =  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦




           7.7 
Constraints 
Energy balance: 𝐷𝑀𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 ≤ 𝑄𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑇 + Q𝑡
U, 𝑡 = 1, . . , 𝑂𝑃      7.8 
Capacity requirement: 𝑋𝑡
𝑈 + 𝑋𝑡
𝐵𝑂𝑇 ≥ 𝑃𝐿𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑂𝑃      7.9 
 Fuzzy set is used to deal with the uncertainty in power demand/production forecasting of 
SIPP. Based on the proposed game model in Table 3-5 of Chapter 3, the fuzzy game theory is 
applied for determining the expected payoff of players. The power demand/production 
(GWH) is estimated as a fuzzy variable, i.e. TFN 〈5658.4, 6430, 6687.2〉 using fuzzy Delphi 
method. Fuzzy Delphi method was explained in section 5.3.3.1. Based on the experiences, the 
cost function data are a=0.0509, b=116.9, c=0. The game table is shown in Table 7-4. (PM, 
NR) and (PM, R) strategies are Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal solution respectively 
(See Figure 7-4). Based on the fuzzy game theory, the expected payoffs (M€) under 
demand/production uncertainty are computed as fuzzy numbers. 
E[Π𝑝] = 〈6.65,13.64,22.62〉, 𝐸[Π𝑔] = 〈377.99,392.31,400.03〉. 
By using the Level Rank defuzzification method (Moller and Beer, 2004) the expected 
payoffs (M€) are converted to crisp value. 𝐸[Π𝑝] = 13.7 , 𝐸[Π𝑔] = 390.1. The concept of 
the Level Rank method is based on the α-discretization. The membership scale of the fuzzy 
variable is discretized with the aid of chosen α-levels, and then the arithmetic mean of the 
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Figure 7-4 Pareto frontier of SIPP Bid competition (M€) 
 
Figure 7-5 Pareto frontier of PPP-BOT negotiations pattern in Iran 
Figure 7-5 shows the Pareto frontier of PPP-BOT negotiations pattern in the 3 studied 
projects. As can be seen, the negotiation solution has moved from non-equilibrium position 
for KPP project to Nash equilibrium position for PSPP project and then moved to Pareto 












































optimal position for SIPP project. The power sector in Iran is now achieving some success in 
its policy of attracting investment in BOT-BOO projects. Given the increasing level of 
demand for electricity, the acceptance that the majority of this will be met through investment 
by private capital; the fundamentals are in place for the policy to eventually succeed. 
7.2.2 VFM and Optimal Risk Allocation 
To calculate value for money (VFM) and optimal risk allocation, 5 scenarios are 
developed for this case study: 1st scenario is proposal1-Final negotiation position. 2nd 
scenario is proposal2-Initial negotiation position. 3rd, 4th and 5th scenarios are proposals 2, 3 
and 4 respectively. The NPV of life cycle payments to private sector in different scenarios are 
estimated and shown in Figure 7-6. 
The purpose of analysing the VFM for the private funds invested is to compare the 
proposal submitted by SIPP concessionaire with the public sector comparator (PSC) in order 
to quantify the benefits of the PPP-BOT approach compared with the conventional approach 
(Value for Money Report, 2007; Iacobacci, 2010). The VFM analysis is based on a 
comparison of the total project costs to the government of Iran (IPDC) as of 2002.  Based on 
the above analysis, the IPDC should realize value for money in the order of 1543.23 million 
Euro by carrying out the project as PPP-BOT compared to the traditional procurement 
approach invested thought the public funds. VFM versus transferred risk to private sector for 
5 scenarios are shown in Figure 7-7. As can be seen, the best VFM is achieved in scenario1. 
215 
 
Figure 7-6 NPV of life cycle payments to private sector in 5 scenarios (M€) 
 
Figure 7-7 VFM VS. Transferred risk to private sector (M€) for 5 scenarios 
Definitions 
Residual Value 
At the end of the partnership agreement period, the SIPP infrastructure will not have reached 
to the end of its economic life. Accordingly, a value, referred to as the residual value or asset 
value, will be assigned. This value relates to, among other things, the value of the land, the 




































Transferred Risk to private sector (M€)











carried out. Table 7-5 shows the total cost of the private sector’s proposal to the government 
which is NPVPPP (PPP approach). Table 7-6 shows the PSC calculation. 
Table 7-5 Total cost of the private sector’s proposal (M€) 
1. Payment to private partner 
 i. Construction payments     320.00 
 ii.  Availability payments 619.31 
2. Agreement monitoring costs 32.00 
Total Execution Costs 971.31 
Residual (asset) value @ transfer date (112.00) 
Nett project execution cost under the terms of PPP 859.31 
Present Value as at 2002, in Millions of Euros 
 
Table 7-6 Public Sector Comparator (PSC) (M€) 
1. Project cost of 35 years  2016.00 
2. Revenues  (607.41) 
3. Risk quantification  1089.94 
 i. Cost overrun risks 483.84 
 ii. Revenue risks 303.70 
 iii. Other risks 302.40 
Nett execution costs  2498.54 
Residual (asset) value @ transfer date  (96.00) 
Nett project completion cost 2402.54 
Present value as at 2002, in Millions of Euros 
 
Figure 7-8 demonstrates project costs under the conventional approach and its comparison 
with the PPP approach. The calculated PSC is € 2402.54 million. As is shown in the Table 
7-6 and Figure 7-8, the PSC is calculated as follows: 
PSC = 2016.00 (Total project cost) - 607.41(revenues) + 1089.94 (Quantified risks under 
conventional procurement) - 96.00(residual (asset) value at transfer date) = 2402.54 
The “Quantified risks under conventional procurement” part is calculated as follows: 
Quantified risks under conventional procurement =1089.94 = 483.84 (cost overruns=20%) + 
303.70 (risks related to revenues= 60%) + 302.40(Other risks-contingency =15%) 
The SIPP project, as a PPP, presented an excellent opportunity for the IPDC by proposing 
high VFM. The savings generated by carrying out this project as a PPP was € 1543.23 million 
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in present value terms as at 2002 or 64.23% of the nett costs under the PSC (See Figure 7-8). 
The magnitude of the VFM savings is due to the transfer of risks to the private partner and to 
the fact that the private partner estimated higher revenues than those estimated as part of the 
PSC. 
 
Figure 7-8 VFM calculation summary, project costs for the government under PPP and conventional approaches 
VFM Quantitative Evaluation- Sensitivity Analysis 
If it is necessary to compute VFM with imperfect information, the likelihood and impact of 
the risk can be assessed subjectively, but in a systematic manner, by using such things as 
group expert judgment and statistical techniques. Also, undertaking sensitivity analysis to 
estimate PSC is a useful way of understanding the impact of changes in these variables on the 
overall project NPV. HM Treasury (2004c) proposed VFM quantitative evaluation which is 
carried out by using a spreadsheet. The VFM quantitative evaluation and sensitivity analysis 
for SIPP project case study is done using this method. The results of the sensitivity analysis 
of the project are shown in Figure 7-9. As can be observed, the VFM value is most sensitive 

















































Figure 7-9 VFM Quantitative Evaluation- Sensitivity analysis of Concession SIPP Project with Positive and Negative Multipliers 
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Table 7-7 shows the summary of risk allocation of the SIPP project. Table 7-8 indicates the 
degree of risk-taking (adopted risk allocation strategies) by government and Project 
Company. 
Table 7-7 Summary of risk allocation of the SIPP project 
 
            Risks                                      Government          SIPP                         Lender     Insurer 
 
1. Political risks 
Revoke, expropriation, sequestration  ×           
Governmental authorization   ×                                         
Project abandonment  ×  
Changes in law    × 
Increase in taxes     × 
Plant import limitation   × 
Political force major   ×          × 
2. Commercial risks 
Interest rate    ×   ×   
Foreign currency exchange rate  ×   
Foreign currency convertibility  × 
Electricity price non-payment  ×  
Unsuccessful in debt payment    × 
3. Construction risks 
Construction materials supply    × 
Construction materials price increase    × 
Fuel shortage    × 
Damage on the plant     ×         × 
Delay in plant installation     × 
Site convenience      × 
Plant thievery      ×         × 
Construction price increase      × 
Environmental damage     × 
Construction force major     ×         × 
4. Operating risks 
Delay in operation      × 
Operator inability      × 
Operation suspension by means of company   × 
Equipment quality and efficiency    × 
Raw materials supply     × 
Fuel shortage    × 
Power demand fluctuation   × 
Production fluctuation     × 
Operation stops by means of Government × 
Technology risk      × 
Equipment quality while transfer to Government  × 
Operating unforeseen costs     ×                      × 
Environmental damage     × 







Table 7-8 the degree of risk-taking by government and Project Company (*: the severity of risk-taking) 
Risks Risk level Time span IPDC SIPP 
Political risks Macro Long term ***** - 
Financial risks Macro Long term **** * 
Legal risks Macro Long term ** ** 
Revenue and market 
risks 
Macro Long term **** * 
Investment risks Intermediate Short term * **** 
Engineering and 
Technical risks 
Intermediate Short term * **** 
Construction risks Intermediate Short term * **** 
Operation and 
maintenance risks 
Intermediate Long term - ***** 
Relationship and 
partnership risks 
Micro Long term ** ** 
7.2.3 Negotiable Concession Items (NCIs) Determination 
To demonstrate the advantage of the proposed model in determining the NCIs, its 
application in the SIPP project is presented. The fuzzy Delphi technique is utilized to 
estimate the value of uncertain parameters. In order to calculate these values and to 
implement the fuzzy Delphi technique procedure, a group of twenty experts including 10 
experts from the public sector and 10 experts from private sector were answered a set of 
questionnaire separately. Total project costs are estimated based on this method. It is 
estimated as normal distribution with parameters as fuzzy random variables, i.e. normal 
distribution: N (320, 32), Mean fuzzy variable: Tr.F.N 〈314, 320, 320, 334〉, S.D fuzzy 
variable: Tr.F.N 〈29.65, 32, 32, 37.25〉. 
A special program has been developed by MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, 
Massachusetts) to apply the FR-MCS technique in order to evaluate the uncertainties and 
risks in simulation input, including the demand uncertainty. To do this, in this study our focus 
is on the representation of the uncertainty by fuzzy random number and the risk by random 
variable. Basic input data of the project comprises of deterministic, risky and uncertain 
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parameters. Uncertain and risky parameters consist of three components i.e. macroeconomic 
indicators and indexes, fuzzy-stochastic variables (FSV) and negotiable concession items 
(NCIs). In this case a total of 1000 iterations are generated. 
In this study, the determining of NCIs, such as concession period and tariff, under 
uncertainty of quantity of production (yearly generated energy) is considered. By using the 
fuzzy Delphi technique and following same procedure for total project costs estimation, the 
quantity of production (yearly generated energy) is estimated as fuzzy random variable. The 
membership function of quantity of production (yearly generated energy (KWH)) as 
uncertain random variable is represented in Figure 7-10. The quantity of production (GWH) 
is represented as a fuzzy variable, i.e. Tr.F.N 〈6044.2, 6430, 6430, 6622.9 〉. 
 
Figure 7-10 Membership function of quantity of production (yearly generated energy (KWH))-uncertain random 
variable 
Fuzzy PDF and fuzzy CDF of total project costs resulted from fuzzy Delphi technique are 
exhibited in Figure 7-11. Based on the triangular membership function of uncertain random 
variable and its values - pessimistic, most likely and optimistic values - the following three 
scenarios are developed; pessimistic scenario, most likely scenario and optimistic scenario. 
















Figure 7-11 Fuzzy PDF and fuzzy CDF of total project costs (M€) 
The project life cycle cash flow and its chart at most likely scenario are shown in Figure 
7-12 and Figure 7-13. 
 
Figure 7-12 project life cycle cash flow (M€) at most likely scenario 
1 2 3 1 2 19 20 21 30
Yearly production-GWH 6004.99 5855.81 5594.75 5709.21 5731.710808 5709.205808
Avaiability 0.93 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.89
Operating revenue (M€) 84.95 82.84 79.15 80.77 81.09 80.77
construction costs (M€) -64 -160 -96
construction costs-Cumulative (M€) -64 -224 -320
Interest During Construction (M€) -3.58 -12.54
O&M costs (M€) -21.24 -20.71 -19.79 -20.19 -20.27 -20.19
Depreciation (M€) -16.00 -16.00 -16.00 -16.00 0.00 0.00
Net operating income (M€) 47.71 46.13 43.36 44.58 60.81 60.58
Project Cashflow (M€) -84.00 -163.58 -108.54 47.71 46.13 43.36 44.58 60.81 60.58
Cumulative (M€) -84.00 -247.58 -356.13 -308.41 -262.28 481.23 525.81 586.62 1124.00
PV (M€) -84.00 -247.58 -356.13 -312.35 -273.53 41.45 49.40 59.36 117.96
loan interest payment (M€) -9.26 -7.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Earning before tax (M€) 38.45 38.19 43.36 44.58 60.81 60.58
Tax (M€) -13.61 -13.55 -14.84 -15.14 -15.20 -15.14
Net earning (M€) 24.84 24.64 28.52 29.43 45.61 45.43
Depreciation (M€) 16.00 16.00 16.00 16.00 0.00 0.00
loan principal peyment (M€) -29.41 -29.41
DSCR ( EBIT/Debt service) 1.65 1.66
Equity Cashflow (M€) -25.20 -49.08 -32.56 11.43 11.23 44.52 45.43 45.61 45.43
-25.2 -74.28 -106.84
PV (M€) -25.20 -74.28 -106.84 -96.99 -88.64 14.59 16.93 18.95 28.09
Cumulative (M€) -25.20 -74.28 -106.84 -95.41 -84.18 486.10 531.53 577.14 980.17
IRR and NPV on Project 9.61% € 14.58
IRR and NPV on Equity 16.03% € 0.23
PV of min Retun on equity (M€) 17.09
PV of min Retun on project (M€) 32.05
DSCR min 1.65
Year
Construction Period Operation Period Post concession period









trapmf, Total project costs (M€), Expected PDF is in bold
















Figure 7-13 project life cycle cash flow chart (M€) at most likely scenario 






























Based on the private sector objective function, i.e. Πp equation 7.1, cumulative NPV of 
equity and project cash flow at 3 scenarios are displayed in Figure 7-15 and Figure 7-16 
respectively. The pessimistic, most likely and optimistic values of cumulative NPV of project 
and equity cash flow are tabulated in Table 7-9. 
 
Figure 7-15 Cumulative NPV of equity cash flow (M€) at 3 scenarios 
 
































Table 7-9 Pessimistic, most likely and optimistic values of cumulative NPV of project and equity cash flow 
(M€) 
Year 













1 -84 -84 -84 -25.2 -25.2 -25.2 
2 -247.58 -247.58 -247.58 -74.28 -74.28 -74.28 
3 -356.13 -356.13 -356.13 -106.84 -106.84 -106.84 
4 -315.86 -312.35 -310.6 -99.46 -96.99 -95.75 
5 -280.17 -273.53 -270.2 -93.19 -88.64 -86.37 
6 -249.19 -239.78 -235.07 -88.25 -81.98 -78.84 
7 -221.04 -209.11 -203.15 -83.6 -75.86 -71.98 
8 -193.93 -179.61 -172.44 -78.41 -69.35 -64.82 
9 -169.78 -153.31 -145.07 -73.9 -63.73 -58.65 
10 -148.18 -129.77 -120.56 -69.94 -58.83 -53.27 
11 -127.67 -107.44 -97.32 -65.9 -53.96 -47.99 
12 -109.33 -87.45 -76.52 -54.89 -42.24 -35.92 
13 -92.87 -69.51 -57.83 -45.54 -32.3 -25.68 
14 -76.91 -52.14 -39.76 -37.16 -23.39 -16.5 
15 -62.43 -36.37 -23.34 -29.99 -15.76 -8.65 
16 -49.51 -22.3 -8.69 -23.94 -9.32 -2.01 
17 -37.3 -8.99 5.16 -18.6 -3.64 3.84 
18 -26.39 2.89 17.53 -14.09 1.15 8.78 
19 -16.61 13.55 28.63 -10.27 5.22 12.97 
20 -7.27 23.73 39.22 -6.87 8.84 16.69 
21 1.26 33.02 48.89 -3.95 11.94 19.89 
22 9 41.45 57.67 -1.46 14.59 22.62 
23 16.31 49.4 65.95 0.73 16.93 25.02 
24 25.67 59.36 76.2 2.63 18.95 27.11 
25 34.19 68.42 85.54 4.26 20.68 28.89 
26 41.85 76.57 93.94 5.63 22.14 30.39 
27 49.03 84.22 101.81 6.84 23.42 31.72 
28 55.49 91.09 108.89 7.86 24.51 32.84 
29 61.33 97.29 115.28 8.73 25.43 33.79 
30 66.84 103.16 121.32 9.5 26.25 34.63 
31 71.87 108.51 126.83 10.16 26.96 35.35 
32 76.45 113.39 131.86 10.73 27.56 35.97 
33 80.75 117.96 136.56 11.22 28.09 36.52 
 
The expected return on investment (𝐼𝑐𝑅) on equity and project cash flow (M€) are equal 
to 17.09 (=106.84*0.16) and 32.05 (=356.13*0.09) respectively. Thus based on the 
developed three scenarios, NCIs such as concession period and tariff could be extracted and 
represented in fuzzy format (fuzzy number). Based on the project cash flow the concession 
period is represented as fuzzy number: Tr.F.N 〈19.33, 20.9, 20.9, 24.75〉. Based on the equity 
cash flow the concession period is represented as fuzzy number: Tr.F.N 〈20.125, 23.08, 
23.08, 33〉. Furthermore, with the same approach based on the three scenarios, tariff (Euro 
Cents/ KWh) is represented as fuzzy number: Tr.F.N 〈1.3580, 1.3833, 1.3833, 1.4389〉. 
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Based on the previous similar projects and project proposal from concessionaire, the 
minimum value for money (VFM) of the project is estimated 10% of project investment. So 
the government’s objective function, i.e. Π𝑔 (equation 7.2), could be represented as fuzzy 
number: (NPV-M€): Tr.F.N 〈403.86, 418.75, 418.75, 426.20〉. Thus there is no problem on 
three scenarios from public sector perspective. DSCRmin of three scenarios is represented as 
fuzzy number: Tr.F.N 〈1.55, 1.65, 1.65, 1.70〉.  So there is no problem on three scenarios 
from the lenders perspective as well (DSCRmin ≥ 1.5). Finally, the concession period and the 
tariff are represented as fuzzy numbers in a shot in Figure 7-17 and Figure 7-18 respectively. 
The intersection area is shaded. Finally, by using the Level Rank defuzzification method 
(Moller and Beer, 2004), NCI at specific µ-cut/α-confidence level is determined as a crisp 
value (denoted by NCI𝛼
μ
) for final decision making.  
µ-cut represents the uncertain level and α-confidence represents confidence level. These 
levels are taken by decision makers based on the uncertainty and risk attitude that each party 
is taken at negotiation table. The shaded intersection area could be restricted based on the 
different µ-cut that is adopted by decision makers to reflect their uncertainty and risk attitude. 
As can be seen in Figure 7-17, the maximum µ-cut for shaded intersection area is 0.7. 
Decision makers usually adopt the value 0.5 to reflect their uncertain level in deciding the 
NCI, e.g. concession period. By utilizing the Level Rank method of defuzzification, the 




Figure 7-17 Fuzzy representation of NCIs: concession period from private sector and government perspective 
 
Figure 7-18 Fuzzy representation of NCIs: Tariff from private sector perspective 
In the absence of fuzzy variables in the simulation model, i.e. no uncertainties is taken 
into account in simulation input, the results of the simulation for the NCIs would be 
deterministic values. In this case, there is no intersection for the NCIs that result from the 
main parties’ perspective. Consequently there is no common values/consensus for the NCIs 
and there is no success in negotiations.  
The proposed method gives a range for negotiation which is based on the characteristics 
of the players (determine by fuzzy parameters). Whereas, with the crisp method, there is no 












trapmf, Tariff (Euro Cents/ KWh) =[1.3580 1.3833 1.3833 1.4389]
















bound for negotiation which would lead to failure in this case. This is the main advantage and 
significant of the proposed method and mechanism. 
7.2.4 Real Option Valuation 
Real option valuation (ROV) is applied to examine two governmental supports and 
incentives. The South Isfahan power plant (SIPP) project comprises six power generation 
units which were brought on stream as each unit was completed. The public and private 
sectors benefit from the early fund generation (EFG) option by faster construction and earlier 
operation of the project. The EFG period was design as an incentive to the concessionaire. It 
was agreed that the government compensate the concessionaire EFG period which is the 
period of saved time in construction phase. 
 The original construction period was 4 years and the earlier completion period was 1 
year. The concessionaire operates the project for a period of 21 years. Only the first year 
includes EFG. (𝑟0 = 0.16, 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃
′ = 24 , 𝐶𝐷 = 4, 𝐶𝐷′ = 3,𝐷𝐸𝐺 = 1,𝑂𝑃 = 𝑂𝑃
′ = 20). 
The percentage increase in discounted benefits gained from earlier completion was 16%. The 
percentage increase in discounted cost to complete project earlier was 8%. So the net benefit 
was 7% of the present value (PV) of the yearly net benefit which is equal to M€2.23. 
The overall contractual package also included granted guaranteed minimum return on 
equity (Min-GEROR), 𝑟𝑓 = 15%. Now the question is that what would be a fair guaranteed 
maximum return (Max-GEROR), 𝑟𝑐, under the uncertainty of quantity of production (yearly 
generated energy). Since the input parameters include uncertain random variables, the actual 




The membership function of an uncertain random variable, quantity of production (yearly 
generated energy (GWH)), was represented in Figure 7-10 . The quantity of production 
(GWH) as fuzzy variable is: Tr.F.N 〈6044.2, 6430, 6430, 6622.9 〉. A total of three different 
scenarios (optimistic, most likely and pessimistic scenarios) have been constructed in order to 
capture this uncertainty in a fuller picture. 






























Equations 6.5 to 6.9 are utilized to determine a fair cap of rate of return, 𝑟𝑐. The risk-free 
interest rate and standard deviation are assumed 5% and 25% respectively. By using the 
Excel solver the cash flow link to Min-GEROR, 𝑟𝑓 = %15, under three assumed scenarios is 
determined. Then again by using the Excel solver and assuming the same value of put option 
for call option, the cash flows link to Max-GEROR for three assumptions are calculated. 
Consequently yearly cash flow-cap (YCF-cap) and equity internal rate of returns (EIRR) link 
to three scenarios on Max-GEROR are calculated and represented as fuzzy numbers (See 
Figure 7-19). Finally, by utilizing the Level Rank method of defuzzification, the YCF-cap 
and EIRR (call option-cap, defuuzified) at specific µ-cut/α-confidence level is determined as 
a crisp value. The fair cap of EIRR is determined: 𝑟𝑐 = 19.5%. The guaranteed EIRR (bound 
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within floor and cap) is represented as fuzzy number (See Figure 7-20). The guaranteed 
bound of cash flow resulted from call and put options during the operation period as final 
result is shown in Figure 7-21.  
 
Figure 7-19 Fuzzy representation of cap-EIRR resulted from three scenarios cash flows link to Max-GEROR 
 
Figure 7-20 Fuzzy representation of guaranteed EIRR (bound within floor and cap) 
 












Tr.F.N, Fuzzy Cap-EIRR =[16.65 20.33 20.33 22.22]
















Figure 7-21 the guaranteed bound of cash flow (M€) resulted from call and put options during the operation 
period 
7.3 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the different aspects of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for developing 
power plant infrastructure with an emphasis on giving necessary guarantees to the private 
sector are discussed. Preferring Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) contracts over other ones, 
guaranteeing capital return with appropriate profit over a determined period, partnership of 
the public sector with a limited share without expecting profit during the contract period, 
limited and predefined government’s interference in pricing, using all investment potentials in 
the host country, etc. are among recommendations provided by this chapter to create more 
incentives for the private sector to invest in this field and also to help the government to reach 
its developmental and social role. 
A case study is presented to demonstrate how the proposed methods and mechanisms in 
this thesis are applied in a real project. The case study is used to illustrate the application of 
the proposed methods and mechanisms for negotiation risk management, by demonstrating its 
use on the SIPP BOT project. This case study serves as a validation for the proposed models 



















The guaranteed bound of cash flow resulted from call and put options 
Guaranteed CF-call-
Defuuzified (Cap)
Current price at most likely
scenario (ECF)
Put exercise price (GCF-Floor)
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Valuation are applied to this case study to show how PPP-BOT negotiations can be expressed 
in development phase. A comparison with the traditional approach is carried out to show the 




CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To achieve the goals of this study, this dissertation has proposed an overarching systematic 
framework for negotiation-based risk and uncertainty modelling and management. The 
outline of the proposed framework follows the structure of this dissertation. 
The framework incorporates fuzzy game theory, as a tool for analysing parties’ behaviour 
under uncertainties. The proposed FR-MCS technique helps to establish the game table 
including the payoff functions and strategies aimed to find the equilibrium solutions under 
uncertainties and risks. It also has incorporated life cycle financial modelling with proposed 
FR-MCS technique with the aim of financial viability decision making under uncertainty and 
risk. Finally, it has incorporated Real Options Valuation and Analysis to arrive at a consensus 
negotiation position. This position would be equitable for main parties involved under 
uncertainties and risks for the cases that there is no solution for negotiations. 
In summary, the key contributions and conclusions of this work are discussed in the 
following three sections in detail. 
8.1 Negotiation-Based Risk Management 
This dissertation has presented a game theory model for determining negotiation positions 
as an attempt to overcome the problems on determination of negotiable concession items 
(NCIs) as well as decision variables from different angles. Determining negotiable 
concession items from a risk management perspective is presently a challenge issue by using 
existing methods. 
Determination of negotiation positions includes a systematic framework based on the 
Nash equilibrium concept to find the consensus negotiation positions which are critical and 
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important to ensure the success of a PPP-BOT project. Determined negotiation positions 
satisfy main parties involved with conflicting objectives in the project. 
The game theory was applied in the development phase of PPP-BOT project. The major 
function of game theory approach is to find equilibrium solutions that no party wants to 
deviate from these positions. The results show that game theory is a suitable tool to 
demonstrate and simulate negotiations between parties and analysing their behaviour.  
Based on these results, the development phase of PPP-BOT project is divided into two 
stages: the first stage is bid preparation stage which consists of several shallow negotiations 
that leads to nominate the selected bidder at effective date and the second stage is deep 
negotiations stage which leads to final negotiation/arbitration at closing date (financial 
closure). The former’s negotiations are defined by static game while the latter’s negotiations 
are defined by dynamic game. 
The application of game theory is also represented by a proposed mathematical model 
and demonstrated via an illustrative example in chapter three. It also applied in a real project 
and represented in case study chapter, chapter 7. This model represents the relationship of 
parties’ behaviour in two stages of development phase and is an evidence module based on 
Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality concepts to fulfil parties’ objectives. 
The proposed mathematical model reveals that consequently by increasing the 
cooperation between public and private sectors, the game type of negotiation is changed from 
incomplete static game to complete and perfect dynamic game. By this movement the payoff 
of both players are increased from Nash equilibrium position to Pareto optimality position. 
One advantage of game theory is that it can capture and anticipate behaviours in complex 
projects with multiple players and multiple diverse and inconsistent objectives. Consequently 
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it proposes appropriate type of game to solve the problems and difficulties involved. This 
capability facilitates the generation of alternative negotiation outcomes for both public and 
private sectors which are strategically stable during the development phase of PPP-BOT 
projects. In addition, game theory provides a method and module for achieving win-win 
solutions. 
Currently, the payoff of game theory is deterministic and this is a major drawback of 
game theory application. Thus, future research could focus on the integration of utility theory 
and possibility theory (fuzzy logic) to manage the uncertainties involved in the game. This 
limitation can be alleviated by extending to fuzzy game theory. Fuzzy game theory is 
considered in section 3.6.2. 
8.2 Uncertainty and Risk Modelling 
This thesis has also introduced a new approach for simulation technique under risk and 
uncertainty for long-term infrastructure projects, which is called FR-MCS technique. The aim 
of this development is for generalization of the conventional MCS to make decision based on 
the hybrid simulation approach of randomness and fuzziness. The basic requirement of FR-
MCS is to be able to randomly produce random/fuzzy/crisp numbers in simulation procedure 
(input parameters). Consequently, determine inferior and superior of output values of 
simulation function by using fuzzy probability (fuzzy CDF). 
Probability theory has been successfully used in modelling random variables; however, 
this is insufficient for modelling imprecise information. Currently, the most popular method 
to carry out the PRA is MCS and its analysis. However, typically the data required to conduct 
the conventional MCS is not readily available or it is too costly to collect the required data.  
236 
 
However available data can be utilized through other mathematical tools such as fuzzy set 
theory. Thus, it is risk analysts responsibility to investigate, gather and efficiently include all 
the existing information using the most appropriate methods and mathematical tools. The 
main idea proposed here is to utilize subjective probabilities, i.e. represent the uncertain 
variable as a fuzzy number, and produce outputs which reflect all risky and uncertain 
information (i.e., uncertainty due to randomness, imprecision or due to both). In this 
approach, random variables parameters are treated as fuzzy numbers (Alternative 1). 
Alternatively, by using subjective approach, random variables are treated as pure fuzzy 
numbers (Alternative 2). 
The proposed methodology has been introduced to integrate fuzzy set theory into PRA 
studies. α-cut method is used to perform algorithm for generating fuzzy random variable and 
to implement FR-MCS. Practically, given enough iterations of FR-MCS technique, it will 
produce a sufficiently small error. 
For cases where the necessity of conventional MCS and its analysis is justified but 
necessary information to conduct this analysis does not exit, the new approach proposed in 
this research can be conducted as an alternative to conventional MCS. The proposed FR-
MCS technique allows fuzzy and probabilistic uncertainty to be considered simultaneously 
for the risk and uncertainty analysis of PPP-BOT projects. Depending on the project host 
country, the decision maker can adjust the conservative nature of FR-MCS using lower 
percentiles of risk. 
The proposed technique is applied to a case whose data requirements are comparatively 
less or easier to obtain. The membership functions of the fuzzy random variables can be 
formed using imprecise, vague information or expert judgment. Thus, application of the FR-
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MCS approach to risk assessment problems instead of conventional MCS approaches may be 
more realistic for many PPP-BOT cases and may provide decision makers with sufficient 
information for decision making. The results of conventional MCS and its analysis cannot 
easily be compared with results of FR-MCS, fuzzy CDF. It is not straightforward. Extensions 
of possibilistic concepts to various situations of reliability evaluation may lead to some 
interesting studies and the author aims to extend these results in the PPP-BOT context.  
Furthermore the proposed hybrid simulation model developed in this thesis facilitates 
determining feasible negotiable concession items (NCIs) of a PPP-BOT project negotiations 
as may affected by various risky and uncertain drivers relating to the NCIs e.g. toll structure, 
toll revision schedule, extent of government grant, and the duration of the concession period. 
By careful consideration of the results of the simulation study, the government and 
concessionaire can arrive at a reasonable agreement on the terms of the concession i.e. NCIs 
and consequently sharing of risks and uncertainties. The proposed simulation’s results are 
demonstrated through the case study. 
8.3 Financial Viability Mechanisms 
This dissertation has also introduced a mechanism to study life cycle financial modelling 
of PPP-BOT projects from the perspective of multi-party involved, which provide the much 
required level of detail. In addition it has proposed a suitable framework for multi-criteria 
decision making (MCDM) under uncertainty and risk and their management and control 
mechanisms. 
A PPP-BOT project as long-term infrastructure cannot be successful without all three 
main parties’ involvements. While researchers on PPP-BOT in the past generally focus on 
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single party’s view to analyse the financial viability via financial modelling which as most 
can be considered as a static model, in this study we cut into from three main primary parties’ 
views involved in the PPP-BOT project to analyse decision variables and indices of their 
concerns, including indicators SLR for public sector, EIRR and NPV for private sector, and 
DSCR and LLCR for financial institutions and lenders. 
Considering the life cycle financial modelling as long term estimation of costs/revenue 
and financing plan is effective and essential. The proposed financial model described in this 
thesis facilitates the study of the financial viability of a PPP-BOT project as affected by 
various options relating to the financial structure, risks and uncertain variables, as 
demonstrated by a case study. By careful consideration of the results of the proposed 
financial model, the project sponsor and the project promoter can arrive at an acceptable and 
a reasonable agreement on the sharing of risks and the terms of the concession.  
Furthermore, the methodology developed in this thesis has contributed in two main 
aspects. It presented a means for valuing of early fund generation option. Also it has 
presented a procedure to calculate equitable bound for guaranteed rate of return for project 
sponsor under uncertainties and risks. The government supports as options should be 
carefully designed and well formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses of the 
contract are more valuable in risky projects. Correct evaluation of the concession in a bidding 
process is essential for government and bidders. 
Options provide flexibility for concession agreement and add value to the project in such 
a way that a specific project with a negative NPV could be acceptable if the value of the 
Options for the concessionaire outweighs the negative value of the NPV. Some of the 
existing or possible Real Options in PPP-BOT concessions as guarantees and financial and 
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incentives supports are minimum revenue guarantee (MRG), tariff/toll guarantee, direct 
capital contributions (e.g. grants, subordinated loans (extra loan)), and concession period 
extension. The existence of this type of guarantees and financial and incentives supports 
makes the concession considerably more attractive for the concessionaire and lenders, 
because it limits the possible adverse results to them. 
The analysis developed in this thesis showed a valuation model of early fund generation 
option. Furthermore, it contributed to assess the project’s financial viability under 
uncertainties and risks by calculating feasible and equitable bound for guaranteed rate of 
return for project sponsor. The results show that by applying the proposed systematic 
negotiation mechanism both public and private sectors could take advantage of its flexibility at 
the negotiation table. The proposed mechanism could facilitate negotiations on the verge of 
break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have been slowed down. 
8.4 Recommendations for Future Work 
The scope of this thesis has been confined to the negotiations between two main parties, 
public and private sectors in development phase and the project evaluation from their standpoint. 
Since this research did not consider third parties, more research is needed to identify and address 
the role of third parties such as insurers, in addition to major and key parties, i.e. public and 
private sectors, lenders and sponsors in PPP-BOT projects. 
Also it is needed to consider and study negotiations in other phases of project life cycle, 
including construction, operation and post-concession phases using game theory. As it was 
discussed in chapter six, Real Options Valuation (ROV), in addition to subsidies (cash 
subsidies), there are sort of government support categories that could be offered to 
240 
 
concessionaire in mainly two forms of guarantees (e.g. minimum revenue guarantee (MRG)) 
and financial and incentives supports (e.g. direct capital contributions). The cost of the 
guarantees must be estimated and compared with the equivalent subsidies in order to 
ascertain which of the approaches are more effective in reducing the project risk and 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW WITH PPP-BOT EXPERTS/ PROJECT MANAGERS 
Part A: General Information of the Respondent 
1. Your organization name 
                                                   
2. Type of your organization. 
 Government     Private Sector   Academic institutes and R&D centres   
NGO 
 Financial institutions / Banks  Insurers  Off-takers  General Contractor 
                                                        
3. Role of your organization in PPP projects. 
 Public Sector  Concessionaire   Investors   Sponsors  Advisor 
 General Contractor  Operators  Lenders  Insurers   Off-takers 
                                                        
4. Please indicate your primary role in your organization. 
 Project Manager   Expert   Advisor   Researcher 
 Engineer/ Designer/contractor/operator  Other, please specify:  
5. Please indicate your primary role in PPP projects. 
 Project Manager   Expert   Advisor   Researcher 
 Engineer/ Designer/contractor/operator  Other, please specify:  
6. How many years of construction industrial-related experiences do you have? 
 5 years or less   6-10 years  11-15 years  16-20 years  21 years or more 
7. How many years have you been involved in PPP projects? 
 5 years or less   6-10 years  11-15 years  16-20 years  21 years or more 
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8. How many PPP projects have you been involved? 
 2 or less  3-4  5-6  7-9  10 or more 
9. In which kind of PPP projects and how many of each have you been involved? (You 
may select more than one answer)? 
 BOT       BOO       BOOT       BTO       
 Others (Please specify):                 
10. In which phases of PPP projects have you been involved? (You may select more than 
one answer)? 
 Development phase (Negotiation and Tender)   Construction phase  
Operation phase  Post-Concession Period  Project Life cycle 
11. What type of PPP projects have you been involved with (You may select more than 
one answer)? 
 Power and Energy   Transportation & Urban infrastructure  Hospital  
Water and Sanitation   IT& Communication   Housing  School & Education  
Police & Prison   Defence & Naval   Others (Please specify):                 
Part B: Current methods and strategic mechanisms for PPP negotiations in 
development phase 
Based on you experiences, please answer the following questions in details. 
1. What are the methods for concessioner selection in tender period (bid process) of PPP 
projects? 
2. Which method is used in your PPP project? 
3. What are the criteria for concessioner selection? 
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4. What is the sequence of negotiations during development phase? 
5. Which concession items are focused in negotiations during development phase? 
6. What are the negotiation parameters that public sector is willing to negotiate on them 
before preferred concessionaire is selected and noticed (before effective date)? 
7. What are the negotiation parameters that private sector is willing to negotiate on them 
before preferred concessionaire is selected and noticed (before effective date)? 
8. What are the negotiation parameters that public sector is willing to negotiate on them 
after preferred concessionaire is selected and noticed (after effective date)? 
9. What are the negotiation parameters that private sector is willing to negotiate on them 
after preferred concessionaire is selected and noticed (after effective date)? 
10. What are the shortcomings and defects of existing concessioner selection methods and 
related criteria? 
11. Which criteria are most important in development phase to success in negotiations? 
12. Did the criteria meet and fulfil the project parties’ objectives? (win-win-win solution for 
public sector, private sector and end-users) 
13. What are the most important negotiation parameters in development phase to success in 
negotiations and achieve the win-win-win solutions? 
14. What are the common negotiation conflicts in PPP projects? 
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15. What are the strategic mechanism that you have taken to find concession items that meet 
main parties’ objectives and interests? 
16. Which incentives and subsidies could be applied and proposed by government in PPP 
concession contract aim to support the project and concessionaire in negotiation? 
Part C: Research Concerns and Methodology 
Section 1: Negotiations Conflicts and Equilibrium Solutions-Game Theory 
Game theory is used in PPP research projects context to simulate negotiations between 
parties involved in the projects. The aim of using the game theory is to analyse the parties’ 
behaviour at various strategies adopted and to find the equilibrium positions which are called 
“Nash equilibrium” and are strategically stable. Based on the rational behaviour assumption, 
no parties want to deviate from these strategically stable solutions. So, knowledge about these 
solutions and positions could facilitate parties to have understanding of PPP negotiations, 
predict opponent’s behaviour and choose strategies that are best response to them. 
Based on the brief introduction on game theory application, please answer the following 
questions. 
1. Please provide the conflicts and challenges that you have encountered in PPP negotiations 
between the concessionaire and the government. 
                                                            Please provide 
the methods that you have employed to overcome these conflicts and find the equilibrium 
solutions in negotiations. 
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2. Are you familiar with the term “game theory” in PPP development systems? 
 Yes  No If your answer to the previous question was yes, 
3. Have you applied “game theory” in any PPP negotiation? 
Yes  No If your answer to the previous question was yes, Please specify the 
problem that game theory has been used to solve it 
                                                             
4. What was the contribution of using the “game theory” in your PPP project? Please specify 
                                                             
5. Which strategies have the most efficient and effective effect on increasing the use of 
“game theory” in PPP practice? (Please select all that can be applied and then rank them) 
 Improve game theory models to better reflect negotiation realities  
 Understand  the type of Game that reflect players’ behaviours  
 Model managerial behaviour by game theory  
 Develop game theory application in development phase of PPP project  
 Develop game theory application in construction phase of PPP project  
 Develop game theory application in operation phase of PPP project  
 Develop heuristics  
 Link game theory earned values to the value of the whole firm  
 Others (Please specify):  
6. Please provide the problems and subjects that you think can be simulate by game theory 
and could be potential future research subjects in: 
Development phase                                                         
Construction phase                                                          
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Operation phase                                                              
Section 2: Prediction and Future Estimation-Simulation 
PPP infrastructure development as long term project is included prediction and future 
estimation under risks and uncertainties. Some methods are developed in literature and have 
been used in practice. The main concerns in these methods are uncertainty modelling and 
assessment. 
7. Please explain the methods that you have employed for prediction and future estimation 
to model and assess the risks and uncertainties in the PPP projects. 
                                                             
8. Please provide the shortcomings and defects of explained methods for prediction and 
future estimation to model and assess the risks and uncertainties in the PPP projects. 
                                                              
9. Are you familiar with the term “Monte Carlo Simulation” in PPP development systems? 
 Yes  No If your answer to the previous question was yes, 
10. Have you applied “Monte Carlo Simulation” in any PPP project? 
Yes  No If your answer to the previous question was yes, Please specify the 
problem that Monte Carlo Simulation has been used to solve it 
                                                             
11. What was the contribution of using the “Monte Carlo Simulation” in your PPP project? 
Please specify                                                              
12. What were the shortcomings and defects of using the “Monte Carlo Simulation” in your 
PPP project? Please specify 
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13. Which method you have employed for risks and uncertainties modelling and assessment 
when you utilized the “Monte Carlo Simulation” technique? Please specify 
                                                             
14. Which strategies have the most efficient and effective effect on increasing the use of 
“Monte Carlo Simulation” in PPP practice? (Please select all that can be applied and then 
rank them) 
 Improve Monte Carlo Simulation to better reflect project risks and uncertainties  
 
 Understand  the type of risks and uncertainties in simulation input   
 Model subjective issues by Simulation   
 Develop heuristics  
 Link Simulation  and game theory to estimate the payoff of game  
 Others (Please specify):  
Section 3: Converges and Arrive at Consensus Solutions-Real Options 
In the case that there is no solution in the negotiation (game) between the concessionaire and 
the government, specifically in negotiations between them in development phase, a 
mechanism which helps to arrive at a consensus solution is needed. By this approach, 
negotiation will not be fruitless and consequently project will success at earliest time and 
lowest transaction cost. 
15. Please explain the conflicts that you have encountered in PPP negotiations between the 
concessionaire and the government which leads to fruitless negotiation. 
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16. Please provide the mechanisms that you have employed to overcome these conflicts and 
to arrive at equilibrium solutions in negotiations. 
                                                                   
17. Are you familiar with the term “Real Options” in PPP development systems? 
 Yes  No If your answer to the previous question was yes, 
18. Have you applied “Real Options” in any PPP contract? 
Yes  No If your answer to the previous question was yes, 
19. What was the contribution of using the “Real Options” in your PPP project? Yes  
No 
20. Which Options do you propose to apply in PPP concession contract aim to arrive at 
solution in negotiation?                           
21. Which strategies have the most efficient and effective effect on increasing the use of 
“Real Options” in PPP practice? (Please select all that can be applied and then rank them) 
 Improve Real Options models to better reflect reality  
 Understand ‘split’ Real Options that are owned by multiple agents  
 Model managerial behaviour  
 Develop heuristics  





APPENDIX 2: WEIGHTED FUZZY-DELPHI TECHNIQUE BASED SURVEY FOR 
RESEARCH ON PPP-BOT PROJECTS 
The aim of this survey is to collect the specific project data that feed the input of life cycle 
simulation based on the weighted Fuzzy-Delphi technique. Please refer to attachment for 
more details on weighted Fuzzy-Delphi technique. 
Briefly, you are asked to provide your estimates (or appraisal) on the key simulation input 
variables (risky and uncertain variables) using the fuzzy numbers, in the form of triangular 
fuzzy numbers T.F.N, or trapezoidal fuzzy numbers (Tr.F.N). For T.F.N, a is the pessimistic 
value, c is the optimistic value and b is the expected value. For Tr.F.N, a is the pessimistic 









Triangular fuzzy number (T. F. N)〈𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐〉 , Trapezoidal fuzzy number  (Tr. F. N) 〈𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑〉 
Simulation input 
There are three main types of simulation model inputs through the life cycle simulation. 
Macroeconomic indicators and indexes, which is depended on the host country economy, 
such as debt capital interest rate, discount rate, inflation rate, demand growth rate (e.g.: traffic 














Fuzzy-Stochastic Variables (FSV), which are appraised based on the past project experiences 
and data or estimated based on the experts’ judgment, such as construction cost, operation 
cost, maintenance cost, etc. Each risky/uncertain parameter follows specific probability 
distribution/membership function.  
Negotiable concession items (NCIs), which are policy parameters, such as concession period, 
tariff/toll design including the initial level of tariff/toll and tariff/toll adjustment scheme, 
construction and operation period, financial return, etc. 
General project information and assumptions 
1. Project name:                                               
2. Project location:                                          
3. Your organization name                                     
4. Role of your organization in PPP projects. 
 Public Sector  Concessionaire   Investors   Sponsors  Advisor  
General Contractor  Operators  Lenders  Insurers   Off-takers 
                                    
5. Please indicate your primary role in PPP projects. 
 Project Manager   Expert   Advisor   Researcher 
 Engineer/ Designer/contractor/operator  Other, please specify:  
6. Which kind of PPP project is adopted for underlying project? 
 BOT       BOO       BOOT       BTO       
 Others (Please specify):                 
7. What is the project status (which phase of PPP project)? 
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 Development phase (Negotiation and Tender)   Construction phase  
Operation phase  Post-Concession Period (Transfer) 
8. What is the type of PPP project? 
 Power and Energy   Transportation & Urban infrastructure  Hospital  
Water and Sanitation   IT& Communication   Housing  School & Education  
Police & Prison   Defence & Naval   Others (Please specify):                 
9. Concession period (years)                ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
10. Construction period(years)                , <     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
11. Operation period(years)                 , <     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
12. Total Project cost ($)                     , <     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
13. Loan details: 
a. Loan interest rate (%)           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
b. Loan repayment period (years)      , <     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
c. Loan commitment fee (%)         ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
d. Loan commission fee (%)         ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
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e. Equity/ Loan ratio:      /     ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
f. Loan repayment reserve account (percentage of yearly interest and principal 
repayment) (%)           ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > 
g. Repayment method of Interest during the construction period 
                
14. Equity (%)                     , <     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > 
15. Loan (%)                     , <     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > 
16. Subsidies (%)                     , <     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
17. Guarantees awarded ($)               , <     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
18. Risk free rate           ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > 
19. Expected equity rate of return (Cost of equity)           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
20. Project discount rate           ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > 
21. Tax details: 
a. Tax rate: (%)                 ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > 
b. Effective year                 
22. Depreciation method                                      
23. Minimum dividend rate                      










regime (%)  
Loan 
investment 







1      
…      
Total 100%     
 Inflation rate (escalation rate)   
 
25. Operation period details (Power Plant project): 
a. Production Capacity (MW) 
b. Energy production (GWh)      from year      to year      of operation 
period, (GWh)      from year      to year      of operation period 
c. Tariff           ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > $/kwh 
d. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs details 
i. Fixed costs          ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > 
(%) percentage of construction costs 
ii. Variable costs           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > $/MWh energy production 
e. Escalation rate of O&M costs           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
f. Other costs           ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > (%) 
percentage of total income 
26. Operation period details (Toll Road project): 
a. Capacity of toll road project(vehicles)           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
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b. Demand (vehicles/day or vehicles/year)           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
c. Toll rate ($/vehicle)           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
d. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs details 
i. Fixed costs          ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    >  
(%) percentage of construction costs 
ii. Variable costs           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > $/vehicle 
e. Escalation rate of O&M costs           ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
f. Other costs           ,<     ,    ,    > , <     ,    ,    ,    > (%) 
percentage of total income 
27. Decision variable-Simulation output (e.g. Financial indicators Criteria) 
a. Concessionaire           , Min      ,<     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
b. Government           ,Min     , <     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
c. Lenders           , Min     , <     ,    ,    > , < 
    ,    ,    ,    > 
28. Which criteria are adopted for bidders’ consideration and selection in development 
phase (before effective date)?                      
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29. Which procedure is adopted to select and nominate preferred concessionaire from the 
project bidders?                      
30. What are the negotiable concession items as policy parameters that are taken for 
bargaining at negotiable table with nominated bidder (concessionaire)? (after effective 
date and before closing date) 
                                                        
31. What is the negotiable concession item that is taken for final negotiation? 
                                                        
32. Which kind of incentives and subsidies are provided by government for this PPP 






APPENDIX 3: IRAN’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION 
ACT (FIPPA) 
The government of Iran welcomes foreign investments and urges all the foreign investors to 
attentively peruse Iran’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA) and 
its executive bylaws to know their own rights and be informed of the facilities and 
protections they may enjoy as well as the legal obligations and requirements caused by 
investing in Iran. In this act, firstly the process of looking into the applications by foreign 
investors to the Investment Organization of Iran is briefly discussed. Then, some articles 
from FIPPA and its bylaws, referring to guarantees given to the investors, their rights, 
facilities granted, the protection extended as well as their commitments and obligations will 
be offered. It is also devoted to entry and registration procedures for foreign investments once 
the investment permit is issued. 
1- The process of examining the applications by foreign investors to the investment 
organization of Iran up to permit issuance 
The foreign investors who would like to make investments in Iran within the framework of 
Iran’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA), need to first fill out a 
special form (available on www.oietai.ir) and submit it to the organization. The application is 
presented by the Investment Organization to the Foreign Investment Council and will be 
pursued until a permit is issued. Choosing the form depends on the type of the foreign 
investment and the agreement concluded between the parties (domestic and foreign 
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investors). The form has to be submitted in English except for when the investor is an Iranian 
expatriate or from Persian-speaking countries like Tajikistan or Afghanistan. 
2- Guarantees and protections 
Foreign Capital is guaranteed against nationalization and expropriation, and in such cases the 
Foreign Investor shall be entitled to receive compensation (Article 9 of the FIPPA). Should 
laws or government regulations lead to prohibition or cessation of approved financial 
agreements within the framework of this Act, then the government shall procure and pay the 
resulting damages (Article 17 of the FIPPA & Article 26 of the bylaws). The purchase of 
goods and producer services of the foreign investment is guaranteed in cases where a state-
run organ is the only buyer or supplier of a product or producer service at a subsidized price 
(Article 11 of the bylaws). 
Rights and facilities 
Foreign investments subject to this Act shall enjoy the same rights, protections and facilities 
available to domestic investments in a non-discriminatory manner (Article 8 of the FIPPA). 
- The Foreign Investment and its profits may be transferred in foreign currency or goods 
(Articles 13-18 of the FIPPA). 
- Acceptance of foreign investments in all the production, industrial, agricultural, 
transportation, communications, and services fields as well as in fields related to water, 
power, and gas supply and energy fields. 
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- The possibility of the referral of investment-related disputes to international authorities 
(Article 19 of the FIPPA). 
- The possibility of land ownership in the name of the company (registered in Iran) in joint 
ventures (Article 24 of the bylaws). 
- Issuance of visas for three years in Iran for foreign investors, managers, experts and their 
immediate family members and the possibility of visa renewals  (Article 20 of the FIPPA & 
Article 35 of the bylaws). 
- The investors are notified of the final decision regarding their applications within at most 45 
days (Article 6 of FIPPA). 
- Having a choice to choose the investment method in the project as FDI or Foreign 
Investment in all sectors within the framework of “Civil Participation”, “Buy-Back” and 
“Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) schemes (Article 3 of FIPPA). 
- Acceptance of investments by any natural or legal non Iranian or Iranian person utilizing 
capital of foreign origin and granting the facilities envisaged in FIPPA to them (Article 1 of 
FIPPA). 
- The foreign investor must choose an audit institute out of the audit institutes recognized by 
the Association of the Official Auditors of Iran to substantiate their financial and annual 
reports (Articles 1, 22-23 of the bylaws). 
3- Legal commitments and obligations of the investors 
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- Applications of Foreign Investors in respect of issues such as admission, importation, 
utilization and repatriation of capital under the FIPPA shall be submitted to the Organization 
shall only be submitted to The Organization and followed up through it (Article 5 of FIPPA). 
- The Organization should be notified of any changes in the name, address, legal shape, or 
nationality of the foreign investor or of changes of more than 30% in his/her ownership 
(Article 33 of the bylaws). 
- It is necessary for the investor to notify the Organization of the transfer of all or part of 
his/her Foreign Capital to other investors. In case of transfer to another foreign investment, it 
is needed to obtain the approval of the Council and the permits from the Organization 
(Article 10 of FIPPA). 
-  All the applications of the foreign investor for transferring the profit, capital and the 
proceeds from the increase in the capital value under FIPPA must be submitted to the 
Organization accompanied by the report of the audit institute that is recognized by the 
Association of the Official Auditors of Iran (Articles 22-23 of the bylaws). 
- The investor is obligated to bring a portion of the capital into Iran to implement the 
approved project over the period of time specified by the foreign investment license which is 
usually 6 months. Otherwise and in order to extend the validity of the license and prevent it 
from being revoked, the investor is required to submit his/her reasons and justifications for 
the delay to the Organization (Article 32 of the bylaws). 
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- The foreign investor is required to announce the entry of its capital including cash and non-
cash items to the Organization within the framework of the license issued for the foreign 
investor so that they will be registered in the Organization and subjected to FIPPA. Failure to 
register the entered capital is tantamount to not being covered by the FIPPA.  (Article 11 of 
the FIPPA & Article 24 of the bylaws). 
- The Iranians who intend to utilize capital of foreign origin in Iran and wish to be subjected 
to FIPPA must be involved an economic and trade activities abroad and need to submit the 
relevant documents to the Organization (Article 5 of the bylaws). 
- Acceptance of foreign investments in the existing Iranian enterprises and economic 
companies (purchase of shares) is possible provide that added value is created in that 
economic unit after the purchase of shares. 
4- Other advantages and facilities 
- Foreign investors can supply a portion of their capital from domestic and international 
sources as loans. Needless to say, the borrower will have to guarantee the repayment of the 
loans received. 
- Foreign capitals can enter the country as cash currency, machinery and pieces of equipment, 
raw materials, technical know-how, and other forms of intellectual property and they will be 
promoted and protected. 
- 80% of the incomes made by the producer and mineral units based in lesser developed 
zones will be exempt from tax for 4 years. 
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- 100% of the incomes made by the producer and mineral units based in lesser developed 
zones will be exempted from tax for 10 years. 
- Tourist installations are exempt from annual tax for 50%. 
- 100% of the income generated by the exporting industrial and agricultural, conversion 
industries goods and their completion are exempt from tax. 
- 50% of the incomes generated by exporting goods aimed at developing the non-oil 
exportations   are exempt from tax. 
- 100% of the incomes generated by exporting transit goods are exempt from tax. 
- Re-investments made by cooperative and private companies aimed at developing, restoring 
and completing industrial and mineral units will be exempt from tax for 50%. 
 
